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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION, AND OBJECTIVES 
Corporate responsibility and sustainability reporting have become much-discussed topics, and 
in the last few decades an abundance of studies and literature about these subjects have 
emerged. The study of corporate responsibility is important, since the role of businesses in 
society has evolved and grown enormously (see, e.g., Mbare, 2007; Ismail, 2009; Mullerat, 
2010; Sastry, 2011; Safwat, 2015) and the awareness of companies’ impacts on the environment 
is constantly increasing (see, e.g., Post, 2011; Medarevic, 2012; Kolk, 2016). Consequently, 
companies need to regularly address issues related to corporate responsibility (see, e.g., Hohnen 
& Potts, 2007; Moravcikova et al., 2015), as well as attempt to seek ways to benefit from 
sustainability (see, e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2006; Gupta & Sharma, 2009; Księżak, 2016). 
Despite the positive progress in terms of quantifying and measuring sustainability performance 
(see, e.g., Weber, 2008; Searcy, 2012; Nicolăescu et al., 2015), sustainability reporting is mostly 
qualitative by nature (see, e.g., Freundlieb & Teuteberg, 2013; Hąbek & Wolniak, 2016; 
Michelon et al., 2015), making it prone to many kinds of influences, both positive and, 
unfortunately, negative. For example, the British newspaper The Guardian reported on their 
website in 2011 about a study carried out by Leeds University, which stated that over 4 000 
companies all over the world had significant defects, such as lacking information, unfounded 
claims, and misleading key figures, in their sustainability reports. This alone gives an excellent 
reason to continue studying corporate responsibility, sustainability reporting, and, especially, 
the assurance of the reported information which could very well be the key to significantly 
improve the quality of companies’ sustainability disclosures.  
Indeed, sustainability assurances – i.e. conducting and reporting on an external audit which 
evaluates the credibility, accuracy and relevance of non-financial information reported by 
companies – have become a popular topic in the field of corporate responsibility in recent years. 
Studies regarding the assurance process and the resulting reports have emerged slowly after the 
turn of the millennium (among the first ones, e.g., Wallage, 2000), but the amount has increased 
notably from around 2010 onwards. So far, studies regarding sustainability assurances have 
mainly focused on the state of and challenges associated with assurance reporting (see, e.g., 
Anttila, 2013; Mäki-Rahko, 2013; Immonen, 2016; Ackers, 2017; Velte & Stawinoga, 2017), 
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as well as the drivers behind companies’ decisions to request assurance (see, e.g., Kolk & 
Perego, 2010; Sierra et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero & García-Sánchez, 2017). 
Some studies have also discussed the quality of assurance reports (see, e.g., Owen & O’Dwyer, 
2004; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Zorio et al, 2013; Romero et al., 2014; Damen, 2016), but there 
seems to be no consensus on how the quality should be defined and measured.  
Besides scholars, both companies and their stakeholders have shown a growing interest towards 
assurance reporting. Increasingly, companies are requesting external sustainability assurance, 
and stakeholders, in turn, are requesting companies to present the resulting assurance reports 
(see, e.g., Bepari & Mollik, 2016; Kaya, 2017; Braam & Peeters, 2018). There may be many 
explanations for this trend, but the most significant seems to be the claimed improving effect 
of assurances on the quality of companies’ sustainability disclosures in general (see, e.g., 
Sheldon, 2016). Whether the quality of those disclosures is, in fact, improved, is yet to be 
properly ascertained, as the evidence so far is mostly mixed, and rudimentary at best (see, e.g., 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Plufgrath et al., 2011; Moroney et al., 2012; Cho et al., 2014; Casey & 
Grenier, 2015). Additionally, it seems that the reliability of assurance reporting – and thus its 
possible positive effects on sustainability disclosures – has been questioned, as the assurance 
system lacks regulation, robustness, consistency, supervision, and a standardized form for 
assurance reports (see, e.g., Dando & Swift, 2003; Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009). 
Despite the shortcomings of the current assurance system, engaging in an assurance process is 
still an increasingly important part of companies’ reporting of non-financial information. It 
would then seem logical that a high-quality assurance report would influence a company more 
positively than a low-quality assurance report. This view is slightly debated, however, since the 
mere presentation of an assurance report – with no regard to its quality – has been claimed 
sufficient in increasing company value, as stakeholders do not necessarily have the expertise to 
analyze the quality of assurance reports (Salman & Van Staden, 2016). This sounds plausible 
for now, but the situation is constantly evolving, as assurance reports become more common 
and knowledge of them improves. Therefore, the quality of assurance reports is a topic that 
should not be overlooked.  
While some previous studies have taken a concern in assurance report quality, studies regarding 
the regulation of assurance reporting are alarmingly scarce. Perhaps the most significant study 
of this subject to date focused on the effects of the sustainability-related King III report on the 
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assurance reporting practices in South Africa (see Ackers and Eccles, 2015). The study found 
that the regulation, while not entirely forcing, increased the number of sustainability assurances 
significantly. Similar results would not be surprising in the context of this study, either. It was 
also found that the voluntary assurance practices had resulted in inconsistencies in the assurance 
processes, thus reducing stakeholders’ ability to understand the contents of assurance reports. 
Ackers and Eccles indicated that an improved sustainability assurance regime could improve 
the situation. Since the study was conducted only in the context of a single country – and 
remains one of the very few contributions to assess the effects of regulation on assurance 
reporting – more findings about the subject are required. The need for studying assurance 
reporting from a regulatory perspective is, indeed, strongly underlined, as proper findings can 
help authorities better regulate and supervise the assurance system. This issue is becoming more 
apparent now that many countries around the world – most notably in the EU and Asia – have 
showed a strong notion towards following the examples set by South Africa and France, the 
only two countries where assurance reporting has been significantly regulated for years.  
The regulation regarding assurances in France – known as the Grenelle II Act – is very similar 
to its equivalent in South Africa in terms of assurance reporting. Both regulations are rather 
loose on assurances and consist of broader sets of regulations relating to sustainability 
disclosures in general. Companies affected are only required to present an independent third-
party report of an assurance engagement conducted by that third party as part of their annual 
report, but the contents of the assurance reports are essentially not regulated at all. Previous 
studies have indicated that the absence of proper regulation and supervision tends to result in a 
wide variety of assurance practices and reports (e.g., Hui & Bowrey, 2010; Ackers & Eccles, 
2015; Alon & Vidovic, 2015), thus maybe adding little value to companies’ sustainability 
disclosures over time and even contradicting some of the major accounting principles, such as 
consistency, comparability, and materiality. In any case, the importance of providing new 
information on both the quality and the regulation of assurance reporting is underlined, so that 
the desired improvements in the quality of companies’ sustainability disclosures can be pursued 
with adequate knowhow and in an appropriate regulatory environment. The aspects of 
assurance reporting quality and regulation are significant to assurance providers, as well, since 
their role is becoming increasingly more important (Ackers, 2009) and the demand for their 
services is therefore likely to increase and depend on the quality of their work.  
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The purpose of this study is to produce knowledge about how the quality of non-financial 
assurance reporting is associated with voluntary and mandatory contexts – in this case, Finland 
and France, respectively – especially in the case of large companies. In addition, this study 
discusses whether – and possibly, how – the change of context from voluntary to mandatory 
has affected assurance reporting in France. Finland, where assurance reporting is entirely 
voluntary, acts as a counterpart to France for a comparative assessment. To assess the quality 
of assurance reports, this study uses previous findings and contributions to assemble the most 
comprehensive set of indicators for measuring assurance reporting quality to date. This set of 
measures can be utilized and further improved in future studies.  
Overall, this study should provide interesting findings that can help explain and understand the 
quality of non-financial assurance reports. In addition, it may also provide indications regarding 
the effectiveness of assurance-related regulations, although these effects cannot be stated with 
absolute certainty due to the applied research method. In addition to its other contributions, this 
study will specifically present a broad, yet detailed assessment of the state of assurance 
reporting of some of the largest companies both in Finland and France. The findings of this 
study should be easily expandable in future studies.  
 
1.2 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study focuses on 25 very large publicly listed companies by market capitalization in the 
stock exchanges of both countries – i.e. the Paris and Helsinki stock exchanges – thus including 
50 companies in total. The number of companies included should be enough for scientifically 
relevant findings. A higher number would, of course, be better, but that would have resulted in 
either exceeding the scope of a master’s thesis or diluting the thoroughness of assessment per 
company. Including only very large companies is likely to tell a mere part of a multifaceted 
story, as the regulation in France applies to hundreds of companies of various sizes, i.e. all 
companies listed in the Paris stock exchange and certain unlisted large companies. However, 
the additional work needed to examine the subject phenomenon with an adequate number of 
companies representing multiple size categories would have also exceeded the scope of this 
study. The reasoning behind which companies were ultimately included, are presented in the 
third main section of this document.  
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The examined period spans from 2010 to 2015, so that it covers periods both before and after 
the gradual implementation of the Grenelle II Act – which includes the regulation regarding 
assurance reporting – in France. Since the Grenelle II Act applies to all listed companies in the 
Paris stock exchange, it is irrelevant whether the examined companies in this study are, in fact, 
headquartered in France. The same decision was made regarding the companies selected from 
the Helsinki stock exchange, as well. Specifying this detail may prove to be relevant, as possible 
country-specific differences in assurance reporting practices could be present in the gathered 
data (see Braam & Peeters, 2018). These differences, if noticed and in any way relevant in the 
context of this study, will be pointed out later when results are presented and discussed.  
This study focuses on Finland and France for two reasons. First, the effect of regulation on 
assurance reports in South Africa – the other of the two countries with a relatively long history 
of assurance-related regulation – has, as was previously indicated, already been subject to a 
similar study. Therefore, focusing on France is likely to offer a more original and fruitful point 
of view. Second, Finland was chosen as the unregulated counterpart to France mainly due to 
both countries having a similar history in terms of average rates of assured reports before the 
examined period, according to a 2012 joint report by the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) and the Net Balance Foundation. Being members of the European Union 
(EU) – and thus affected by its general regulations – was considered to further enforce the 
suitability of these two countries in terms of a comparison. While a handful of other countries 
might have also been equally suitable, Finland was ultimately considered the most natural 
choice, due to its familiarity to the person responsible for this research.  
The aspect of quality is the main interest of this study, but quantity is also included in the 
assessment, as the Grenelle II Act allows companies to not actually present assurance reports 
but instead explain why they chose to not comply. Moreover, the regulation is not enforced by 
sanctions of any kind if a company fails to both comply and explain. It is, then, also interesting 
to explore how the largest companies in France have approached the new mandatory – but, in 
practice, not forcing – regulation, and reflect the results on the partially similar study conducted 
in the context of South Africa, which was discussed earlier in Section 1.1.  
While this study is a pioneer in the comparative research of assurance reporting between 
voluntary and mandatory contexts, the limited scope of the study does not allow for drawing 
far-reaching conclusions and generalizations about the subject. Therefore, it should be noted 
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that the objective of this study is not to provide a definitive set of findings on the examined 
subject, but rather produce useful and interesting implications for future studies which can be 
then conducted more efficiently and on a broader scale.  
It is also worth noting that perhaps the only major challenge of this study is forming a valid and 
applicable definition of quality in this context, as there is no consensus and very few established 
practices to lean on. However, two major attempts to construct suitable scoring criteria to 
indicate the level of quality of assurance reports have been made (see Kolk & Perego, 2012; 
Zorio et al, 2013), and a few other studies have associated certain additional characteristics of 
assurance reports with overall report quality. Both the issue of assessing the quality of assurance 
reports, as well as how previous findings and contributions regarding the subject are utilized in 
this study, are further discussed in Section 2.3 of this document.  
 
1.3 STRUCTURE 
This study consists of six main sections, excluding the references and the appendices. The 
introduction is followed by an extensive theoretical background which is constructed by using 
the contributions of previous studies and other notable literature, as well as other possible 
sources considered credible and relevant for the study of a relatively new and very current 
subject, such as the assurance of non-financial information. The theoretical background consists 
of two main parts. The first part establishes the larger contextual frame for this study by 
discussing corporate responsibility and sustainability reporting in general, with special 
emphasis on both Finland and France. The second part provides an in-depth view into assurance 
reporting, a specific part of sustainability reporting and the core phenomenon of this study.  
In the third main section, the research method and data, as well as the research questions, will 
be presented and discussed. The fourth section will present the results in detail by using 
descriptive commentary, accompanied by graphs and tables when appropriate. The penultimate 
section is dedicated to discussing the results, and the conclusions are presented in the closing 
section, along with a critical assessment of the results and implications for future studies. The 
sources and appendices are included after the concluding section. The appendices contain the 
complete tabulated data collected for this study.   
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
2.1.1 The concept of corporate responsibility 
The ideological foundation of corporate responsibility can be rooted in the famous writings by 
Andrew Carnegie at the end of the 19th century (e.g., Wulfson, 2001; Lolescu, 2010), a Scottish-
American industrialist pioneer, who underlined the responsibility of the rich to develop the 
society (see Carnegie, 1889). It took, however, nearly half a century for the academic discussion 
and debate around the subject to begin, when the 1932 Harvard Law Review Symposium, which 
discussed the legality of sacrificing profits of businesses for the improvement of surrounding 
societies, first received significant attention from scholars (Reinhardt et al., 2008).  
In the 1950s, the discussion began to gain traction among economists (Ismail, 2009), possibly 
due to the landmark book “Social Responsibilities of the Businessman” by Howard Bowen 
(Carroll, 1999). Following the spirit of Bowen’s writings, Davis (1960) considered corporate 
responsibility to refer to the activities undertaken by companies at least partially for reasons 
beyond economic gain. In the 1970s, the debate expanded further (Secchi, 2007) with the help 
of, among others, Milton Friedman’s famous article “The Social Responsibility of Business Is 
to Increase Its Profits” (Reinhardt et al., 2008). At the end of the 1970s, the discussion briefly 
culminated in the form of new legislation in the United States, helping create major official 
bureaus, such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), whose role was to enforce corporate 
responsibility in action (Carroll, 1999). It was not until the late 1990s, however, that the idea of 
corporate responsibility became widely promoted by all constituents of society (Lee, 2008).  
Despite the apparent development, the notion of corporate responsibility has been vividly 
debated to this day, and the search for a business case for the concept has increased among 
academics, as well as businesses and their stakeholders (e.g., Kurucz et al., 2008; Carroll & 
Shabana, 2010). Consequently, the concept of corporate responsibility has evolved to include 
parts from multiple theoretical frames, such as the theory of business ethics (e.g., Carroll, 1999), 
stakeholder theory (e.g., Branco & Rodrigues, 2007; Brown & Forster, 2013), legitimacy theory 
 8 
 
(e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005), and institutional theory (see, e.g., Campbell, 2007; Brammer et al., 
2012). In addition, the evolution of the concept has seemingly affected its name, as well. While 
the term “corporate social responsibility” – or “CSR” – has historically been the most common 
and is still broadly used, many are now simply referring to the concept as “corporate 
responsibility” or “CR” (for example, the well-known and currently biennial KPMG Surveys 
of Corporate Responsibility Reporting). This is most likely due to the latter emphasizing, at 
least ostensibly, the responsibilities of a company in more than merely social perspectives. This 
is also why “corporate responsibility” is the preferred version of the term in this document, 
although the apparent semantics of the concept bear little to no effect on the actual study.  
Despite the massive and rapid evolution that the concept of corporate responsibility has 
experienced (Cochran, 2007), the perceptions of it remain dispersed, as a common definition is 
yet to be established (see, e.g., Dahlsrud, 2006). This is most likely due to new studies and 
findings constantly emerging from the academic field, as well as businesses having their own 
views on the subject (see, e.g., Moir, 2001). The difficulties related to measuring corporate 
responsibility (see, e.g., Aupperle et al., 1985; Turker, 2009) have likely impaired the tangibility 
of the concept and thus affected its perception, as well. This situation is changing, even if 
slowly, as in the last couple of decades various sets of measures have been constructed (see, 
e.g., Márquez & Fombrun, 2005; Turker, 2009; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012), although the 
measurement systems have been criticized for having no systematic basis (Hopkins, 2005a). In 
any case, the lack of both a commonly established definition as well as inadequate performance 
measures have understandably garnered the attention of vocal critics (see, e.g., Hopkins, 
2005b). The concept of corporate responsibility has also been criticized from other aspects as 
well, such as being based on false beliefs and oversimplifying issues (e.g., Henderson, 2001), 
a mere public relations exercise (e.g., Frynas, 2005), and a distraction from actual business 
practices for companies to abuse at their convenience (e.g., Horrigan, 2010).  
The development of corporate responsibility as a concept, as well as the associated critique, are 
highly debated and massively more detailed than presented here. Since these issues are not the 
focus of this study and add only limited value to establishing an appropriate theoretical frame 
in this context, they will not be discussed further. For those who are interested, analytical views 
into the history of as well as key issues and debates regarding corporate responsibility are 
provided by, for example, Broomhill (2007), Secchi (2007), Carroll (2008), and Lee (2008).  
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Three additional points about the concept will be made, however. First, whatever the truths 
behind the meaning and materialization of corporate responsibility may be, it has become a part 
of business that is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid (Hohnen, 2007). Consequently, perhaps, 
the discussion around the subject seems to have shifted from “whether” to “how” (e.g., Smith, 
2003; Du et al., 2007). While it may be a major challenge for companies (e.g., Lacy et al., 
2009), some have found ways to integrate corporate responsibility into their strategy and 
operations as a value-adding element that can be decisively managed, developed, and used as a 
competitive advantage for economic benefit (see, e.g., Jamali, 2007; Maon et al., 2009; 
Vilanova et al., 2009; Bernardo et al., 2012). Thus, it seems that companies should consider 
corporate responsibility as an investment in their future rather than a mere cost with no benefit.  
Second, still, in 2018, corporate responsibility seems as vividly discussed and debated as ever. 
Its role in the activities of businesses seems to only increase rather than diminish, thus – at least 
for the time being – contradicting the views of it being only a passing phenomenon. Third, and 
lastly, three influential definitions, which illustrate the relationships of the most essential 
responsibilities of companies, will be briefly presented and discussed next to maintain a logical 
train of thought going towards sustainability reporting and, eventually, assurance reporting.  
 
2.1.2 Essential definitions of corporate responsibility 
Despite a plethora of variations, most definitions of corporate responsibility throughout history 
have followed similar spirit of businesses having also other responsibilities than economic, and 
mainly only the emphasis between those responsibilities has varied depending on the prevailing 
era (Rahman, 2011). While the early discussion focused mostly on the social responsibilities of 
companies, as the previous subsection indicated, gradually, environmental views were attached 
to the idea of corporate responsibility, as well. Consequently, in 1971, the United States 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) developed a clear definition that demonstrated 
the relationship between the economic, social, and environmental responsibilities of businesses. 
This definition was illustrated with three concentric circles (see Figure 1 on the next page), 
where the core circle consisted of economic perspectives, such as growth and jobs, the mid-
level circle of considering social values in achieving economic objectives, and the outer circle 
of the responsibility of businesses to consider and develop the environment of the society.   
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FIGURE 1. THE THREE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF CSR 
(AFTER CED, 1971) 
 
 
The second definition to be discussed in this document was developed by Archie B. Carroll, an 
American researcher of corporate responsibility, who has become one of the most acclaimed 
contributors in his field. In 1991, Carroll argued that the idea of corporate responsibility as 
being merely economic was not practical, and that maximizing economic profit needed to occur 
by also obeying the law and being a good, ethical corporate citizen. Carroll demonstrated his 
definition with a pyramid (see Figure 2 on the next page) that has since become one of the most 
popular presentations of the main responsibilities of businesses (Visser, 2006). The pyramid 
consisted of four levels and was based on the idea that businesses had not only economic and 
legal obligations, but ethical and philanthropic obligations, as well. The pyramid had a 
hierarchy, though, with economic responsibility being the most important, followed by legal, 
ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities, in that specific order. The pyramid, then, seemingly 
attempts to reconcile social expectations with the traditional emphasis on maximizing profits, 
which is considered rather ideal in terms of the pragmatic considerations of managing corporate 
responsibility (Geva, 2008).   
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FIGURE 2. THE PYRAMID OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(AFTER CARROLL, 1991) 
 
 
The third definition that has gained widespread attention, can be rooted in the 1992 United 
Nations’ Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the “Rio Earth 
Summit”, where Agenda 21, a programme for specific action plans to materialize sustainable 
development at national, regional, and international levels, was formed. While a clear definition 
was never explicitly presented in the report of the summit, Kahn (1995), among others, argued 
that the Agenda 21 paradigm rested, in fact, on top of three pillars, i.e. economic, social, and 
environmental responsibilities (see Figure 3 on the next page). This illustration was, however, 
very similar in spirit to the concept of the “triple bottom line” by John Elkington, who, in 1994, 
had already argued that sustainable development consisted of three equal principles, or “bottom 
lines”, i.e. economic, social, and environmental bottom lines. A fourth pillar, culture, has also 
been suggested as an addition (see, e.g., Hawkes, 2001), but this notion is yet to gain a common 
foothold. In any case, the idea of equally significant economic, social, and environmental 
responsibilities has gained widespread acknowledgement, although it has been criticized for its 
difficult realization in practice (see, e.g., Sridhar, 2013).  
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FIGURE 3. THE THREE PILLARS OF SUSTAINABILITY 
(AFTER UNITED NATIONS’ AGENDA 21, 1992) 
 
 
Although the definition based on the three pillars – or, alternatively, bottom lines – consists of 
similar responsibilities as the one based on the three concentric circles, it can be argued that 
they have significant differences. While the three pillars present economic, social, and 
environmental responsibilities as equals, the three concentric circles imply a hierarchy, where 
the environment sets limits to the activities of the society, and the society to the activities of 
businesses. Indeed, in the model of the three concentric circles, companies who are maximizing 
their profits can be perceived as parts of their societies, and the societies, on the other hand, as 
parts of their environments. Due to the apparent hierarchy, the three concentric circles seem, 
then, similar in spirit to the pyramid of corporate responsibility rather than the three pillars of 
sustainability, despite consisting of slightly different classification of responsibilities. While 
none of the three definitions presented here are particularly complex, the model based on the 
three pillars is considered the easiest to understand, and is, perhaps consequently, the most 
widespread of all the definitions of corporate responsibility (Kemp & Martens, 2007; 
Moravcikova et al., 2015).  
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The model of the three pillars bears similarities to a later definition of corporate responsibility, 
namely the “three-domain approach” by Schwartz and Carroll (2003). The approach is based 
on the idea of equal responsibilities, as well, but emphasizes their interconnectedness and was 
illustrated with three intersecting circles of economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities. These 
circles formed a figure with areas consisting purely of the aforementioned responsibilities, as 
well as areas where the responsibilities were overlapping with either one or both of the other 
responsibilities. While this model of corporate responsibility is, perhaps, as well-known as the 
one illustrated with the pillars, the latter was chosen to be illustrated instead, as it better 
contrasts with the two approaches illustrated first. However, despite their contrast, it should be 
noted that this study considers none of the discussed definitions as better or worse than the 
others. They all have their benefits and disadvantages – both in theory and practice – and are 
equally essential to understanding the differences and depth of the various views regarding 
corporate responsibility, which was the purpose of this subsection.  
Lastly, before proceeding to the next subsection, it is noteworthy that in the model of the three 
pillars, the top is often referred to as “sustainability” instead of “corporate social responsibility”, 
thus differing from the other two illustrated definitions. While these terms – and any of their 
similar variants, such as “corporate sustainability” or “corporate accountability” – are often 
used interchangeably almost with no regard to the context, they do differ from each other (see, 
e.g., Ebner & Baumgartner, 2006; Montiel, 2008). These differences may be best illustrated 
simply with the definition of sustainability in the context of business. While no universally cited 
definition exists, it is still often acknowledged that sustainability means development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. This definition was published by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1987 as part of their report titled “Our common future”, also known 
as the “Brundtland Report”. If corporate responsibility and sustainability were, in fact, 
synonymous, the definition of corporate responsibility would obviously be the same and much 
less debated. Another way to describe the relationship of these two terms is based on the model 
of the three pillars which seems to imply that responsible actions with respect to all three bottom 
lines will lead to sustainability. In any case, understanding the relationship between corporate 
responsibility and sustainability is not imperative for understanding the phenomenon examined 
in this study, but it helps comprehend the discussion that has played an enormous role in 
pushing companies towards sustainability reporting, the topic of the next subsection.  
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2.1.3 The development of sustainability reporting 
The company activities related to corporate responsibility are nowadays usually documented in 
the form of reports, the purpose of which is to communicate relevant information regarding 
organizational sustainability performance to internal and external stakeholders. The reports are 
often published alongside or integrated in annual reports (Idowu & Towler, 2004). The 
integrated reporting format can be considered slightly better, as it may improve the connection 
between sustainability performance and financial indicators (Clayton et al., 2015). The contents 
of sustainability reports are generally not regulated and may vary depending on multiple factors, 
such as industry (Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008) and scale of operations (Schreck & Raithel, 
2015; Wang, 2017). Sustainability reports, perhaps reflecting the multifaceted nature of the 
underlying concept of corporate responsibility discussed in the previous subsection, are called 
by many names such as CSR reports, responsibility reports, or sustainability reports, the last 
which will be mostly used throughout this document, due to it being preferred in the renowned 
sustainability reporting guidelines by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).  
The first corporate responsibility report that included other than economic perspectives was 
published at the beginning of the 1970s when an American research company Abt Associates 
attached an environmental report to their annual financial report (Tepper Marlin & Tepper 
Marlin, 2003). The first report that included social as well as economic and environmental 
aspects was published by Shell Canada in 1991 called “Progress Toward Sustainable 
Development” (Baker, 2003). Since then, sustainability reporting has increased and evolved 
massively. For example, according to a 2017 report by KPMG, sustainability reporting has 
become a standard practice for large companies around the world and across industries (see 
KPMG, 2017). The most significant reason for this seems to be the demands of the companies’ 
various external stakeholders, such as regulators, activists, and unions, who expect companies 
to be increasingly transparent as well as measure, report, and develop their sustainability 
performance (Tsoutsoura, 2004; Ali et al, 2017). Studies have also shown that the 
comprehensiveness, depth and details of reports have also notably evolved (see, e.g., Perez & 
Sanchez, 2009; Leszczynska, 2012). However, the contents and the quality of these reports may 
vary significantly (see, e.g., Dilling, 2010; Hąbek & Wolniak, 2016), although almost always 
the disclosures revolve around the three main dimensions of sustainability – economic, social, 
and environmental dimensions – which were discussed previously in Section 2.1.2. 
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Besides external pressure, there are many other reasons for companies to engage in 
sustainability reporting. These underlying drivers can be illustrated using perspectives provided 
by various theoretical bases and frameworks used for explaining both corporate responsibility 
and sustainability reporting, most importantly legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, as well 
as institutional theory and signalling theory, among others. Of these theories, legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory, and institutional theory focus mostly on social aspects of companies’ 
operations, whereas the others are mostly concerned with directly economic aspects.  
Legitimacy theory assumes that there is a social contract between companies and the societies 
in which the companies operate (Deegan, 2002). Legitimacy theory thus draws partially from 
the social contract theory which, in turn, originates from moral and political philosophy. In line 
with this theoretical basis, legitimacy theory explains corporate responsibility and disclosures 
thereof as mechanisms that provide accountability to satisfy stakeholders and thus allow 
companies to continue their operations with stakeholder approval (Mitchell et al., 2005). 
Stakeholder theory is similar to legitimacy theory in that it is concerned with the relationship 
between companies and their stakeholders. However, stakeholder theory specifically assumes 
that companies are socially accountable to their stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 2005). Therefore, 
companies may engage in sustainability reporting to fulfill their accountability obligations 
towards their stakeholders (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014). Institutional theory, on the other 
hand, explains sustainability disclosures as methods for companies to achieve similarity with 
each other, by adopting practices considered normal by the surrounding societies or only 
specific, powerful stakeholder groups (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014).  
While the aforementioned three theories have some similarities, signalling theory, on the other 
hand, focuses more on pure company self-interest. It explains why sustainability disclosures 
are necessary for companies to efficiently attract investment capital (Omran & Ramdhony, 
2015). Companies can disclose, i.e. signal, sustainability information to reduce information 
asymmetries and uncertainties, which, in turn, may increase the company price in the eyes of 
the investors and decrease the price of external capital (Connelly et al., 2011).  
While the theoretical perspectives on both corporate responsibility and sustainability reporting 
are vast and interesting topics, they are not discussed further in this document, as it would add 
very little additional value in this context. Later in Section 2.2.2, however, the theoretical 
perspectives regarding assurance reporting specifically are discussed in detail.  
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Sustainability reporting has also garnered criticism due to, for example, its perceived lack of 
relevance and credibility (Husillos et al., 2011) and failure to impact sustainable development 
(Gray, 2010). In addition, and perhaps most famously, Friedman (1970) argues that company 
management have a responsibility only to maximize the company’s profits, and spending 
money to pursue anything else would be irresponsible. While this kind of critique is important, 
it is difficult to agree that sustainability reporting is simply irresponsible or a waste of resources, 
especially when a positive link between sustainability disclosures and company value have been 
found in various contexts (see, e.g., Loh et al., 2017). However, for sustainability reporting to 
add value consistently independent of the context, it needs to evolve further.  
To help with the evolution of sustainability reporting, specific guidelines for sustainability 
disclosures have been developed. Perhaps the most important landmark in this context to date 
are the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), an 
independent non-profit organization established in 1997 in cooperation with the United 
Nations’ Environment Programme (UNEP). The objective of the GRI is to create a common 
framework for sustainability reporting with comprehensive reporting standards. Considering 
that applying these standards is purely voluntary, they can be considered a major success, as 
they are widely utilized by organizations around the world. The GRI Guidelines were originally 
published in 2000 and have been further developed and updated ever since.  
While no globally applicable regulations for sustainability reporting exist, in the EU, significant 
steps forward have been taken in recent years. Indeed, the 2014 EU Directive on disclosure of 
non-financial and diversity information is now effective, and the first reports in accordance with 
this Directive are published in 2018. The Directive is expected to strengthen the accountability 
of approximately 6 000 companies in the EU, by imposing various requirements regarding, for 
example, the reporting of environmental, social, human rights, and anti-corruption matters. 
Furthermore, companies are encouraged to utilize recognized reporting frameworks, such as 
the GRI Guidelines. Although the Directive in the EU is a pioneer in terms of sustainability 
reporting regulation, dozens of countries worldwide have introduced voluntary sustainability 
reporting guidelines in their regulatory schemes, often based on the GRI Guidelines1.  
                                                 
1 According to “Carrots & Sticks – Global trends in sustainability reporting regulation and policy”, a joint 2016 
report by KPMG International, GRI, UNEP, and the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa.  
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While the aforementioned EU Directive is likely to have a notable role in the current reporting 
practices of many large companies in Europe, it has only little to do with this specific study, as 
the examined period ends well before the Directive became effective. Also, the Directive does 
not impose requirements regarding external assurance, although it states that countries in the 
EU can require such assurance if they so choose. Therefore, discussion regarding the Directive 
is only limited in this document and serves as a background for a more detailed presentation of 
voluntary and mandatory reporting contexts which will be the topic of the next subsection.  
 
2.1.4 Voluntary vs. mandatory sustainability reporting 
Before the 2014 EU Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information became 
effective, only very few countries in the world – most notably France and South Africa – had 
mandatory sustainability reporting regimes in effect. In addition, certain groups of companies 
in Sweden, Malaysia, the UK, and Japan, for example, were also already required to publish 
sustainability disclosures to a certain extent. The aforementioned EU Directive now requires 
all countries in the EU to have a mandatory reporting regime in effect as per the Directive’s 
requirements. However, its actual effects on sustainability reporting are mostly unknown, as 
the Directive has only been in effect for a very short time. In any case, it should be noted that 
naturally more information is available about voluntary contexts than mandatory contexts. 
Despite this, evidence from both contexts are presented as evenly as possible in this subsection.  
In voluntary contexts, sustainability disclosures are often part of companies’ political or social 
strategies and may be of higher quality than in mandatory contexts (Hung et al., 2015). In 
addition, voluntary reporting is often favored, as sustainability reporting is expensive, and it is 
difficult for regulators to determine what data should be disclosed and how its reporting should 
be monitored (Lydenberg et al., 2010). At this point, it should be noted that determinants 
explaining companies’ tendencies to engage in sustainability reporting include company size, 
visibility, and scale of operations, as well as industry (Udayasankar, 2007; Gamerschlag et al., 
2011; Kansal et al., 2014). In addition, local embeddedness, corporate governance, and internal 
motivation may also explain a company’s sustainability-related activities (Blombäck & Wigren, 
2009). These findings seem to indicate that the quantity and quality of sustainability disclosures 
may be higher among companies that are best aligned with the aforementioned determinants.  
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However, the voluntary nature of sustainability reporting and the lack of a globally recognized 
standard according to which these reports should be prepared seem to be the main reasons for 
inconsistent – and often incomparable – content and quality of sustainability reports (Hąbek & 
Wolniak, 2016). It is unsurprising, then, that studies have also found evidence that mandatory 
reporting may lead to improvements in disclosure quality compared to voluntary contexts (see, 
e.g., Crawford & Williams, 2010). Indeed, mandatory reporting may have the potential to 
address challenges associated with voluntary reporting, such as variance regarding reported 
time periods and indicators, as well as reporting formats (Lydenberg et al., 2010). In other 
words, mandatory regulation may lead to an overall improvement in sustainability reporting 
quality (e.g., Hąbek & Wolniak, 2016; Wang et al., 2017). It also seems that companies affected 
by mandatory sustainability regulation are increasingly likely to voluntarily request 
sustainability assurance (see Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017).  
Regulation can be a double-edged sword, though: it may increase reporting quantity, but it could 
also limit the companies’ opportunities to distinguish themselves in the market (Hąbek & 
Wolniak, 2016). It is also noteworthy that implementing a mandatory reporting regime, without 
specifying a minimum set of reported key performance indicators (KPIs), likely results in 
increased, but incomparable, disclosures (Lydenberg et al., 2010). All in all, it seems that both 
contexts have their benefits and disadvantages, and this needs to be considered by regulatory 
and market authorities concerned with the future and development of sustainability reporting.  
 
2.1.5 Sustainability reporting in Finland and France 
As the focal point of this study considers both Finland and France, it is appropriate to present a 
brief, focused assessment of the state sustainability reporting in both of these countries. In terms 
of pure quantity, based on the information presented in the last four KPMG Surveys of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting (see KPMG, 2011; KPMG, 2013; KPMG, 2015; KPMG, 
2017), the average rate of sustainability reporting among the top 100 companies in Finland 
between 2011-2015 has been approximately 81 %, whereas the respective amount in France 
has been around 96 %. The KPMG reports also reveal that the rates in France have been among 
the highest in the world during the last decade, whereas the respective rates in Finland have 
only been slightly above the global average.  
 19 
 
According to a 2016 report by PwC, sustainability reporting has a solid foundation among large 
Finnish companies, who seem committed to voluntary international guidelines and standards, 
such as the GRI Guidelines. However, it seems that the growth of sustainability reporting has 
stagnated in recent years, possibly due to a lack of sustainability-related initiatives, which has 
raised concerns about the state of sustainability reporting in Finland. In the future, it will be 
interesting to see, how the EU Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information affects the reporting of Finnish companies – both directly and indirectly.  
In France, on the other hand, a number of initiatives aimed at increasing the range of corporate 
responsibility have been introduced (Wolniak & Hąbek, 2013). Already in 2002, certain 
companies were required to report on various social, environmental, and governance indicators. 
In 2011, the Grenelle I Act became effective, introducing reporting requirements regarding 
greenhouse gases for large companies with high emissions (Wolniak & Hąbek, 2013). The 
Grenelle II Act – effective already in 2012 with a progressive timetable – built upon the 
Grenelle I to introduce a vast and comprehensive sustainability-related regulation, affecting all 
listed companies and certain, large unlisted companies. These companies are required to report 
on a broad set of sustainability indicators which must be integrated in the annual report and 
verified by an independent third-party. If a company fails to do so, it is required to explain why. 
Interestingly, though, the regulation is not enforced with any kind of sanctions, which raises 
concerns about the effectiveness of the regulation in practice. However, the Grenelle II Act 
seems to be only a beginning which will have to be rewritten and improved (Wolniak, 2013).  
All in all, it should be noted that the Grenelle II is a vast and nuanced law. Therefore, in this 
document, only the most important parts in terms of this study are presented. For a more 
comprehensive presentation and discussion, refer to, for example, an official 2012 document2 
about Grenelle II by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France or a 2012 report3 by the Business 
for Social Responsibility (BSR), a global nonprofit organization. In any case, now that a broad, 
overall context has been established, it is time to discuss the assurance of non-financial 
information, the specific phenomenon with which this study is concerned.   
                                                 
2 “The French legislation on extra-financial reporting: built on consensus” by the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 
(the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France), published in December 2012. The document can be accessed via 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Mandatory_reporting_built_on_consensus_in_France.pdf.  
3 “The Five W’s of France’s CSR Reporting Law” by the BSR, published in July 2012. The report can be accessed 
via https://www.bsr.org/reports/The_5_Ws_of_Frances_CSR_Reporting_Law_FINAL.pdf.  
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2.2 ASSURANCE OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
2.2.1 The role of assurance reporting 
The assurance of non-financial information – which refers to conducting and reporting on an 
external audit that evaluates the credibility, accuracy, and relevance of the non-financial 
information reported by companies – has become a much-discussed topic in the past few years, 
thus making it a very new studied phenomenon. While there may be several explanations for 
the growing interest towards the subject, it seems that the main reason is the improvement in 
the quality of companies’ sustainability disclosures that assurance reports4 may provide (see 
Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004; Hodge et al., 2009; Jones & Solomon, 2010; Plufgrath et al., 2011; 
Moroney et al., 2012; Hąbek & Wolniak, 2016; Sheldon, 2016). Consequently, companies seem 
motivated by this (Simnett et al., 2009) and are increasingly requesting external assurance on 
their reported non-financial information (see, e.g., GRI, 2013; KPMG, 2017). While the number 
of assurance reports has encountered periods of – mostly regional – stagnation, it has become 
a worldwide phenomenon in both developed and emerging economies (Junior et al., 2014).  
The positive impacts associated with assurance reporting seem numerous. Indeed, previous 
studies have indicated that external assurance can increase stakeholders’ confidence and reduce 
risks in the quality of companies’ sustainability performance data, increase company value, 
improve management engagement, both internal and external stakeholder communication, and 
internal reporting and management systems (see, e.g., Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; 
Fonseca, 2010; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Nordhaug, 2017). Assurance 
can also be a way to maintain legitimacy among stakeholders to attract investments (O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011; Shen et al., 2017) or enhance the environmental reputation of the company (Birkey 
et al., 2016). These are all evidence that assurance reporting can be an important and beneficial 
part of companies’ sustainability disclosures and reporting practices.  
                                                 
4 The reports of the assurance engagements given by the assurance providers are referred to by many names, such 
as an assurance report or a statement of verification. In this study, no difference is made between these terms and 
their variants, as there is no indication in previous literature that this semantic variance affects the actual report 
contents. Consequently, any kind of a report or statement of an assurance process given by the assurance provider 
is simply considered an assurance report and referred to as such. At times, an assurance report may even be 
abbreviated as “assurance” or simply “report”, if the context allows it, to maintain concise use of language and 
avoid unnecessary repetition. It should also be noted that, in the context of this study, “assurance” refers to the 
assurance of non-financial, i.e. sustainability, information, unless otherwise stated. In cases where there may be a 
risk of confusion, also the terms “sustainability assurance” or “non-financial assurance” may be used.  
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As discussed in the introduction, assurance reports are far from standardized, and their contents 
may vary significantly. However, many reports seem to include similar elements, such as an 
introduction outlining the scope and objectives of the assurance engagement, a section stating 
the responsibilities of the assuror and the assured company, details of the procedures undertaken 
in the assurance process, and a conclusion stating the outcome of the assurance engagement. 
While the reports may include various other elements as well (see Section 2.3 for further 
discussion), the purpose of the report is usually the same, i.e. to increase the reliability and 
credibility of the reported sustainability data, and the report should be prepared accordingly.  
Even though the idea of sustainability assurances is rooted in the 1970s (Ackers, 2008) and 
many stakeholders have expected auditing – as an essential part of corporate governance – to 
consider environmental and social issues besides economic ones since the 1990s (see Percy, 
1997), the materialization of sustainability assurances has occurred only recently. In fact, 
according to a 2008 report on assurances by CorporateRegister.com, the first assurance reports 
seem to have surfaced in 1992, and their number has increased steadily ever since – while a 
mere handful of assurance reports was published globally in the early 1990s, the number was 
already nearing 650 in 2007. According to the same report, the relative growth of assured 
sustainability reports to all reports fluctuated roughly between 10-25 % during that same period.  
According to a 2013 report on assurances by GRI, which consisted of the sustainability 
disclosures registered in the GRI database, the ratio of assured sustainability reports to all 
reports was relatively high between 2007-2012, as roughly half of the reports had been 
externally assured during that period. In absolute numbers, this meant around 250 assured 
reports in 2007, and almost 1 000 in 2012. In other words, based on the data among companies 
found in the GRI database, the ratio of assured reports to all reports seems to be higher if the 
original sustainability reports followed the GRI Guidelines.  
The data from the past decade seems to indicate that the largest companies are, rather 
unsurprisingly, leading the way in terms of assurance reports. For example, according to the 
2017 KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (see KPMG, 2017), the amount of 
assured sustainability reports to all reports among the Global Fortune 250 companies has more 
than doubled in 12 years, from 30 % in 2005 to 67 % in 2017. According to the same report, 
the respective average amount among the top 100 companies per country has also increased 
significantly, from 33 % in 2005 to 45 % in 2017.  
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While the amount of assurance reports has evidently increased globally, the reliability of 
assurance reporting has been contested, however, as the assurance practice lacks robustness and 
consistency (Dando & Swift, 2003; Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009). Indeed, there are 
no specific requirements, such as official certificates, for assurors, and the assurance system is 
largely unregulated, unstandardized, and unsupervised, impeding the acceptability of 
sustainability assurances (Ackers, 2008; Braam & Peeters, 2018). Many assurors may act 
simultaneously as consultants for the companies and may even be imposed to act under 
management’s restrictions (Ball et al., 2000; Owen & O’Dwyer, 2005), which can cast doubts 
on the assuror’s independence. The critique – and even pure criticism – of the assurance system 
and, at the same time, the resulting assurance reports may seem harsh but is ultimately rather 
accurate.  
Despite the critique, assurance reporting is an increasingly important part of companies’ 
reporting of non-financial information. It then seems intuitive that a high-quality assurance 
report would influence a company more positively than one of low quality. This view is 
debated, though, as it has been indicated that the mere existence of an assurance report is enough 
to affect the company’s value positively (Salman & Van Staden, 2016), as the high variance in 
the reports’ contents makes it difficult or even impossible for the stakeholders to possess the 
necessary expertise to analyze the quality of assurance reports (Dando & Swift, 2003; Deegan 
et al., 2006; Salman & Van Staden, 2016). This situation is bound to change, however, as 
assurance reports become more common and knowledge of them improves, likely leading to an 
increasing demand of consistent and understandable, high-quality assurance reports.  
Even though the number of assurances seems to have stagnated in some regions, this situation 
also seems only temporary. The reasons for this may very well be complex and multifaceted, 
but it may also simply be explained with most voluntary adopters already requesting assurances 
while the rest are merely waiting for regulatory authorities to outline standardized requirements 
for sustainability assurances. Whether or not this speculation is true, the amount of assurances 
is anyway likely to increase significantly, as sustainability assurances become mandatory in 
more and more countries, as was indicated earlier in the introduction. The implications of 
mandatory assurance regimes are further discussed in Section 2.2.3. Before that, however, 
assurance reporting is discussed from theoretical perspectives, including legitimacy and 
signalling theories, to better understand the reasons behind sustainability assurances.   
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2.2.2 Assurance reporting from theoretical perspectives 
Similarly to the concepts of corporate responsibility and sustainability reporting, which were 
discussed in Section 2.1, assurance reporting has also been associated with various theoretical 
frameworks, including legitimacy, stakeholder, signalling, and agency theory. The purpose of 
this subsection is to concisely explore sustainability assurances5 through these theories to better 
understand the role of and reasons for assurance reporting. Also, since the academic discussion 
of the assurance of non-financial information is still relatively new and limited, additional 
insight from traditional – i.e. financial – audit research is included, when appropriate6.  
Based on previous literature, legitimacy theory seems to be one of the main explanatory theories 
behind assurance reporting. In fact, it has been suggested that sustainability assurances are 
mostly a quest for legitimacy (Gillet, 2012). This finding seems to be in line with the notion 
that sustainability disclosures in general are a significant method for companies to seek 
legitimacy, as was indicated earlier in Section 2.1.3. In the context of assurance reports, 
however, the seeking of legitimacy is carried out for a slightly different purpose – companies 
may adopt an assurance process to legitimize its sustainability reports among its key 
stakeholders, both internal and external (O’Dwyer et al., 2011), whereas sustainability reports 
are often used as an attempt to legitimize the actions of the reporting company. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that there are certain institutional pressures that play a key role in why 
sustainability assurances can indeed help companies gain or ensure their legitimacy. These 
pressures are rooted in three isomorphic forces, namely the coercive (e.g., the law), the 
normative (e.g., moral compliance), and the mimetic (e.g., adopting similar behavior to other 
companies in the same industry) forces (Kolk & Perego, 2010). In other words, it seems that by 
appropriately responding to these isomorphic forces, companies’ attempts to seek legitimacy 
with sustainability assurances is more likely to succeed.  
                                                 
5 While this study mostly uses the term “assurance” to refer to the assurance of non-financial information – for 
further details, see Footnote 4 in Section 2.2.1 – this subsection makes an exception to avoid confusion, as it 
involves discussion of financial audit and assurance research, as well. Thus, in this subsection, the term 
“sustainability assurance” is mainly used when referring to the assurance of non-financial information. 
6 Auditing, as a general term, implies that an independent third party gathers sufficient evidence so that it can form 
a clear conclusion with respect to the audited information and predefined objectives (Power, 1997). Despite this 
perspective being based on financial audit research, it also seems to fit the description of sustainability assurance 
engagements, the definition of which was briefly discussed in the previous subsection. Therefore, it seems that the 
ideologies of financial and sustainability audits bear similarities, and thus the financial audit literature may offer 
additional insights into sustainability assurances. 
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Legitimacy theory bears similarities with stakeholder theory in this context, as both theories 
seem to explain sustainability disclosures as ways to manage and influence stakeholders 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Van der Laan, 2009). Stakeholder theory, however, utilizes a 
slightly different – and narrower – perspective than legitimacy theory. According to stakeholder 
theory, the seeking of legitimacy and, moreover, accountability is targeted towards the most 
critical stakeholders of companies to gain their support and approval (Gray et al., 1996) which, 
in turn, helps the company gain access to various resources the stakeholders may control 
(Deegan, 2002). As the demand for the types of sustainability data may vary significantly 
between stakeholder groups, companies need to attend to those demands accordingly (Mitchell 
et al., 1997), which may result in differences7 in the companies’ approaches toward assurances. 
The notion of reporting on sustainability assurances to satisfy external stakeholders has been 
contradicted, however, as assurances can be a mere managerial tool for improving internal 
processes, communication, and control (Ackers, 2016; Nordhaug, 2017), thus indicating that 
company management may simply use external assurance for its own benefit – to the detriment 
of other stakeholders (Gillet-Monjarret & Riviere-Giordano, 2017). 
Another theory that has been often utilized in explaining sustainability assurances is signalling 
theory, as assurance reporting can be considered a signal of disclosure credibility and quality 
(Hodge et al., 2009). More specifically, it has been suggested that companies may adopt 
external assurance to signal that their sustainability information is fairly presented in all 
material respects (Braam & Peeters, 2018) and to distinguish themselves as high-quality 
companies in terms of sustainability performance (Connelly et al., 2011). Correspondingly, it 
has been suggested that market participants, especially investors, perceive sustainability 
assurance as a signal of disclosure credibility (Brown-Liburd & Zamora, 2015). There are also 
indications that companies may use external assurance to signal that they are performing well 
in terms of sustainability, although no direct effect on reputation has been observed (Alon & 
Vidovic, 2015). In addition, external assurance has been associated with sustainability reports 
that emphasize measurable activities instead of embellished narrative, and thus signaling a 
reduced risk of greenwashing (Bagnoli et al., 2016).  
                                                 
7 These differences could, perhaps, be perceived in the assurance reports by analyzing the variance in the 
addressees of and the emphasized information within the reports. Further discussion about the possible contents 
of assurance reports is presented in Section 2.3. 
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Previous literature has also discussed sustainability assurances through the lens of agency 
theory (Zorio et al., 2013) which is mainly concerned with the relationship between a principal 
(e.g., a company’s stakeholders) and an agent (e.g., the company) and, more specifically, 
whether the goals and risk tolerances of these two are in conflict. The tendency to utilize agency 
theory in the context of assurance reports is likely rooted in traditional audit research, where it 
has often been indicated that agency costs are associated with companies’ decisions to adopt 
financial audit and assurance engagements (see Chow, 1982). Furthermore, agency theory 
suggests that the company stakeholders may act as principals who can delegate or hire 
companies to act as their agents to provide the information they require to reduce information 
asymmetries between them and the companies (Power, 1991). This logic of agency theory can 
be applied to sustainability assurances, as well, since the growing demand for and presentation 
of sustainability assurances can be perceived as a result of stakeholders pressuring companies 
to act as their agents who provide relief for possible information asymmetries regarding 
sustainability disclosures.  
All in all, based on the various theoretical perspectives and supporting empirical evidence, it 
seems that sustainability assurances are mostly managerial tools for companies to seek 
legitimacy, especially in the eyes of certain internal and external stakeholders who the 
companies consider the most essential. Simultaneously, companies may use sustainability 
assurances to signal high disclosure credibility, although it has been suggested that assurance 
may be a mere managerial tool to improve internal processes rather than a signal to stakeholders 
(Alon & Vidovic, 2015). Additionally, it can be argued that the companies are merely acting as 
agents for stakeholders who may be pressuring companies to reduce risks in, increase credibility 
of, and mitigate information asymmetries related to the companies’ sustainability disclosures. 
However, this seems improbable as it has been often indicated that stakeholders’ demands are 
ultimately not much considered (see, e.g., Park and Brorson, 2005). Previous literature on 
financial auditing and assurance seem to provide supporting evidence for these theoretical 
perspectives on sustainability assurances. While not a priority, the possible implications of the 
results of this study in light of the theoretical perspectives presented in this subsection are 
briefly discussed later in Section 4 along with the main results. In any case, now that a proper 
theoretical basis for sustainability assurances has been established, it is time to move on to the 
next subsection which discusses assurances from a regulatory perspective.   
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2.2.3 The regulation of assurance reporting 
As discussed in the introduction, only France and South Africa have had significant regulation 
regarding the assurance of non-financial information in place for many years now, although 
these regulations are only small parts of broader regulations about sustainability reporting, also 
known as the Grenelle II Act, in France, and the King IV report8, in South Africa. These 
regulations affect directly only listed companies and certain large companies in these countries. 
While the regulations are rather similar, the King report seems to be more diligently updated. 
It is noteworthy that even these two regulations are not entirely mandatory, as they are based 
on a so-called “comply or explain” approach, which means that companies can choose to either 
provide an assurance report by an independent third party or adequately state why they chose 
not to do so. It is interesting, however, that these regulations are not enforced by sanctions in 
practice, which – at least seemingly – undermines the mandatory nature of the regulations.  
Besides France and South Africa, so far only Italy has a similar mandatory assurance regime in 
effect. In addition, a handful of other countries have introduced individual policies regarding 
sustainability assurances. Most notably, Sweden and Argentina have introduced regulations that 
require state-owned companies to externally verify their sustainability disclosures. Also, in the 
U.S. and Taiwan, companies in certain industries face similar requirements. In the EU and the 
OECD, recommendations have been introduced for member countries to apply at their 
discretion. For further details about sustainability assurance policies, please refer to Table 1 on 
the next page. It is also noteworthy that the accounting authorities of some individual countries, 
such as Australia, Brazil, China, the Netherlands, and Spain, have also begun to issue local, 
voluntary sustainability assurance standards and guidelines, mainly basing them on existing 
standards (Manetti & Becatti, 2009). For further details, please refer to Table 2 on page 28.  
Since there is very little research available on the regulation of sustainability assurances, further 
discussion at this point is rather impractical. However, existing literature offers a handful of 
interesting findings about assurance reporting in voluntary settings, which will be the focus of 
the next subsection. These findings are then utilized in Section 2.2.5 for discussing possible 
implications regarding the countries examined in this study, i.e. Finland and France.   
                                                 
8 Assurance reporting was already regulated in the previous version of the King report, namely the “King III”. 
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TABLE 1. REGIONAL SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE POLICIES9 
REGION COMMENTARY ON POLICY 
France • Requires inclusion and verification of environmental and social information in annual 
reports by an independent third party for companies, as part of the Grenelle II Act. 
• Mandatory for listed companies and companies with exceeding annual balance or 
turnover of 100M€ and an average of 500 permanent employees. 
South Africa • Requires third-party assurance of integrated sustainability disclosures and calls for 
the integration and alignment of assurance processes in a company. 
• Applies to all companies listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Italy • Requires third-party assurance of sustainability disclosures. 
• Applies to all companies signified by the requirements in the 2014 EU Directive on 
the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information. 
Sweden • Requires quality assurance by independent scrutiny and assurance, but includes no 
preferences on the type, nature, or provider of the assurance engagement. 
• Mandatory for Swedish state-owned companies. 
Argentina • Requires review of reported social, human rights and environmental information by 
an independent assurance provider. 
• Mandatory only for companies with state or mixed capital and private commercial 
companies that participate in public tenders.  
USA (1) • Requires description and independent auditing of measures taken to exercise due 
diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals.  
• Mandatory for companies that identify conflict minerals in the production of products 
and file reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
USA (2) • Requires a review of social and environmental information per a third-party standard. 
• Applies only to benefit corporations in states where the legislation is introduced.10 
Taiwan • Requires listed companies to specify in the sustainability report whether information 
has been assured, verified, or certified by a third party. 
• Mandatory for companies in specific sectors listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
EU • Voluntary assurance of non-financial information, including environmental, social, 
human rights, diversity, employee, anti-corruption, and bribery matters. 
OECD • Recommends multinational companies to request an annual audit of both financial 
and non-financial information by an independent, competent, and qualified auditor. 
Finland &  
Rest of the World 
• None, except the voluntary guidelines for member countries of the EU, such as 
Finland, and the OECD. 
                                                 
9 The information in this table is mostly based on a 2015 report published by the Global Sustainability Standards 
Board (GSSB) of the GRI. The report was accessed via www.globalreporting.org on Mar 31, 2018. Only the 
information about Italy, however, is based on a 2018 report by CSR Europe, the GRI, and Accountancy Europe. 
The report was accessed via www.accountancyeurope.eu on Aug 13, 2018. 
10 In June 2015, the Benefit Corporation legislation had been passed in 27 states and introduced in 14 states. 
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TABLE 2. REGIONAL SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS11 
REGION COMMENTARY ON STANDARD(S) 
Australia &  
New Zealand 
• ASAE 3000 (2014) and AS/NZS 5911 (2013) by national standards bodies and the 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board of Australia and New Zealand. 
• Local, voluntary assurance standards based on the ISAE 300012. 
Brazil 
• NBC-TO 3000 (2015) by Conselho Federal de Contabilidade. 
• Local, voluntary assurance standard based on the ISAE 3000. 
Canada 
• Local, voluntary assurance guideline (1997) by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA) 
China 
• CAS3101 (2006) by The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
• Local, voluntary assurance standard based on the ISAE 3000. 
• Also, CSR-VRAI, a textile industry standard based on the AA1000AS. 
France 
• Local, voluntary guidelines for the assurance levels of sustainability verifications 
(2003) by the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC). 
Germany 
• IDW AsS 821 (2010) by the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (IDW). 
• Local, voluntary assurance standard. 
Italy 
• Local, voluntary guidelines for limited sustainability assurances (2015) by the Italian 
Association of Internal Auditors (Assirevi). 
Japan 
• Local, voluntary guidelines for sustainability assurances (2007) by the Japanese 
Association of Assurance Organizations for Sustainability, based on the ISAE 3000. 
Netherlands 
• NVCOS 3xxx by the Nederlandse Beroepsorganisatie van Accountants (NBA) 
• Local, voluntary standard mostly based on the ISAE 3000. 
• Also incorporates parts of the AA1000AS and the GRI Guidelines. 
Spain 
• ICJCE Action Guide (2008) by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Spain 
• Local, voluntary guidelines for sustainability assurance engagements. 
Sri Lanka 
• SLSAE 3000 (2010): by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka. 
• Local, voluntary assurance standard based on the ISAE 3000. 
Sweden 
• RevR6 (2008) by the Swedish Institute of the Accountancy Profession (FAR). 
• Local, voluntary assurance standard based on the ISAE 3000.  
Switzerland 
• PS 950 (2013), by EXPERTsuisse. 
• Local, voluntary assurance guideline. 
USA 
• AT Section 101 (2001) by American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
• Local, voluntary assurance standard. 
                                                 
11 The information in this table is based on a report published in 2016 by the Global Sustainability Standards Board 
(GSSB) of the GRI. The report was accessed via www.globalreporting.org on Mar 31, 2018. 
12 Refer to Section 2.3 for details about the main assurance standards, i.e. the ISAE 3000 and the AA1000AS. 
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2.2.4 Voluntary vs. mandatory assurance 
Multiple determinants have been associated with companies’ decisions to voluntarily adopt 
sustainability assurances. Some of these factors are rooted in the theoretical perspectives 
regarding assurance reporting, and others in the contexts where the companies operate. The 
theoretical perspectives were discussed in Section 2.2.2, where it was stated that voluntary 
assurance might be due to companies seeking legitimation, attempting to satisfy certain 
stakeholders, signaling the quality of their sustainability disclosures, or acting as mere agents 
for the stakeholders who require assurance to reduce information asymmetries. The purpose of 
this subsection is to explore the contextual factors behind sustainability assurances. It should 
be noted that since there is relatively little information available on sustainability assurances, 
especially comparative data between voluntary and mandatory settings, traditional, financial 
audit and assurance literature will be utilized when necessary to fill in the possible blanks. 
Previous literature indicates that there are similar contextual factors, such as size, visibility, and 
industry, that affect the companies’ decision to request external sustainability assurance as those 
that affect the adoption of sustainability reporting in general. Indeed, both financial and non-
financial audit literature have indicated that the size of the company plays a significant part in 
voluntary assurance reporting (see, e.g., Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Sierra et al., 2013). Some studies, 
however, have presented contradicting findings which indicate that it is not the size of the 
company – in terms of market value, at least – but the industry in which the companies operate 
that explains the presence of assurance reporting (Cho et al., 2014). More specifically, it seems 
that the demand for assurance is higher among companies with highly visible activities and 
large environmental and social impacts, especially in mining, utilities, and finance industries 
(Simnett et al., 2009). Furthermore, preliminary evidence seems to indicate that the quality of 
sustainability assurances is higher among companies in notably polluting industries than in 
other industries (Perego & Kolk, 2012). These findings seem to support both legitimacy and 
stakeholder theory in the context of sustainability assurances, as it seems that companies who 
significantly affect their surrounding societies attempt to uphold their social contracts13 and 
retain their social licenses to operate14 at least partially with sustainability assurance reports.  
                                                 
13 The theory of social contract argues that businesses have obligations to the societies within which they operate. 
For details about the social contract theory, see, e.g., “Corporations and Morality” by Thomas Donaldson (1982).  
14 Social license to operate is the result of businesses meeting social expectations (see Gunningham et al., 2004). 
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In accordance with the stakeholder theory, it has been found that companies are more likely to 
voluntarily request sustainability assurances in stakeholder-oriented than in shareholder-
oriented countries (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Zhou et al., 2016). This might explain why relatively 
more companies in many European and Asian countries tend to assure their sustainability 
information than, for example, in the United States (see Kolk & Perego, 2010; Casey & Grenier, 
2015). Additionally, it seems that companies operating within a greater legal system and 
cultural development are more likely to voluntarily publish an assurance report (Martínez-
Ferrero & García-Sánchez, 2017), although a weaker governance enforcement regime has also 
been found to increase the presence of assurances (Kolk & Perego, 2010). In any case, the 
demand for assurance seems higher in countries where sustainable corporate practices are better 
enabled by market and institutional mechanisms (Kolk & Perego, 2010).  
There is surprisingly little previous literature about how the quality of traditional audits depend 
on them being either mandatory or voluntary. This is likely explained by financial audits being 
often mandatory in practice. Some interesting findings have emerged, such as that companies 
would likely use financial assurances to send positive signals and attract credit rating upgrades 
and investments, if the audits were no longer mandatory (see Lennox & Pittman, 2011).  
Joint auditing – i.e. a single audit by two or more auditors sharing responsibility and producing 
a joint report – have also been discussed in this light, as they can be both voluntary and 
mandatory, the latter of which is the case, for example, in France, for all legal entities who are 
obliged to publish consolidated accounts. Studies regarding the benefits of joint audits have 
reported mixed results, though. In the case of Sweden, for example, voluntary joint audits have 
been positively associated with audit quality (see Zerni et al., 2012), but a similar link could 
not be identified in, for example, Germany or France (see Velte & Azibi, 2015), casting doubts 
on the efficiency of the French mandatory joint audit system (Bédard et al., 2014).  
The implications that the findings presented in this subsection may have in the context of this 
study are discussed later in Section 3.3. The next subsection, on the other hand, discusses the 
state of sustainability assurance reporting in Finland and France. This will appropriately 
conclude the exploration of the role and state of assurance reporting – both in general as well 
as in the context of the examined countries – before beginning a detailed discussion about the 
assessment of sustainability assurance quality, which will be the focus of Section 2.3.   
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2.2.5 Assurance reporting in Finland and France 
The rate of assured sustainability reports shows an even more substantial difference between 
Finland and France than the rate of sustainability reporting which was discussed earlier in 
Section 2.2.1. According to a 2011 KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (see 
KPMG, 2011), the amount of assured sustainability reports among the top 100 companies was 
29 % in Finland and 60 % in France. This was, unfortunately, the last time the aforementioned 
KPMG surveys of corporate responsibility presented comprehensive country-specific statistics, 
which means that more recent exact data is unfortunately not readily available.  
Using various sets of data, however, some illustrative comparisons can be made. In 2015, 
according to a KPMG report (see KPMG, 2015), the rate of assured sustainability reports was 
96 % in France among the country’s top 100 companies. While the exact same data from 
Finland is not readily available, among the 161 sustainability reporters in 2015, only 36, i.e. 
around 22 %, presented an assurance report, according to a 2016 report by the Finnish PwC 
(see PwC, 2016). To put these amounts into perspective, the average rate of sustainability 
assurances among the top 100 companies of approximately 40 countries in 2015 was 42 % 
(KPMG, 2017). While these figures are not directly comparable, it still seems that the rate of 
assurances has increased significantly more in France than in Finland, most likely due to the 
Grenelle II Act which requires external assurance (refer to Section 2.1.5 for details).  
There is very little previous literature available regarding assurance reporting specifically in 
Finland or France. Immonen (2016) conducted a content analysis of assurance reports between 
2002-2013 with a group of 16 companies in Finland. While a relatively small study, the findings 
still indicated prevalence of the ISAE 3000, rarity of reasonable assurances, clearly stated scope 
of assurance and responsibilities, commonness of limitations, and rarity of observations. In 
addition, the study found that the reports were often titled “Independent Assurance Report” and 
addressed to the management of the assured company. Overall, a clear congruence of assurance 
reports was evident. Another content analysis by Syrjälä (2017) found similar results among 
the assurance reports of Finnish companies in 2015. Comparable analyses from France seem to 
not exist, at least in English. However, Gillet (2012) found that the assurance reports of the 
French CAC40 companies simply lacked precision and explanation. In addition, the study 
indicated that the main motives for these companies to engage in sustainability assurances is to 
manage and develop their sustainability policies and reporting practices.   
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2.3 THE QUALITY OF ASSURANCE REPORTS 
2.3.1 Assessing the quality of assurance reports 
Even though the amount of assurance reports is increasing globally, discussion about the quality 
of these reports is only minor in previous studies, but – fortunately – enough to form a valid 
basis for this study. In general terms, it has been suggested that assurance report quality can be 
regarded high if the report fully concerns the completeness, accuracy, honesty and balance of 
the original sustainability information (Damen, 2016). Previous studies have also made 
attempts at accurately measuring and scoring the quality of sustainability assurances based on 
individual quality indicators that have been identified within the context of assurance reports. 
A handful of other studies (e.g., O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Janggu et 
al., 2013) have examined the quality of assurance reports specifically with respect to the 
assurance report elements mentioned in either one or more of the main assurance standards and 
guidelines, namely the International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000, the 
AA1000 AccountAbility Assurance Standard, and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
guidelines for the external assurance of sustainability reporting.  
When these standards and guidelines were first introduced, they had significant similarities as 
well as differences. However, they have since gone through numerous revisions and updates. 
Currently, they all seem to consist mostly of similar requirements and suggestions, the purpose 
of which is to guide assurance reports to include such elements as a clear title, an addressee, the 
scope, level, and possible limitations of the assurance engagement, the used assurance standard, 
an identification and the responsibilities of involved parties, a description of the assuror’s 
competence, independence, and methodology, as well as a clearly stated conclusion with 
possible recommendations on how to improve sustainability reporting disclosures and practices 
(for a more detailed discussion about the origins, development, and contents of these main 
standards and guidelines, as well as a few additional quality indicators, see Section 2.3.2). These 
elements presented in the ISAE 3000, the AA1000, and the GRI assurance guidelines often 
form the basis upon which assurance reports are built. Moreover, these standards and guidelines 
are evidently globally influencing the formation of national assurance standards, the assurance 
engagements, and ultimately the contents of the resulting reports. Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that the more comprehensively an assurance report responds to these standards and 
guidelines, the higher its quality is likely to be.  
 33 
 
Despite the emergence of the aforementioned assurance engagement standards and guidelines, 
the problems in the broader assurance system seem to persist. As was indicated earlier in both 
the introduction and Section 2.2.1, the lack of proper and adequate regulation, standardization, 
and supervision seems to lead to inconsistent approaches to assurance engagements and, as a 
natural consequence, a large variance in both the form and content of the resulting assurance 
reports. This, as was also noted earlier, seems to impair the stakeholders’ ability to understand 
sustainability assurance engagements as well as the content and quality of the resulting 
assurance reports, and, therefore, assurance reports may often be taken at face value, as the 
quality of sustainability assurances is simply disregarded by many users of these reports.  
Besides the aforementioned shortcomings within the sustainability assurance system, it is also 
notable that company management may have significant control over the assurance process. 
This further enforces the notion discussed in Section 2.2.2 that the company management may 
use sustainability assurances for its own benefit, and to the detriment of other stakeholders, as 
this is likely to undermine the role and stakeholder-oriented purpose of assurances in increasing 
the quality of sustainability disclosures. Consequently, some previous studies have suggested 
certain factors that could help improve the quality of sustainability assurance engagements and 
ultimately the sustainability reporting practices in general. These suggestions include  
• standardizing the content and form of resulting reports (Deegan et al., 2006),  
• explaining levels of assurance on the procedures undertaken (Manetti & Becatti, 2009),  
• strongly involving experts specialized in matters other than accounting and auditing, to 
increase the pervasiveness of the performed controls (Manetti & Becatti, 2009),  
• clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of the various parties included in the 
interdisciplinary assuror team (Manetti & Becatti, 2009),  
• increasing stakeholder inclusiveness in the assurance process (Edgley et al., 2010), 
• achieving a more punctual verification of essential assurance aspects, such as the 
independence of the assuror, the link with financial audit, legal compliance, and the 
materiality of the information given (Adams, 2004; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  
While these improvements seem appropriate and could – if present – improve the quality of an 
assurance report, they are excluded from the empirical part of this study, as they have not been 
properly validated in previous literature or the existing assurance standards and guidelines.  
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Before moving forward to a detailed presentation of individual indicators of assurance report 
quality, it is appropriate to briefly discuss a certain decision regarding these indicators that has 
been made in this study. As the remainder of this section will demonstrate, there are plenty of 
quality indicators related to assurance reports. Thoroughly discussing all of them under a single 
subsection is, then, rather impractical. Therefore, to maintain a clear manner of presentation, 
the indicators have been divided into separate categories that can all be considered important 
areas of assurance report quality. Making a specific note about this may seem odd, but it is very 
important, actually, as dividing the quality indicators into categories is unprecedented in this 
particular field of research and may bear significant consequences in terms of, for example, 
understanding the nature of each individual indicator. Even more importantly – as it will 
become clear during the course of the following subsections – the categories are eventually 
utilized in the applied research method, as well, a topic which is discussed more thoroughly 
later in Section 3.2. In any case, it seems that all assurance report quality indicators can be 
divided quite naturally into an appropriate set of five distinct categories, namely 
• standard-related quality indicators (e.g., the referred standards and level of assurance),  
• assuror-related quality indicators (e.g., the assuror’s independence and competence),  
• process-related quality indicators (e.g., the assured data and specified procedures),  
• conclusion-related quality indicators (e.g., the conclusions and reservations),  
• formality-related quality indicators (e.g., the clarity of heading and signature).  
These categories as well as their corresponding components, which were only briefly alluded 
to in this subsection, will be discussed in detail next, with each category in its dedicated section, 
i.e. Sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.6. The indicators are presented and discussed thoroughly by using both 
narrative and tables, i.e. Tables 3 to 715, to better illustrate their roles in this study’s context. 
Hopefully, it will also help remedy the lack of understanding some assurance report users may 
experience regarding the varying contents of the reports.  
                                                 
15 Since the tables are rather clear and self-explanatory, to avoid cumbersome repetition, the column headings of 
these tables are aberrantly already explained at this point. The column named 
• “INDICATOR” specifies the name or content of the quality indicator, 
• “ISAE 3000” specifies whether the indicator is included in the ISAE 3000 assurance standard, 
• “AA1000” specifies whether the indicator is included in the AA1000 assurance standard, 
• “GRI” specifies whether the indicator is included in the GRI assurance guidelines (see GRI, 2013), 
• “STUDIES” specifies whether the indicator has been utilized, validated, or suggested in prior literature. 
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2.3.2 Standard-related quality indicators 
Standard-related quality indicators are one of the most significant elements in terms of overall 
assurance report quality. They define many elements of both the assurance engagement and the 
resulting reports. These indicators are commonly cited both in the main assurance standards 
and guidelines as well as previous studies. The Table 3 below concisely specifies these 
indicators and their possible prevalence in the ISAE 3000 and AA1000 assurance standards, 
the GRI assurance guidelines, and previous studies regarding the quality of sustainability 
assurance reports. In this subsection, the standard-related quality indicators are presented and 
discussed in detail to provide a better understanding of the overall quality of assurance reports.  
 
TABLE 3. STANDARD-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS16 
INDICATOR ISAE 3000 AA1000 GRI STUDIES 
• Assurance standard specified x x x x17 
- ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS specified - - x x18 
• Level of assurance indicated19 x x x x20 
- Reasonable assurance indicated x x x x21 
- Level of assurance explained x - - - 
• Additional standards or criteria specified x x x x22 
- GRI specified as reporting criteria x - x x23 
- Additional standards cited x x x - 
 
                                                 
16 Although rather self-explanatory, the column headings are described in Footnote 15 on page 34. 
17 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Manetti & Becatti (2009), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Zorio et 
al. (2013), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
18 E.g., Iansen-Rogers & Oelschlaegel (2005). 
19 In some studies (see, e.g., Perego & Kolk, 2012), this indicator is also referred to as “the objective of the 
assurance engagement”. 
20 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya 
et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
21 E.g., Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
22 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen 
(2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
23 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Manetti & Becatti (2009), Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), 
Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
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The main assurance standards: the ISAE 3000 and the AA1000AS 
Despite the assurance system lacking regulation and supervision, two standards have become 
an informal norm in assurance engagements, namely the ISAE 3000 by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and the AA1000AS by AccountAbility, a global non-profit 
organization promoting sustainability. The ISAE 3000 – first issued in 2000 – is mostly used 
by accountants, and the AA1000AS – first issued in 2003 – by sustainability specialists 
(Simnett, 2012). This may be due to the ISAE 3000 requiring compliance with the Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants by the International Ethics Standards Board for 
Accountants (IESBA). Other assurors can still base their assurance on the ISAE 3000, but full 
compliance is impossible. The AA1000AS, in turn, imposes no similar requirements, but does 
require a license fee. It can also be considered the more suitable of the two, as the ISAE 3000 
is not specifically designed for sustainability assurance engagements (Manetti & Becatti, 2009). 
However, it seems that based on their current guidance on assurances, these two standards are 
becoming increasingly congruent, even though the ISAE 3000 seems to mostly emphasize data 
quality and audit risk, whereas the AA1000AS stresses the assurance process, identifying 
material sustainability issues, and stakeholder engagement (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012).  
Both the ISAE 3000 and the AA1000AS indicate that it is possible to conduct assurances 
against multiple standards, but they do not explicitly specify each other by name. Utilizing them 
simultaneously seems recommended, though, as they have no conflicts and using them jointly 
can even enhance the quality of an assurance engagement (Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel, 
2005). In addition, the GRI assurance guidelines, which are further discussed a bit later in this 
subsection, support the notion of using multiple assurance standards.  
The most relevant version of the ISAE 3000 for this study is the revision issued in 2008. This 
version was updated during this study’s examined period, but these updates became effective 
after the end of 2015, thus possibly affecting only the last examined year. The most relevant 
version of the AA1000AS for this study is the latest one, issued also in 2008. This information 
is relevant, as the prevalence of each quality indicator in these two standards is assessed by their 
current revisions, which means that some indicators included in the current version of the ISAE 
3000 may not have been present in the original version, according to which many assurors may 
have conducted their assurances. This is only a minor detail, however, and not addressed 
further, as the indicators are validated across multiple sources and with appropriate discretion.  
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The level of assurance: limited and reasonable assurances 
The principles by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) state that 
all external assurances should state the level of assurance. Furthermore, the International 
Framework for Assurance Engagements (IFAE) by the IAASB specifies only two types of 
assurance engagements: a reasonable (i.e. high) and a limited (i.e. moderate) assurance. In a 
reasonable assurance engagement, the assuror gathers evidence to conclude that the subject 
matter reliably conforms in all material aspects with suitable criteria, and usually gives a 
positive assurance – e.g., stating that the sustainability report has been prepared in accordance 
with applicable accounting standards. In a limited assurance engagement, however, the assuror 
gathers evidence enough to conclude that the subject matter is plausible in the circumstances, 
and usually gives a negative assurance – e.g., stating that nothing has come to their attention 
that causes them to believe that the sustainability report is not prepared in accordance with 
applicable accounting standards.  
Stating the level of assurance can reduce the expectation gap between the report users’ 
perception of the reliability of the assurance and its actual effectiveness (Manetti & Becatti, 
2009). While the ISAE 3000, the AA1000AS, and the GRI assurance guidelines do not 
explicitly state that a reasonable assurance is more desired than a limited one, it is very much 
implied, and previous studies have suggested that reasonable assurances can, indeed, increase 
the credibility of a company’s sustainability reporting more than limited assurances (e.g., Hasan 
et al., 2003; Fuhrmann et al., 2017). Despite this, limited assurances are much more common 
than reasonable assurances (see, e.g., GRI, 2013). There may be many explanations for this, but 
it may simply be due to reasonable assurances being more thorough and thus more costly than 
limited assurances. Also, some national assurance standards – in the Netherlands and Germany, 
for example – state that a limited assurance can be more appropriate for qualitative information 
and a reasonable assurance for quantitative information, respectively (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  
Overall, it seems that the level of assurance is a complex matter and can vary significantly 
depending on the nature of the subject matter. Therefore, it seems justified that the assurance 
reports should not just indicate, but also explain the level of assurance in that specific context 
to help the report users better understand the assurance engagement that has been conducted. 
While previous studies have not utilized this aspect in assessing the quality of assurance reports, 
it is also mentioned, for example, in the current version of the ISAE 3000.  
 38 
 
The GRI Guidelines and additional criteria related to assurance engagements 
The GRI Guidelines are a set of voluntary principles for sustainability disclosures (for further 
details about the GRI and their guidelines, refer to Section 2.1.3). While these guidelines are 
often cited by assurors, they are not a standard for assurances (Ackers, 2008). Also, many 
assurance reports are unclear on how these guidelines have been utilized in practice (see 
CorporateRegister.com, 2008). Still, previous studies have considered a reference to the GRI 
Guidelines an indicator of quality, possibly as it creates an impression that at least some kind 
of protocol is being followed. The relevance of the GRI Guidelines in terms of assurances may 
have increased notably after the GRI published a specific guide for sustainability assurances in 
2013. Perhaps consequently, the ISAE 3000 now mentions the GRI Guidelines as applicable 
reporting criteria. Overall, it seems, a reference to the GRI Guidelines – despite possible 
ambiguity – can improve assurance report quality.  
Besides the GRI Guidelines, other criteria can also be used in assurance engagements. These 
include, for example, the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol and the ISO 14000 standard series. 
The GHG Protocol was created jointly by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) and the World Resources Institute (WRI) to provide a reporting 
standard for GHG emissions. The ISO 14000 series, in turn, was created by the International 
Organization of Standardization (ISO) to aid in environmental responsibility management. It is 
also notable that various quality controls can also be utilized. In fact, the GRI recommends 
implementing quality control procedures to assurance engagements, and the ISAE 3000 now 
specifically requires compliance with the International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC) 1, 
or a similar quality control standard. This requirement was, however, not included in the 2008 
version of the standard, which was earlier indicated as the most relevant one for this study.  
The GRI assurance guidelines also mention that company-specific reporting criteria may be 
utilized in assurance engagements. While referring to this kind of reporting criteria in an 
assurance report is appropriate if it is in any way relevant to the assurance process, they are still 
not considered a sign of additional quality in this study. This is due to company-specific criteria 
usually being very ambiguous and thus extremely difficult to compare, unlike the 
internationally established standards which have been discussed in this subsection. Other 
standards and criteria could – at least in theory – be used in assurance engagements, but the 
prevailing guidelines and previous studies offer no further implications about the subject.  
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2.3.3 Assuror-related quality indicators 
Similarly to the standard-related quality indicators, assuror-related indicators are also very 
significant for both the assurance engagement and the report. Indeed, sustainability assurances 
can only be effective when the assuror is independent, competent, and has quality controls in 
place over the assurance process (Cohen & Simnett, 2015). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
these indicators are often cited in the main assurance standards and GRI assurance guidelines, 
and there is also a relatively substantial amount of previous literature about the role and 
implications of the assuror in case of sustainability assurances (see Table 4 below for details). 
The purpose of this subsection is to present and discuss these assuror-related quality indicators 
in detail to provide a better understanding of the overall quality of assurance reports.  
 
TABLE 4. ASSUROR-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS24 
INDICATOR ISAE 3000 AA1000 GRI STUDIES 
• Assuror identified x x x x25 
- Assuror’s credibility implied - - x x26 
- Multiple assurors identified - - - - 
• Assuror’s independence described x x x x27 
- Independence standard or code cited x - - x28 
• Assuror’s competence described x x x x29 
- Relevant experience specified x - - x30 
- Multidisciplinarity specified x - - x31 
 
                                                 
24 Although rather self-explanatory, the column headings are described in Footnote 15 on page 34. 
25 E.g., Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016). 
26 E.g., Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
27 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen 
(2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
28 E.g., Zorio et al. (2013). 
29 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & 
Hahn (2016). 
30 E.g., Moroney et al. (2012). 
31 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009). 
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The assuror and its relevance to assurance quality 
The main assurance standards and guidelines, as well as previous literature, seem rather 
unanimous about the necessity of clearly identifying the assuror responsible for the assurance 
engagement. The significance of the assurors is further underlined, as they can play a key role 
in shaping the entire assurance system in the absence of proper standardization, regulation, and 
supervision. Most often the assurance providers are large accountancy companies – namely the 
Big Four auditors – but qualified sustainability and certification experts also provide assurance 
services (see, e.g., GRI, 2013). While both specialist consultants and professional auditors 
perform sustainability assurances, they seem to utilize different assurance methods and report 
formats (O`Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Perego and Kolk, 2012). 
The significant prevalence of the Big Four auditors indicates that the assurors seem to have 
consisted largely of the same companies – although operating in different countries – in recent 
years. This may have decreased the variance in assurance engagements and reports – similarly 
to companies copying the sustainability reporting practices of superior performers which has 
also resulted in reports with almost identical form and content (De Villiers & Alexander, 2014). 
While not the main focus of this study, it is interesting to see, whether this type of congruence 
is apparent in the gathered data and the results.  
In any case, there has been a lot of discussion about whether and how the type of assuror affects 
the assurance process and its quality. Consequently, the quality of assurance reports seems to 
depend on the type of assuror, as well (Bollas-Araya et al., 2016), as report users may have 
different perceptions of the various assuror types (Hodge et al., 2009). Often, it has been found 
that professional accountants and auditors issue assurance reports of higher quality than 
specialized sustainability consultants (e.g., Plufgrath et al., 2011; Fernández-Feijóo-Souto, 
2012). More specifically, the Big Four companies seem to positively affect assurance quality 
in terms of the reporting format (Perego, 2009) and the assuror’s perceived independence 
(Perego & Kolk, 2012), the latter of which may be the result of accountants having to comply 
with their professional ethics and independence requirements (see, e.g., Wallage, 2000; Hodge 
et al., 2009). This connection seems, however, more prevalent in terms of reasonable rather 
than limited assurances (Hodge et al., 2009). The role of the assuror’s independence is discussed 
further a bit later in this section. 
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In any case, the implications of these studies are interesting, as, at the time when sustainability 
assurances first began to gain significant attention, providing sustainability assurances was 
deemed very challenging for traditional, financial auditors (see Wallage, 2000). The evidence 
suggests that traditional auditors seem to have coped rather well by fruitfully translating their 
success in traditional audits into non-financial audit domains (O’Dwyer 2011). 
Although studies have found that auditors may provide assurance reports of higher quality, 
significant contrasting evidence has also emerged (see, e.g., Moroney et al., 2012; Clarkson et 
al., 2015), which indicates that the effect of the type of assuror on the quality of assurance 
reports is still not entirely obvious. Therefore, this study does not consider the type of assuror 
to be relevant, but rather focuses on the assuror’s general credibility and reputability. While it 
is expected that the assurors in the context of this study will match these qualifications very 
well, it is still an appropriate aspect to be included in an assessment of assurance report quality.  
As a final note about the subject of assurors, the role of joint auditing should be briefly 
discussed. As was indicated earlier in Section 2.2.4, there is not much information available 
regarding joint sustainability audits and assurance engagements. This is slightly surprising, as 
in France – which is also one of the pioneers in terms of sustainability assurances – the use of 
at least two statutory auditors for financial audits is mandatory for all legal entities who are 
obliged to publish consolidated accounts, which include, for example, all the companies 
examined in this study. However, the implications of joint auditing on audit quality are mixed 
at best. This could be one of the reasons why the main sustainability assurance standards and 
previous studies seem to have simply overlooked the role – and even the possibility – of joint 
auditing in the context of sustainability assurances.  
While it may not indeed be an indicator of higher assurance report quality, the presence of 
multiple assurors in sustainability assurances is still examined in this study. The reason for this 
is that due to sustainability assurances involving both quantitative and qualitative information 
and other unique features compared to traditional audits (Cohen & Simnett, 2015), it would not 
be surprising to see, for example, an auditor opting to utilize the expertise of a sustainability 
consultant or certification body to enhance their sustainability assurance capabilities. This is, 
however, mere speculation, as previous studies seem to offer no implications regarding joint 
sustainability assurances. In any case, it will be interesting to see, whether and how joint 
assurances are present among the assurance reports examined in this study.  
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The assuror’s independence and code of ethics 
The significance of the assuror’s independence is underlined in the main assurance standards 
and guidelines. Previous studies assessing the quality of assurance reports have also without 
exception included this aspect in their report quality scoring criteria. Regarding the assuror’s 
independence, the ISAE 3000, for example, specifically requires assurors to be compliant with 
the IESBA Code of Ethics or a similarly demanding independence and ethics standard, as was 
indicated earlier in Section 2.3.2. The AA1000AS, in turn, states that an appropriate reference 
to the IFAC Code of Ethics32 implies that the assurance provider has assessed and met the 
requirements imposed by the ethics code in question. The AA1000AS also encourages assurors 
to provide a broader explanation and justification of their independence in the assurance reports. 
All in all, considering these implications by both of the main assurance standards, it seems 
obvious that the assuror’s independence should be indicated – and preferably explained – in the 
assurance report.  
In some studies, the assuror’s independence has been studied separately with respect to two 
distinct parties: the assured company and the company stakeholders. While the assuror’s 
independence from both aspects is very important, most studies have still chosen not to separate 
the two. This may be due to the aforementioned professional codes of ethics already requiring 
the auditor’s independence in all aspects. Previous studies have, in fact, often considered a mere 
reference to the IESBA and IFAC Codes of Ethics to be a sufficient description of the assuror’s 
independence. While this seems to be an appropriate approach, this study assesses separately, 
whether the assuror’s independence is explained and whether there is also a reference to a 
specific, globally established code of ethics or professional standard. Company and country-
specific standards are not given a similar status, as they may be ambiguous and incomparable, 
unless they are specifically mentioned to be at least as demanding as a specified international 
independence standard or ethics code, such as the IESBA Code of Ethics.   
                                                 
32 It is noteworthy that the standards specifically refer to the IESBA and IFAC Codes of Ethics, respectively, but, 
in practice, there are no significant differences between them. The IESBA is, in fact, a standards board operating 
under the auspice of the IFAC, a global organization dedicated to developing the accountancy profession. The 
purpose of the IESBA, in turn, is to develop globally applicable ethics standards, namely the Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants, which include specific independence requirements for auditors. 
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The assuror’s competence 
Including a description of the assuror’s competence is discussed in the main assurance standards 
and guidelines, but it is not as underlined as the assuror’s independence. Still, the GRI assurance 
guidelines, for example, specifically urge to consider the assuror’s competence in terms of 
sustainability disclosures. Moreover, describing this information in an assurance report may 
reduce information asymmetries (Fuhrmann et al., 2017), and thus improve the value and 
quality of the assurance report. It is not surprising, then, that previous studies have often 
included the description of the assuror’s competence as part of their quality scoring criteria.  
The assuror’s competence in terms of relevant experience seems especially important. The 
ISAE 3000, for example, states that additional information included in an assurance report may 
include a description of the assuror’s previous experience. Previous studies (see, e.g., Moroney 
et al., 2012) have also noted the importance of this aspect. In addition, multidisciplinarity has 
been underlined, as well (see, e.g., Manetti & Becatti, 2009). Its implications in practice seem 
mixed, however, as the roles and responsibilities of the multidisciplinary team may often be 
unclear (Ball et al., 2000), leading to possible conflicts among the team members due to their 
professional and educational differences (O’Dwyer, 2011). Still, due to the multifaceted nature 
of the sustainability-related subject matter, indicating multidisciplinarity in an assurance report 
should, perhaps, be considered a sign of higher, rather than lower, quality by default.  
Despite the importance of these two aspects in terms of the assuror’s competence, previous 
studies have often opted to only examine the inclusion of a description of competence, but not 
its details. This seems slightly odd, as the subject matter seems to clearly require specific 
competencies which are also discussed in the ISAE 3000. Therefore, this study considers the 
description of assuror’s previous experience and multidisciplinarity as further indications of 
assuror’s competence and ultimately assurance report quality. It should also be noted that the 
latest version of the ISAE 3000 also discusses the importance of the assuror having appropriate 
quality control policies in place, as was implicated earlier in Section 2.3.2. While including a 
description of this in an assurance report could then also be an assessed aspect of the description 
of the assuror’s competence, this study will exclude it, as the role of quality controls was not 
emphasized in the assurance standards during this study’s examined period. If the standard 
related to quality controls, i.e. the ISQC 1, is present, it is included in the assessment of 
additional reporting criteria as part of the standard-related quality indicators.   
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2.3.4 Process-related quality indicators 
Process-related quality indicators consist of the described scope of the assurance engagement, 
the addressed limitations or liabilities, the clarified responsibilities of the involved parties, and 
the specified procedures undertaken in the assurance process (see Table 5 below for details). 
These indicators may not individually be as substantial as, for example, the level of assurance, 
as they often merely reflect the agreed assurance level. Their role should not be underestimated, 
however, as they may help report users understand the assurance engagements – especially, 
since sustainability assurances are far from common knowledge, as previously indicated.  
 
TABLE 5. PROCESS-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS33 
INDICATOR ISAE 3000 AA1000 GRI STUDIES 
• Scope of the assurance described x x x x34 
- All or only selective data assured - - - x35 
- The assured data types specified - - - x36 
- Form of sustainability report indicated - - - x37 
• Limitations or liabilities addressed x x x x38 
• Responsibilities clarified x x x x39 
• Procedures described40 x x x x41 
- Stakeholder participation indicated - x x x42 
 
                                                 
33 Although rather self-explanatory, the column headings are described in Footnote 15 on page 34. 
34 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn 
(2016). 
35 E.g., Syrjälä (2017). 
36 E.g., Syrjälä (2017). 
37 E.g., Syrjälä (2017). 
38 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009), Janggu et al. (2013), Damen (2016). 
39 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & 
Hahn (2016). 
40 In some studies, also the procedures are individually analyzed, but this was considered to add only marginal 
value to this study and would have required extensive analysis of the procedures specified in the assurance reports. 
Thus, it is considered sufficient to only focus on whether the procedures are at all specified. 
41 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya 
et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
42 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Janggu et al. (2013), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
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The scope of the assurance engagement 
The scope of the assurance engagement is closely related to the level of assurance in terms of 
the depth of the assurance process. In fact, the level of assurance may often be indicated as part 
of the overall description of the assurance engagement, as, for example, the AA1000AS 
recommends. While the level of assurance could have been consequently included in this 
category of quality indicators, as well, it was considered a better fit among the standard-related 
indicators, as the main assurance standards and guidelines specifically require the indication of 
the level of assurance. Despite the close connection between the scope and the level of the 
assurance, they do have significant differences, as the scope should also indicate the assured 
sustainability data, which is obviously not in any way indicated in the level of assurance. The 
main standards and guidelines do not, however, explicitly state that it is recommended to assure 
as much of the disclosed sustainability information as possible, but instead require or suggest 
to clearly specify the assured information. This includes also the period during which the data 
has originally been reported. Clearly stating the scope of the assurance is very important, as 
some sustainability information is often excluded from assurance engagements (Park & 
Brorson, 2005) – this is also specifically discussed in the GRI assurance guidelines. 
While it could be argued that only specifying – but not the comprehensiveness of – the assured 
data is relevant for the quality of an assurance report, it is still chosen to be included in this 
assessment. The reason for this is that it – at least intuitively – should improve the value, and 
ultimately the quality, of the report, if the assurance of all or most disclosed sustainability 
information is indicated, instead of only a single environmental indicator, for example. While 
this intuition may be proven wrong in the future, currently there seems to be no evidence either 
for or against it, which means that, in this case, this study chooses to place trust on the power 
of intuitive deduction. Whatever the correct approach is, it still seems surprising that previous 
studies have almost completely overlooked this aspect when assessing assurance report quality.  
It should be noted that in this specific study, the aspect of how comprehensively the 
sustainability data is assured according to assurance reports is actually very important. As was 
indicated earlier in Section 2.2.3, the Grenelle II requires listed and certain unlisted companies 
to externally assure their social and environmental disclosures. Therefore, it will be interesting 
to ascertain whether and how the companies in France indicate the assurance of these – and 
possibly other – types of sustainability information.  
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In addition to assessing whether it is indicated that all or most sustainability data is assured, 
also the explicit description of the data types is also assessed. While this has also often been 
overlooked in previous studies, the indication of specific sustainability data types – e.g., social 
information – further clarifies the scope of the assurance, thus reducing the report users’ need 
to separately confirm the contents of the original sustainability reports, which they may very 
well do, to understand the actual scope of the assurance. Also, if the scope is described in detail 
and the form of the original sustainability report is specified, it may give the report users some 
indications about the contents of the original sustainability disclosures.  
 
The limitations and liabilities regarding the assurance engagement 
According to the main assurance standards and guidelines, there may be many kinds of 
declarations or statements regarding limitations and liabilities included in assurance reports. 
The ISAE 3000, for example, suggests that the report users should be informed if the applicable 
assurance criteria are only designed for a certain purpose or if specific sustainability 
information among the assured data is excluded from the assurance engagement. The ISAE 
3000 even indicates that certain limiting wordings regarding the measurement of GHG data and 
the nature of internal controls have become a norm. The ISAE 3000 also indicates that 
restrictions regarding the use of the assurance report and disclaimers regarding the assuror’s 
liability to various report users should be included.  
In addition to specific disclaimers about limitations and liabilities, the assuror may also include 
an assessment of audit risk in the assurance report (Manetti & Becatti, 2009). The role of audit 
risk is discussed in the main assurance standards, especially the ISAE 3000, and the AA1000AS 
also recommends including this in the assurance engagement plan, which, in practice, may act 
as the basis of the assurance engagement agreement. While not specifically suggested in the 
standards, it is implied that it could be included in the public assurance report, as well. In 
addition, even though there is only little discussion about the subject in previous studies, it still 
seems recommendable to include an appropriate assessment of audit risk in an assurance report. 
It should be noted that this aspect could be assessed individually from other disclaimers, but 
since this is not an established approach in previous studies, it is considered similar to other 
disclaimers and thus included under the same main quality indicator.  
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It should be noted, that it is not considered necessary to always include declarations regarding 
limitations or liabilities in assurance reports. This is also specifically stated, for example, in the 
AA1000AS. However, the standard suggests that the assuror may include this information in 
their assurance reports if they so wish. This seems recommendable, and somehow addressing 
possible limitations or liabilities even if there were none could be justified, as it would eliminate 
any doubts the report users may have about possible limitations. In any case, due to the 
uncertain yet multifaceted nature of whether and what kind of declarations about possible 
limitations or liabilities could or should be included in assurance reports, they are assessed as a 
joint indicator – with a grain of salt – in the context of this study.  
 
The responsibilities of the involved parties 
Clarifying the responsibilities of the involved parties is specifically suggested and discussed in 
the main assurance standards and guidelines. According to the ISAE 3000, for example, the 
responsibilities of the involved parties may include such descriptions as the management’s 
responsibility to prepare and present all relevant subject matter information according to 
applicable criteria and the assuror’s responsibility to express a conclusion according to the 
agreed level of assurance based on obtained evidence. These examples are quite common, but 
assurance-specific responsibilities may also apply. For example, a description of the assured 
company’s responsibility for its adherence to the AA1000 AccountAbility Principles of 
inclusivity, materiality, and responsiveness should be included in assurance reports compliant 
with the AA1000AS.  
Describing the responsibilities of the involved parties is also considered an indicator of quality 
in previous studies. Moreover, often the descriptions of the assuror’s and the assured company’s 
respective responsibilities have been individually assessed and scored. In this study, however, 
the need to ascertain specific quality scores has been eliminated, and therefore they are 
considered a joint indicator of quality. It is also expected that if either of these responsibilities 
is chosen to be clarified, the other is also likely to be present, as previous studies have shown a 
very strong positive correlation between the two (see, e.g., Manetti & Becatti, 2009). In 
addition, the main standards suggest the inclusion of both. If an assurance report includes a 
description of the responsibilities of only one of the involved parties, this will be clarified in 
the results.  
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The procedures undertaken in the assurance engagement 
The procedures undertaken in assurance engagements can vary significantly, also depending on 
the intended level of assurance. Consequently, describing these procedures is important, so that 
the report users better understand the actual contents of the assurance engagement. In addition, 
the indication of a high-quality design of the assurance process can help reduce information 
asymmetries (Fuhrmann et al., 2017). Examples of possible procedures include interviewing 
company management and employees from various organizational levels, assessing stakeholder 
inclusivity and responsiveness based on company documentation, and testing the consolidation 
of information on a sample basis.  
Some previous studies have also analyzed and scored the comprehensiveness of the procedures 
(see, e.g., Perego & Kolk, 2012), as well as the inclusion of control and substantive tests (see, 
e.g., Manetti & Becatti, 2009). The latter is also discussed in the ISAE 3000. Analyzing the 
procedures seems recommended, since, for example, indicating tests of numerical data among 
the procedures can reduce information asymmetries (Fuhrmann et al., 2017), and thus improve 
assurance report quality. However, despite its added value in assessing assurance report quality, 
examining the procedures in detail is considered outside the scope of this study, as it requires 
significant amounts of additional work to be conducted for only a marginal benefit in terms of 
the overall assessment. Indeed, previous studies have often considered the comprehensiveness 
of the procedures to amount to only a small fraction of the total scoring criteria.  
Regarding the assurance process and the undertaken procedures, one aspect seems especially 
underlined in previous studies, namely the indication of stakeholder participation. Indeed, the 
inclusion of stakeholders in the assurance process has been identified to be a crucial, but often 
disregarded, element in successful assurances (Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004; Edgley et al., 2010). 
The importance of stakeholder inclusiveness seems to be rooted in the assured company’s 
management often possessing significant control over the assurance process (see, e.g., Ball et 
al., 2000; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Jones et al., 2016). It then seems logical that the 
management control should be reduced through stakeholder participation and a corresponding 
indication in the assurance report. In addition, including stakeholders in the assurance process 
is discussed both in the AA1000AS and the GRI assurance guidelines, although mostly only 
regarding reasonable assurances. In any case, it seems that the indication of stakeholder 
inclusiveness can increase the value and thus the quality of an assurance report.  
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2.3.5 Conclusion-related quality indicators 
While the assuror and the standard against which the assurance is conducted are both important 
in terms of the overall reliability of the assurance, the conclusion may be the most important 
content element of an assurance report, as it indicates the result of the assurance engagement to 
the report users. Conclusions may also include additional commentary, such as observations or 
reservations about the subject matter. Table 6 below presents these conclusion-related quality 
indicators and their additional aspects, as well as their prevalence in relevant source material. 
The purpose of this subsection is to further discuss these quality indicators. 
 
TABLE 6. CONCLUSION-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS43 
INDICATOR ISAE 3000 AA1000 GRI STUDIES 
• Conclusion(s) clarified x x x x44 
- Form of conclusion indicated x - - x45 
• Additional commentary presented x x - x46 
- Observations or recommendations x x x x47 
- Reservations or qualifications x - x x48 
- Inclusivity (or completeness) - x - x49 
- Materiality x x x x50 
- Responsiveness - x - x51 
- Sustainability performance - x - x52 
- Assuror’s performance - - - x53 
 
                                                 
43 Although rather self-explanatory, the column headings are described in Footnote 15 on page 34. 
44 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya 
et al. (2016), Damen (2016). 
45 E.g., Manetti & Becatti (2009). 
46 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
47 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
48 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Janggu et al. (2013), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
49 E.g., Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
50 E.g., Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
51 E.g., Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
52 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007). 
53 E.g., Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
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The clarity and form of conclusion 
The importance of a clear conclusion is underlined in the main assurance standards, the GRI 
assurance guidelines, and previous literature about assurance engagements. The conclusion can 
be stated in two distinct forms, namely positive or negative. As was indicated earlier in Section 
2.3.2, a positive conclusion states that the subject matter reliably conforms in all material 
aspects with suitable criteria, whereas a negative conclusion states that the subject matter is 
plausible in the circumstances. Because the form of conclusion strongly reflects the agreed level 
of assurance, the positive form is consequently often used in reasonable assurances, and the 
negative in limited assurances. In fact, this is suggested in the ISAE 3000, as well. Since it is 
not a requirement, however, a perfect positive correlation may not always exist (see Manetti & 
Becatti, 2009). All in all, whatever the form of conclusion is, it still reflects the outcome of the 
assurance engagement and is therefore an important part of a high-quality assurance report.  
 
Additional commentary in assurance reports 
As the Table 6 on the previous page indicates, many types of additional commentary, such as 
observations about the subject matter of the assurance, possible recommendations on how to 
improve sustainability reporting based on the assurance, and reflecting on various sustainability 
reporting principles, such as inclusivity, materiality, and responsiveness to stakeholders, can be 
included in an assurance report. In fact, the main assurance standards and guidelines clearly 
support the notion of including additional commentary, especially concerning possible 
reservations which should always be included if necessary. Furthermore, additional 
commentary has been utilized in previous studies to assess the quality of assurance reports. It 
could be argued, though, that the presence of reservations is a sign of lesser assurance quality, 
as it indicates that the subject matter could not have been fully assured. However, since this 
study is concerned with the quality of the reports, addressing reservations is considered a 
positive sign. Previous studies have also often considered these additional aspects equal to other 
quality indicators, but that seems hardly appropriate, as assurance reports are not required to 
address reservations if there are none. However, while this has not been indicated previously, 
there is no reason why a report could not include a statement explaining that the conclusion has 
been formed without any reservations – to eliminate any doubts the reader may have.  
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In addition to possible reservations, the ISAE 3000 states that recommendations may also be 
included in assurance reports. The standard also specifies that if the subject matter consists of 
multiple aspects, separate conclusions may be provided for each of them – reflecting, for 
example, a situation where distinct levels of assurance are provided within a single assurance 
report. The AA1000AS and the GRI assurance guidelines are similar in spirit, but the former 
also implies that a description of progress since last report could also be included.  
The inclusion of recommendations has also been contradicted. Since the aim of assurances is 
to express an opinion on the reliability of the disclosed sustainability information, the assuror 
should refrain from simultaneously advising the management (Manetti & Becatti, 2009), as this 
could jeopardize the independence of the assuror (O’Dwyer, 2011). Despite the mixed views 
on including recommendations, previous studies have often considered them as a significant 
indicator of quality. This study, however, adopts a compromise and treats recommendations as 
only a minor aspect in the overall assessment of conclusion-related indicators. While excluding 
recommendations altogether would have also been justified, this study chooses not to dismiss 
them altogether, as they could benefit the assurance practice in general (O’Dwyer, 2011).  
Besides reservations and recommendations, previous studies have also assessed the inclusion 
of reflecting on certain principles in the assurance reports, namely the principles of inclusivity54, 
materiality, and responsiveness. These principles, in that very order, govern the issues of how 
all relevant stakeholders have been engaged in the companies’ sustainability reporting, how all 
relevant sustainability issues have been reported, and how the sustainability disclosures reflect 
the requirements of key stakeholders. The principles are most heavily rooted in the AA1000AS, 
but the ISAE 3000 and the GRI assurance guidelines also discuss materiality in a similar spirit. 
The AA1000AS, in fact, acknowledges this and states that whichever definition of materiality 
is applied, it needs to be systematic and defensible. While reflecting on these principles in an 
assurance report could be considered a sign of assurance thoroughness, their role in assessing 
the report quality is not straightforward. Since these principles are mostly specific to and 
basically required in the AA1000AS, it seems unjustified to assess them individually as equals 
to other indicators, as it would lead to heavy bias and suggest the superiority of the AA1000AS, 
                                                 
54 The principles to which the conclusions should refer according to the AA1000AS have gone through various 
changes. In the currently applicable version of 2008, inclusivity replaced completeness in the principals. While 
they do differ from each other, they are treated the same in this context to ensure the continuity of the sub-indicator, 
as previous studies have naturally referred to them distinctly, depending on the content of the AA1000 principles. 
 52 
 
a notion for which there is very little evidence. Even if the AA1000AS did result in higher 
quality assurance reports, applying considerable weight to an additional conclusion-related 
aspect seems impractical in this study, as the aim is to provide only an overview of changes and 
differences in the quality of assurance reports in different regulatory contexts.  
Besides the three principles discussed above, the AA1000AS also indicates that the companies’ 
sustainability performance should be addressed in reports of Type II55 assurance engagements. 
In addition, assurance reports could include a reflection on the assuror’s own performance in 
the engagement (Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016) to further illustrate the reliability of the assurance. 
However, since these elements are not very well established, they are not in any way specified 
in the data gathered in this study but will be considered as additional commentary nonetheless.  
Overall, it could be argued that additional commentary is not an indicator of quality, as it is not 
always necessary to include supplementary information in terms of the conclusion. Therefore, 
this quality indicator was nearly entirely excluded from this assessment. However, there are 
multiple reasons for additional commentary, and assurance reports should, perhaps – for clarity 
and to eliminate any doubts the reader may have – somehow address whether any observations 
or reservations, for example, emerged during the assurance process. Thus, the inclusion of 
additional commentary can be considered an aspect of assurance report quality. This is 
especially justified, as the sustainability assurance system is very young and not as established 
as financial auditing, and therefore additional clarity should be especially advocated. This might 
also explain why previous studies have tended to emphasize various types of additional 
commentary in scoring the quality of assurance reports.  
As a final note on the subject, despite the relevance of additional commentary, the conclusion 
itself seems to be the most crucial factor, and everything added or otherwise related to it are 
only supporting elements in the overall assessment of conclusion-related quality indicators. To 
achieve clarity, however, the quality indicator regarding additional commentary was presented 
at the same main level (indent) as the indicator regarding a clear conclusion in Table 6.   
                                                 
55 While not discussed in detail in this document, it should be noted that there are two types of assurance 
engagements under the AA1000AS, namely Type I and Type II engagements. There are multiple differences 
between these engagements, but, in general, a Type I assurance mainly involves a content analysis of the 
completeness of sustainability disclosures and their alignment with the GRI Guidelines, and a Type II assurance 
also examines additional data sets for accuracy, consistency, completeness, and reliability. 
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2.3.6 Formality-related quality indicators 
Formality-related quality indicators consist of the clarity of the heading and the identification 
of the addressees and the report users, as well as the inclusion of several sections and a formal 
signature by the assuror (refer to Table 7 below for details). Since these indicators are mainly 
related to the assurance report only and not in any way to the underlying process, they could be 
considered the least significant of all quality indicators. However, they are still important, as 
they are likely to improve the credibility and understandability of an assurance report. The 
purpose of this subsection is to discuss these formality-related quality indicators in detail.  
 
TABLE 7. FORMALITY-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS56 
INDICATOR ISAE 3000 AA1000 GRI STUDIES 
• Clarity of heading considered x - x x57 
- Independence of the assuror indicated x - - x58 
• Addressee identified x x x x59 
- Stakeholders identified as addressees - - x x60 
- Users separately identified x x x x61 
• Several sections included - - - x62 
• Signature included x - x x63 
- Date specified x x x x64 
- Location specified x x x x65 
  
                                                 
56 Although rather self-explanatory, the column headings are described in Footnote 15 on page 34. 
57 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen 
(2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
58 E.g., Syrjälä (2017). 
59 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Janggu et al. (2013), Zorio et al. (2013), Bollas-Araya 
et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
60 E.g., Perego & Kolk (2012), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & Hahn (2016). 
61 E.g., Janggu et al. (2013). 
62 E.g., Zorio et al. (2013), Damen (2016). 
63 E.g., Damen (2016). 
64 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & 
Hahn (2016). 
65 E.g., O’Dwyer & Owen (2007), Perego & Kolk (2012), Bollas-Araya et al. (2016), Damen (2016), Gürtürk & 
Hahn (2016). 
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The clarity and form of the report heading 
According to the official ISAE 3000 description, an appropriate heading helps immediately 
identify the nature of the assurance report and distinguish it from reports issued by those who 
do not need to comply with the same ethical requirements as professional assurors. Also, the 
clarity of the heading is also mentioned in the GRI assurance guidelines as an important part of 
a formal assurance report. It should be noted, though, that the indication of independence in the 
report heading has not been utilized as a measure of quality in previous studies, but it has been 
discussed in the context of assurance report content analyses. However, since it is specifically 
mentioned in the ISAE 3000 description and seemingly enforces the independence of the 
assuror – an important aspect of assurance reports, as the Section 2.3.3 indicated – it is included 
in this study as an additional aspect of overall assessment of formality-related quality indicators.  
 
The intended audience and report users 
The identification of the addressee is discussed in the main assurance standards and guidelines, 
and it has been utilized in previous studies as an indicator of quality. Some studies (see, e.g., 
Janggu et al., 2013) have separated the addressee and the users of the report – perhaps due to, 
for example, the ISAE 3000 stating that there may be other intended users besides the addressee. 
There is, however, no indication that separately identifying the report users improves the quality 
of an assurance report, which may explain why the GRI assurance guidelines and most previous 
studies have considered the addressee and the report users the same. Still, since it is implied in 
the main assurance standards, this study will examine if the report users are explicitly specified 
in addition to the identified addressee, although this is not expected to be common.  
Previous studies have given relatively much weight to whether the report is addressed to the 
company stakeholders. This may be due to it possibly indicating less management control over 
the assurance process, as management control may be evidenced by not addressing the reports 
to other stakeholders (Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004). However, it could also be a mere consequence 
of the management being the requesting party and the assuror simply responding accordingly 
in terms of the report addressee. Therefore, this study considers the inclusion of stakeholders 
among the addressees an additional aspect in the overall formality-related quality assessment 
of the assurance reports.  
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The readability of assurance reports 
Dividing the report into several sections has been discussed in a handful of studies assessing 
the quality of assurance reports. Utilizing several sections as a sign of assurance report quality 
seems justified, as are clear sections are likely to enhance the readability of the report which 
may present a lot of distinct information in a relatively small space, as the previous subsections 
have implied. This, then, could help the report users better understand the contents of assurance 
reports, which has been stated to be a significant issue in terms of sustainability assurances.  
While the main assurance standards and guidelines do not specifically discuss this aspect, it 
seems that the reporting practices have become somewhat established nonetheless. A quick 
look at recent assurance reports presented by large multinational companies indicates that the 
reports have been divided in separately titled sections such as the scope of the assurance, 
responsibilities of the involved parties, procedures undertaken, and conclusion. It is difficult to 
argue that such distinct sections with clear titles would not enhance the readability of a 
document of any kind in most contexts. Therefore, the inclusion of several sections in an 
assurance report is considered an indicator of report quality in this study. Other elements 
regarding readability, such as font, could also be studied, but these are considered very minor 
and subjective details, which likely explains their absence in previous literature, as well.  
 
The formal signature and identification of the responsible assuror 
The inclusion of a formal signature with a specified date and location is explicitly suggested in 
the main assurance standards and guidelines. Furthermore, the report should be signed by the 
assuror’s most senior executive responsible for the assurance engagement. While the inclusion 
of a formal signature may seem obvious in an official report, its inclusion should not be 
overlooked, as excluding it from an assurance report could impair the report’s credibility. Still, 
most previous studies have not assessed whether the report is formally signed, but they have 
often included the identification of the responsible assuror, as well as the specified date and 
location, as part of the assessment of assurance report quality. This study, on the other hand, 
will assess the inclusion of a formal signature, as well, while also considering the mere 
identification of the responsible senior assuror a sign of quality.  
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3 METHOD AND DATA 
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As was stated in the introduction, the purpose of this study is to produce knowledge about how 
non-financial assurance reporting quality is associated with voluntary and mandatory contexts, 
especially in the case of large companies. Respectively, Finland and France – i.e. 25 very large 
companies by market value listed in the Helsinki and Paris stock exchanges – act as examples 
in a comparative assessment. Assurance reports published by these companies are analyzed 
based on various indicators of quality that have been identified using existing knowledge. The 
examined period spans from 2010 to 2015, thus totaling a possible maximum of 300 reports to 
be assessed, although the actual number should be a bit lower. The importance of this research 
is rooted in the need to gain a better understanding of assurance reporting in distinct regulatory 
contexts, so that future regulations can be as effective as possible. Consequently, the assessment 
in this study is carried out by answering the following two research questions:  
1. How many of the companies presented an assurance report? 
2. Which indicators of quality were present in the companies’ assurance reports? 
The second research question is substantially more emphasized than the first one in the context 
of this study and consists, in fact, of several sub-questions. Each sub-question is based on the 
indicators of quality validated in previous studies (see Tables 3-7 previously in Section 2.3). 
The sub-questions are divided into five categories and are as follows:  
Standard-related quality indicators 
• Is either or both main assurance standards referred to in the assurance reports?  
• What is the indicated level of assurance? Is the level explained?  
• Are additional standards or reporting criteria (e.g., the GRI Guidelines) specified?  
Assuror-related quality indicators 
• Are one or more credible assurors identified?  
• Is the assuror's competence (e.g., multidisciplinary team or experience) described?  
• Is the assuror's independence described? Is a relevant standard or code of ethics cited?  
 57 
 
Process-related quality indicators 
• Is the scope of the assurance stated? What sustainability data is assured?  
• Is the form of the original sustainability report indicated?  
• Are the responsibilities of involved parties clarified? Have stakeholders participated?  
• Are liabilities or limitations addressed?  
• Are the procedures undertaken in the assurance process specified?  
Conclusion-related quality indicators 
• Is the type of conclusion clarified? Is the form of conclusion positive or negative?  
• Is additional commentary (e.g., observations or reservations) presented?  
Formality-related quality indicators 
• Is the report title clearly stated? Does it indicate the independence of the assuror?  
• Are the addressees or the report users explicitly identified? Who are they?  
• Does the report consist of several sections?  
• Is the report formally signed by the assuror? Is the date or the location specified?  
Some quality indicators have additional aspects that will also be analyzed, such as the number 
of reasonable assurances of all indicated assurance levels. These aspects have been intentionally 
left out of the list above but are presented and discussed in Section 4 among the results.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
As was discussed earlier in Section 2.3, assessing the quality of assurance reports is not entirely 
straightforward, and there is still much we do not understand about the exact importance and 
relevance of various elements often found in these reports. Therefore, it could be argued that 
their quality could also be assessed not just by evaluating the reports independently, but also 
by, for example, interviewing various stakeholders about their views on the subject. The latter 
option may not, however, be fruitful at this point, as it has been suggested that stakeholders 
often lack the expertise to properly evaluate the reports (refer to Section 2.2.1 for details). 
Therefore, document analysis – a systematic procedure for reviewing and evaluating documents 
to elicit meaning and develop empirical knowledge (see Bowen, 2009) – seems to be our only 
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relevant option to appropriately study the subject phenomenon. It is noteworthy that, while 
document analysis is often considered only complementary to other research methods, it can be 
used as a standalone method for specialized forms of qualitative research – especially, if 
documents are the only viable and representative source of information (Bowen, 2009).  
Document analysis is essentially a form of qualitative content analysis, as its general purpose 
is indeed to derive meanings and make inferences regarding the examined phenomenon based 
on the analyzed data (see, e.g., Bengtsson, 2016). Qualitative content analysis is a widely used 
research technique, which can be applied with different approaches, such as conventional, 
directed, and summative approaches (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This study mostly includes 
elements from the latter two, as the utilized quality assessment criteria are essentially based on 
existing knowledge (directed approach) and the analysis involves counting and comparisons 
followed by the interpretation of the underlying context (summative approach). In addition to 
the aforementioned three approaches, a qualitative content analysis can also be conducted as a 
manifest analysis, i.e. focusing strictly on the visible and obvious content, such as words, or as 
a latent analysis, i.e. finding the underlying meaning of the content (see, e.g., Bengtsson, 2016). 
The first description seems to fit this study better, as the conducted form of analysis focuses on 
the visible report elements and text, i.e., in this case, the apparent quality of the report, not 
necessarily any underlying meanings, e.g., regarding the quality of the assurance engagement.  
In general, document analysis consists of three distinct main phases: skimming, i.e. a superficial 
examination, reading, i.e. a thorough examination, and interpretation (Bowen, 2009). This 
process – which may also be iterative – also includes elements of thematic analysis, which is a 
form of pattern recognition within the data (see Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). In other 
words, the data is carefully reviewed for pertinent themes regarding the phenomenon, and 
coding schemes and categorization are altered accordingly. Elements of thematic analysis can 
be seen in this study, as well, as it somewhat deviates from existing quality assessment methods 
due to observations made from the data during the early stages of document analysis. In other 
words, compiling the ultimate set of quality indicators for this study was conducted in the spirit 
of thematic analysis.  
It should be noted that, while there seem to be essentially no other viable methods to use in this 
study, document analysis possesses many attractive characteristics that would nonetheless 
support its use even if there were other options. In general, document analysis is especially 
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applicable to qualitative case studies that focus on a single phenomenon (Stake, 1995; Yin, 
1994). Documents are also very suitable for repeated reviews and enable objectively tracking 
changes and developments of events – especially, when these events cannot be observed or 
when informants do not remember them anymore (Bowen, 2009). In addition, document 
analysis is efficient and cost-effective, as – especially public – documents are often easily 
available (Bowen, 2009). These qualities seem to strongly support the notion of utilizing 
document analysis as the main research method in this study, as the objective is to examine 
possible changes in a single phenomenon, and the sample consists of nearly 300 publicly 
available documents, each with a plethora of individual aspects to be assessed and reviewed.  
Despite its strong benefits – especially in the context of this study – document analysis is not 
without its shortcomings. Depending on the nature of the documents, they may not always be 
retrievable, and, even if they are, most of them have been originally produced for other than 
research purposes, which may ultimately make them insufficient in terms of answering the 
defined research problem (Bowen, 2009). Also, if all the necessary documents cannot be 
collected, it may result in a form of biased selectivity in terms of the overall data (Yin, 1994). 
In addition, as was already indicated earlier in this subsection, document analysis may not 
always be independently sufficient to find the desired answers – other research methods are 
often needed. Still, in this case, the positives seem to heavily outweigh the negatives, supporting 
the notion of document analysis being the research method of choice for this study. 
Now that the main research method has been discussed in a general manner, it is appropriate to 
explore how document analysis has been applied in this study particularly. As the study is 
specifically interested in the quality of assurance reports, the evaluated documents naturally 
consist solely of assurance reports of non-financial information published by the included 
companies. The assurance reports are expected to be found on the companies’ websites, if such 
reports exist. If a report cannot be accessed via a company’s website or another source specified 
by the company, but it is indicated that such a report exists, no effort is made to find the report 
in question. This scenario is extremely unlikely, but, if it occurs, an inaccessible report will be 
considered to not exist, as its contents cannot be verified. An appropriate notation, if indeed 
even necessary, will be made in the data. The decision to exclude such documents is based on 
two reasons. First, in a document analysis, it is necessary to determine the authenticity and 
credibility of the included documents (see Bowen, 2009), which may be essentially impossible 
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if that has not been done by the companies already. Second, the additional work needed to hunt 
down every possible document may turn out to be considerable, especially for a relatively small 
benefit, as the role of a single document in the overall picture should not be critical.  
When the assurance reports have been located and accessed, the data from the reports is 
tabulated and analyzed so that detailed and valid inferences and comparisons can eventually be 
made. For the sake of transparency – which is essentially required of a proper document analysis 
(see Bowen, 2009) – the entire gathered data is accessible at the end of this document. In any 
case, the quantity of assurance reporting is simply assessed by considering any relevant 
statement of verification to be an assurance report as defined in this study (for details, refer to 
Section 2.2.1). If a company presents more than one assurance report per year – which is 
expected to occur only rarely, if at all – they are considered a single report to avoid distortion 
of the results. This decision was made due to it being expected that these assurance reports 
cover different issues with distinct levels of assurance, and thus their other contents can be 
effectively combined to form a single assurance report. An alternative approach would be to 
select only one of the presented assurance reports for further assessment. This, however, would 
likely cause distortions of the results, as these assurance reports are, indeed, expected to be 
complementary rather than substitutes, and significant information could then be excluded. If a 
company presented more than one assurance report in a single year, an appropriate notation is 
included both in the data and the corresponding discussion.  
As explained earlier in the introduction, the companies representing Finland and France consist 
of 25 very large companies by market value listed in the respective stock exchanges of both 
countries. In essence, this study simply includes the top 25 companies in the CAC40 stock index 
of the Paris stock exchange, and the entirety of the OMXH25 stock index of the Helsinki stock 
exchange. It should be noted that the OMXH25 does not technically include only the largest 
companies, but the most traded instead. The index is, however, the most often cited of the 
indices in the Helsinki stock exchange, and still includes very large and visible companies 
which should make it applicable for the purposes of this study. The companies have been 
selected based on the available component data of the aforementioned indices at the end of 
2016. The only exclusion is the Finnish company Valmet, which has been replaced with 
Kemira. The decision to exclude Valmet is based on it being essentially founded in 2013 – in 
the middle of the examined period of this study – via the demerger of Metso Corporation which 
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is also included in this study. Including Valmet, then, would have obviously caused unnecessary 
absence of data. The decision to include Kemira instead is due to it being the last company to 
have been excluded from the OMXH25 before the end of 2016 when it was replaced by Metsä 
Board. Further discussion and descriptive statistics about the included companies is presented 
in Section 3.3. 
The decision to use only very large and visible companies from both countries is mainly due to 
it resulting in the most straightforward method of obtaining a suitable sample. As the discussion 
in Section 2.1. indicated, it is expected that these companies are under the most pressure in 
terms of their sustainability disclosures and reporting practices, as both company size and 
visibility seem to be one of the most significant determinants of the likeliness of a company to 
engage in sustainability reporting and thus face the decision whether to externally assure the 
reported information. Also, most data available regarding assurance reporting considers only 
the largest companies (see, e.g., the regularly published reports about corporate responsibility 
by KPMG and PwC). This aspect is, however, mostly only relevant in terms of the companies 
in the Helsinki stock exchange, as the Grenelle II Act is anyway strongly pushing companies 
in the Paris stock exchange towards sustainability reporting and assurance.  
At this point, it should be noted that the included companies were not screened beforehand in 
terms of whether they report on their sustainability – let alone what they report – during the 
examined period. It is expected due to their characteristics that most – if not all – companies 
likely engage in some form of sustainability reporting. If a company does not, it simply adds to 
the overall picture of sustainability disclosures in the represented country. While it could be 
argued that only those companies that report on their sustainability should be included, this 
approach might have resulted in cherry-picking of companies and thus possible biases. Also, as 
the examined period covers multiple years, it would have required extensive additional work to 
ascertain which companies reported throughout – or at least most frequently – during the period.  
In any case, as was briefly indicated earlier in Section 2.3, this study applies a different 
approach to assessing assurance report quality than its predecessors which seem to have mainly 
utilized two distinct approaches – although both of them are forms of content analyses, as well. 
The first approach (originally by Perego & Kolk, 2012) is based on scoring the assurance reports 
based on individual indicators, with each indicator usually producing a score of either 0 or 1 of 
the total score. The second approach (originally by Zorio et al., 2013), utilizes an index that 
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applies weights on the quality indicators based on their relevance in terms of overall assurance 
report quality, and then produces a total score based on the results of each indicator. While both 
of these contributions are welcomed and appreciated in an otherwise scarce research landscape 
of assurance quality, there are inherent faults in these methods.  
Applying weights on the indicators is very ambitious, even laudable, and probably, in theory, 
the best way to score the quality of assurance reports. However, since very little is known about 
the specific importance of each individual quality indicator, the weights are inevitably mostly 
based on pure speculation. In addition, this method, as utilized previously, includes only a part 
of known indicators of assurance report quality, and is thus incomplete. This defect could be 
easily mitigated by increasing the number of indicators to include all known quality indicators, 
but there would then be no precedence as to how the weights should be applied to this new set 
of indicators, even if the original weights were accurate. For this approach – which could be 
called a balanced assurance report scorecard – to properly work, much more information about 
the importance of each quality indicator is required. This, however, could prove to be 
impossible due to various users of assurance reports likely having different views on the subject.  
The other previously utilized approach, on the other hand, is quite comprehensive. It also makes 
no attempt to apply accurate weights to the indicators, but it does, however, consider evidently 
important indicators, such as stating the level of assurance (see, e.g., Manetti & Becatti, 2009), 
equally important to, for example, whether the report specifies the location of the assuror. This 
seems hardly practical, or even appropriate, and is likely to result in misleading total quality 
scores for the assessed assurance reports.  
To avoid the aforementioned defects in previous approaches, this study utilizes a method based 
on indicator categories, so that different aspects of quality can be holistically compared between 
the assessed assurance reports. To clarify, the quality indicators are not assigned any specific 
weights and are therefore not precisely quantified. In other words, only the presence of an 
indicator is assessed. Additionally, to tackle the problem of considering all indicators equal, 
some indicators consist of additional aspects, i.e. sub-indicators, which are also assessed as part 
of the overall assessment. For example, clearly stating the form of conclusion of the assurance 
engagement is considered a main indicator of quality within its category, but whether the 
conclusion discusses the aspect of materiality, is only considered to be supporting information 
instead of a main indicator in the overall assessment.  
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While there is no precedent, it seems logical that assessing the quality of assurance reports 
based on distinct indicator categories – with some indicators consisting of both main and 
supporting aspects – eliminates the problem of finding appropriate balance between individual 
indicators and enables the utilization of all known quality indicators in an appropriate and 
effective manner without relying on speculation on their relative importance. The assessment 
method based on categories is also supported by the fact that all quality indicators can be 
divided naturally into an appropriate set of five distinct categories which were specified 
previously both in Sections 2.3.1 and 3.1.  
Even though the manner in which the research method is applied in this study seems well-
argued and likely capable of providing original scientific contributions with relevant and 
credible answers to the research questions, it still possesses certain shortcomings. Most 
importantly, the applied method based on unspecified weights of both indicator categories as 
well as individual indicators does not allow for accurately stating and comparing the overall 
level of quality between the two included countries. It is unfortunate that there simply seems to 
be no credible method of doing that at the moment, as more information about the importance 
of each quality indicator is needed, as was indicated earlier. While it should be remembered 
that the purpose of this study is not to be as quantitatively accurate as possible, but rather offer 
broader indications about the subject phenomenon, it still does not change the fact that the 
applied method is likely to not provide an exhaustively accurate answer to the research question.  
In addition, the included data set is relatively large – in fact, likely the largest in a study 
representing this specific field to date – which means that the applied method is bound to lack 
a certain level of analytical depth. While the applied method is still very rigorous, it does omit 
certain elements that could be further studied, such as the types of procedures specified in the 
assurance reports. Also, the study does not include a thorough analysis of the used wordings, 
with the exception of certain quality indicators, as was previously discussed in Section 2.3.  
Therefore, there is a chance that some interesting details are ultimately ignored in the study, 
although they would likely only have a very marginal effect on the overall results.  
As a final note about the shortcomings of the applied method, regarding the first research 
question, it should be stated that the number of included companies may necessarily not be 
appropriate to properly answer a quantity-related question. However, it should be remembered 
that this study focuses on large companies only, which partially addresses this issue, as the 
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number of included companies should give appropriate indications about the population they 
represent. Still, an even higher number of companies would obviously be more desired, but 
since the main focus of this study is the aspect of assurance report quality, not quantity, the 
included number of companies was ultimately limited to a total of 25 per country.  
While one could argue that the quantity of assurance reports could have been disregarded 
altogether, it was still considered a relevant subject to explore for three reasons. First, the 
quantity of assurance reports regarding these specific companies was not known beforehand, 
thus providing new and useful knowledge. Second, it is likely to illustrate the possible effects 
of the Grenelle II Act in France, as the regulation in question is mostly concerned with the 
presence, not the contents, of assurance reports. Third, and finally, it adds to the overall context 
of the included companies, and thus helps put the rest of the findings into proper perspective. 
All in all, this study is likely to provide proper indications about the subject phenomenon, 
despite the identified shortcomings, due to the thoroughness of the analysis. The applied method 
also paints a tangible picture about how the countries fared in each area of quality compared to 
the other country. This data may, in fact, be even more useful than a total sum of guessed 
estimates of quality. Moreover, the strength of the applied method lies in the fact that even 
when knowledge about the importance of each individual indicator improves, the results of this 
study are still likely to apply, as the assessment was based on argued discretion rather than 
arbitrary values which are more than likely to change as knowledge about them improves.  
 
3.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE EXAMINED COMPANIES 
This subsection presents descriptive statistics of the examined companies to further illustrate 
the context of this study. The gathered data is presented with separate tables for companies 
representing each country (Tables 8 and 9, respectively) on the next two pages. The data has 
been selected so that it creates a concise yet versatile picture of each company. Specifically, the 
data consists of each company’s market capitalization (MCAP), weight in its respective stock 
index, number of employees, reach of operations, location of headquarters (HQ), and industry. 
While these variables were considered the most suitable for the purposes of this subsection, 
other approaches or similar combinations of variables would have also likely sufficed.   
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TABLE 8. OVERVIEW OF THE EXAMINED OMXH25 COMPANIES 
Company MCAP (Bn€)66 Weight67 Employees68 Operations69 HQ70 Industry71 
Amer Sports 2,90 2,28 % 8 600 Global Finland Personal & Household Goods 
Cargotec 2,56 1,43 % 11 200 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
Elisa 6,05 3,86 % 4 700 Local Finland Telecommunications 
Fortum 15,82 6,07 % 8 100 Global Finland Utilities 
Huhtamäki 3,90 2,54 % 17 100 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
Kemira 1,69 N/A72 4 800 Global Finland Chemicals 
Kesko 3,30 2,49 % 22 500 Europe Finland Retail 
KONE 18,36 9,00 % 52 100 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
Konecranes 2,82 1,98 % 11 000 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
Metso 3,94 1,10 % 1 2000 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
Metsä Board 2,59 2,40 % 2 500 Global Finland Basic Resources 
Neste 14,70 5,84 % 5 000 Global Finland Oil & Gas 
Nokia 26,34 12,14 % 102 800 Global Finland Technology 
Nokian Tyres 5,10 3,91 % 4 400 Global Finland Automobiles & Parts 
Nordea Bank 35,80 3,35 % 31 600 Europe Sweden Banks 
Orion 2,81 2,13 % 3 400 Global Finland Health Care 
Outokumpu 2,72 1,65 % 10 600 Global Finland Basic Resources 
Outotec 1,42 0,74 % 4 200 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
Sampo 24,96 9,75 % 6 800 Local Finland Insurance 
Stora Enso 9,44 6,38 % 25 000 Global Finland Basic Resources 
Telia Company 17,10 0,79 % 26 200 Global Sweden Telecommunications 
Tieto 2,20 1,49 % 13 100 Global Finland Technology 
UPM-Kymmene 15,77 10,13 % 19 300 Global Finland Basic Resources 
Wärtsilä 10,89 6,16 % 18 300 Global Finland Industrial Goods & Services 
YIT 1,47 0,62 % 5 800 Europe Finland Construction & Materials 
                                                 
66 The market capitalizations have been obtained from the official Nasdaq OMX Nordic website (Mar 18, 2018).  
67 The weights in the OMXH25 index are presented as per the official component listings of Mar 1, 2018. These 
weights have been obtained from the official Nasdaq OMX Nordic website (Mar 18, 2018). 
68 The numbers of employees have been obtained from the websites of each individual company and, if needed, 
rounded to the closest hundred. The numbers can be based on any year between 2015 and 2018. 
69 The regions where companies operate are divided in three categories: local, Europe, and global. “Local” 
indicates operations almost entirely within a single country. “Europe” includes all European countries as well as 
Russia in its entirety. “Global” indicates worldwide operations on at least two different continents.  
70 HQ stands for headquarters. Only the country has been specified, as further details were considered unnecessary.  
71 The industry has been classified as per the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) supersector level.  
72 Due to Kemira – not a component of the OMXH25 index since mid-2006 – replacing Valmet for this study, it 
naturally has no weight in the OMXH25. However, Kemira’s last index weight before exclusion was 1,04 %.  
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TABLE 9. OVERVIEW OF THE EXAMINED CAC40 COMPANIES 
Company MCAP (Bn€)73 Weight74 Employees75 Operations76 HQ77 Industry78 
Air Liquide 43,56 3,78 % 68 000 Global France Chemicals 
Airbus (EADS) 74,36 4,85 % 133 800 Global The Netherlands Industrial Goods & Services 
Arcelor Mittal 27,23 1,54 % 198 500 Global Luxembourg Basic Resources 
AXA 55,28 3,81 % 165 000 Global France Insurance 
BNP Paribas 77,99 6,06 % 189 000 Global France Banks 
Carrefour 13,13 0,81 % 384 200 Global France Retail 
Danone 45,13 3,73 % 99 800 Global France Food & Beverage 
Engie (GDF Suez) 32,97 1,99 % 153 100 Global France Utilities 
Essilor 24,43 2,02 % 64 000 Global France Health Care 
Kering (PPR) 48,23 2,54 % 35 900 Global France Retail 
L’Oreal 100,81 3,97 % 89 100 Global France Personal & Household Goods 
LafargeHolcim 27,48 1,80 % 82 000 Global Switzerland Construction & Materials 
LVMH 125,48 5,93 % 120 000 Global France Personal & Household Goods 
Michelin 22,82 1,99 % 112 800 Global France Automobiles & Parts 
Orange 37,33 2,44 % 155 200 Global France Telecommunications 
Pernod Ricard 35,41 2,50 % 18 200 Global France Food & Beverage 
Publicis 13,35 1,04 % 80 000 Global France Media 
Saint-Gobain 25,46 2,14 % 185 400 Global France Construction & Materials 
Sanofi 82,98 6,49 % 110 000 Global France Health Care 
Schneider Electric 41,57 3,34 % 144 000 Global France Industrial Goods & Services 
Société Générale 36,51 2,87 % 146 000 Global France Banks 
Total 125,83 9,79 % 102 200 Global France Oil & Gas 
Unibail-Rodamco 19,13 1,67 % 1 500 Europe France Real Estate 
Vinci 48,59 3,58 % 183 500 Global France Construction & Materials 
Vivendi 28,15 1,80 % 20 300 Global France Media 
                                                 
73 The market capitalizations have been obtained from the official Euronext website (Mar 18, 2018).  
74 The weights in the CAC40 index are presented as per the official component listings of Mar 1, 2018. These 
weights have been obtained from the official Euronext website (Mar 18, 2018). However, the individual companies 
have been selected based on their weights in the beginning of 2013, which was considered a better point of time 
due to the examined period of this study. The historical weights were retrieved from www.sharptrader.com. 
75 The numbers of employees have been obtained from the websites of each individual company and, if needed, 
rounded to the closest hundred. The numbers can be based on any year between 2015 and 2018. 
76 The regions where companies operate are divided in three categories: local, Europe, and global. “Local” 
indicates operations almost entirely within a single country. “Europe” includes all European countries as well as 
Russia in its entirety. “Global” indicates worldwide operations on at least two different continents. 
77 HQ stands for headquarters. Only the country has been specified, as further details were considered unnecessary. 
78 The industry has been classified as per the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) supersector level.  
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The examined companies are mostly large multinationals with global operations and domestic 
headquarters, overall representing all three main sectors of the economy. Finnish companies 
tend to emphasize the primary and secondary sectors more heavily than French companies, 
although most of them operate simultaneously in the services sector, as well. While roughly 
half of the companies from Finland operate in the industrial goods and basic resources 
industries, French companies are more evenly spread between various industries, such as 
construction, retail, household goods, banks, and media. Despite the different emphasis on 
industries, the only ones represented in only one of the examined countries are the food and 
beverage and the media industries, as they are present only among French companies.  
The average market capitalization of companies representing Finland is nearly €10 billion, 
while the number in France is almost €50 billion. The smallest company by MCAP in Finland 
is the industrial technology company Outotec (€1.42 billion), and the largest Nordea Bank 
(€35.8 billion). In France, the respective companies are the retailer Carrefour (€13.1 billion), 
and the oil giant Total (€125.8 billion). The average difference in company size between the 
two countries is also evident from the number of employees, as companies representing France 
employ around 120 000 people on average compared to only a bit over 17 000 in Finland. 
Interestingly, the smallest employer is the French real estate giant Unibail-Rodamco with only 
1 500 employees, as the respective company in Finland, the paper and pulp multinational Metsä 
Board, employs around 2 500 employees. The largest employer overall, by far, is Carrefour 
with nearly 400 000 employees. The largest employer representing Finland is Nokia with 
slightly over 100 000 people employed. On average, the size of the companies seems to reflect 
upon their respective index weights, but the correlation is only somewhat positive.  
As was discussed in Section 2, multiple factors, such as company size, industry, visibility, and 
scale of operations, as well as the greater legal and cultural contexts may determine the presence 
and quality of sustainability disclosures. Overall, the companies representing both Finland and 
France seem quite evenly matched in terms of these factors, and thus an appropriate comparison 
should be possible. Even though the companies in France are larger and slightly more global 
than in Finland, the latter are nevertheless relatively large in their regional context and operate 
in industries with notable environmental and social concerns, which may also significantly 
increase the likeliness of sustainability assurances. Therefore, the differences in the company 
sizes are very unlikely to affect the results, which are presented in the next section.   
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 THE QUANTITY OF ASSURANCE REPORTING 
The quantity of assurance reports was assessed by considering any kind of a statement of 
verification by an independent third party presented as a part of the examined companies’ 
annual non-financial reporting an assurance report. The amounts of and the changes in the 
quantity of assurance reports both in Finland and France during the examined period are 
illustrated in Graph 1 below. Appendix A at the end of this document presents the complete 
tabulated data about which companies presented assurance reports in each examined year.  
 
GRAPH 1. THE QUANTITY OF ASSURANCE REPORTS 
 
In Finland, the amount of assurance reports increased greatly, from 56 % (n = 14) in 2010 to 80 
% (n = 20) in 2015. In France, the increase was even more substantial than in Finland. After 
the Grenelle II Act became effective in 2012 in France, essentially all companies included in 
this study presented an assurance report every year, whereas in 2010 the amount was only 64 
% (n = 16) of the companies. In total, 101 assurance reports were presented in Finland, and 133 
in France, thus resulting in average annual rates of 67 % (n ≈ 17) and 89 % (n ≈ 22), 
respectively. After the Grenelle II Act, the rates were 71 % (n ≈ 18) and 99 % (n ≈ 25), 
correspondingly. Only four companies did not present an assurance report during any of the 
examined years: Sampo (Insurance), Orion (Health Care), Amer Sports (Personal & Household 
Goods), and YIT (Construction & Materials), all representing Finland.   
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4.2 STANDARD-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS79 
The main assurance standards 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the two main sustainability assurance standards are the ISAE 3000 
and the AA1000AS. The amount of assurance reports referring to either of them is presented in 
Graph 2 below. Appendix B at the end of this document presents the entire company-specific 
data regarding the main assurance standards. 
 
GRAPH 2. EITHER ISAE 3000 OR AA1000AS AS THE MAIN ASSURANCE STANDARD 
 
As we notice, the amount of companies referring to either of the assurance standards is high in 
both countries throughout the period. It is noteworthy, however, that before the Grenelle II Act 
was effective, the amount in Finland was over 10 percentage points higher on average than in 
France. Since then, the amount has been either as high or a bit higher in France than in Finland. 
In total, 76 % (n = 77) of the assurance reports presented in Finland referred to the ISAE 3000 
standard, and 37 % (n = 37) to the AA1000AS. In France, the respective amounts were 89 % 
(n = 119) and 3 % (n = 4). While there was relatively little annual variance in these amounts, it 
should be noted that, in France, the ISAE 3000 increased its prevalence from 75 % (12) in 2010 
to 96 % (24) in 2015, whereas the AA1000AS was eventually entirely absent in 2014 and 2015. 
                                                 
79 The percentages in all graphs and tables in this section have been calculated by using the annual numbers of 
presented assurance reports per country as the corresponding denominators, unless noted otherwise. For the exact 
denominator values for each year, refer to Appendix A. 
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In addition to examining the presence of either of the main assurance standards, the frequency 
of referring to both of those standards in a single assurance report was assessed. Interestingly, 
as seen from Graph 3 below, in Finland, it was relatively common of assurance reports to refer 
to both ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS. In the studied period, about one out of four reports on 
average in Finland referred to both standards, whereas only a single report in France (presented 
by Arcelor Mittal) did the same each year between 2011-2013.  
 
GRAPH 3. BOTH ISAE 3000 AND AA1000AS AS THE MAIN ASSURANCE STANDARDS 
 
As a final note about the main assurance standards, it should be stated that if the assurance 
reports that referred to the Swedish local assurance standard RevR 6 as their main standard 
instead of the ISAE 3000 or the AA1000AS were included, the amount of reports referring to 
either of these main assurance standards would be a full 100 % throughout the examined period 
in Finland. The inclusion of these reports could be justified, as RevR 6 is heavily based on the 
ISAE 3000. However, as the Section 2.3.2 indicated, this study focuses on the internationally 
accepted forms of the original standards to maintain comparability, which is also why the 
observations of the RevR 6 are excluded from the graph. In addition, there is no barrier for these 
assurance reports to simultaneously refer to both the ISAE 3000 and the RevR 6, if there is 
reason to do so. Therefore, referring to only a local assurance standard instead of an 
international one can be considered a lesser indicator of quality, as it impairs the comparability 
of the assurance to other assurances, unless the local standard is explicitly mentioned to match 
a specific international standard. Unsurprisingly, this local assurance standard was present in 
the assurance reports of companies headquartered in Sweden rather than in Finland.   
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The level of assurance 
In both countries, it was extremely common to indicate the level of assurance in assurance 
reports. Each year the amount was well over 90 % in both Finland and France, even reaching a 
full 100 % in some years in both countries, as seen from Graph 4 below. The graph also presents 
the amounts of reports that further explained the level of assurance. The complete data about 
which companies’ reports indicated and explained the level of assurance can be found in 
Appendices C and D, respectively. 
 
GRAPH 4. THE LEVEL OF ASSURANCE INDICATED AND EXPLAINED 
 
The indicated level of assurance was mostly “limited” instead of “reasonable”, although, in 
France, it was relatively common to present hybrid assurances – i.e. providing a limited and a 
reasonable assurance for distinct parts of the assured data in a single report – or two separate 
assurance reports with distinct levels of assurance. In total, 26 reasonable assurances were 
presented in France, compared to only one in Finland. However, the reasonable assurances were 
mostly for small parts of the assured data, namely specific environmental data. Only a single 
company in France – Essilor in 2011 – presented a complete reasonable assurance report, and 
even that report covered only environmental and social sustainability data.  
The indicated level of assurance was not always further explained. In Finland, the average rate 
of reports that explained – often thoroughly – the level of assurance was 86 % (n = 87) with 
slight annual variance. In France, however, the difference compared to Finland was rather 
enormous, as only two reports overall further explained the indicated level of assurance.  
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Additional standards and criteria 
In France, it was very uncommon to refer to the GRI Guidelines, as indicated in Graph 5 below, 
with only a total of eight assurance reports overall referring to the GRI Guidelines between 
2010-2014, and none in 2015. However, in Finland, it was increasingly popular, with around 
90 % (n = 15) of the reports on average annually referring to the GRI Guidelines as assurance 
reporting criteria during the examined period. The complete set of data about references to the 
GRI Guidelines can be found in Appendix E. 
 
GRAPH 5. ADDITIONAL STANDARDS OR CRITERIA SPECIFIED80 
 
The graph above also illustrates the total amounts of other additional standards and criteria 
besides the GRI Guidelines specified in the assurance reports. In France, none of the reports 
had any additional standards specified in their assurance reports, whereas roughly 25 % (n ≈ 5) 
of the reports on average annually in Finland had at least one additional standard specified 
between 2010-2014. In 2015, the amount spiked up to 65 % (n = 13). For the complete 
company-specific data about the cited additional standards and criteria, refer to Appendix F.  
The only additional standards directly related to the assured data were the GHG Protocol and 
the ISO 14000 series standards, namely the ISO 14001 (environmental management) and the 
                                                 
80 While it has been, at times, discussed in previous studies, this study considers it rather insignificant which 
version of the GRI Guidelines was cited as reporting criteria in assurance reports, as it adds little to no value to the 
quality of the assurance report itself. Therefore, that data has been left out from the presentation of the results. 
However, for those who are interested, this data is still presented in the Appendix F, as it was catalogued for 
possible use while gathering the data about additional assurance standards and criteria.  
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ISO 14064-3 (greenhouse gases). In fact, the GHG Protocol and either of the ISO standards, if 
present, were often specified together in the same report. During the examined period, the 
frequency of these observations declined, however, as Table 10 below illustrates. The standard 
that caused the notable increase in 2015 in Finland was the ISQC 1 which was cited in over a 
half of the assurance reports as a standard of general quality control for the assurance process. 
The local Swedish assurance standard called RevR 6 – which was also mentioned earlier in this 
section – is also included in the table below, as it can be considered a significant additional 
assurance standard despite its lack of comparability to assurances conducted in France, for 
example. The table only includes data from Finland, as assurance reports in France had no 
additional quality standards specified during the entire examined period.  
 
TABLE 10. THE ADDITIONAL STANDARDS SPECIFIED (EXCL. THE GRI GUIDELINES) 
Additional standards 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GHG Protocol 14 % (2) 19 % (3) 12 % (2) 6 % (1) 18 % (3) 10 % (2) 
ISO 14000 Series 7 % (1) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 
ISQC 1 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 55 % (11) 
RevR 6 7 % (1) 6 % (1) 12 % (2) 12 % (2) 12 % (2) 10 % (2) 
None 79 % (11) 75 % (12) 76 % (13) 82 % (14) 71 % (12) 35 % (7) 
 
It is also noteworthy that many assurance reports in both countries referred to company-specific 
or entirely unspecified quality control protocols that the assurors have put in place regarding 
the assurance engagement. However, as these protocols were indeed very poorly explained and 
incomparable across multiple contexts, they were excluded from this assessment. Assurance 
reports often also referred to the assured companies’ internal guidelines. These were excluded 
from this study, as well, as such guidelines are company-specific and thus not comparable 
between all examined companies. Industry-specific standards, which were present only very 
rarely, were treated similarly. In addition, general standards of the accounting profession were 
excluded as it was usually unclear how these standards specifically related to the actual 
assurance engagements. For a discussion about the most relevant additional assurance standards 
and criteria, refer to the previously presented Section 2.3.2, if necessary.   
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4.3 ASSUROR-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS81 
The assurance providers 
All assurance reports in both countries were assured by credible auditors or other experts, such 
as sustainability or certification experts. The auditors – which consisted solely of the Big Four 
companies – were by far the more popular of the two assuror types in both countries. In Finland, 
other experts assured 24 % (n = 4) of the reports on average each year, whereas this was the 
case with only a handful of reports in France. The types of assurors per year are illustrated in 
Graph 6 below. The complete data about the assurors can be found in Appendix G. 
 
GRAPH 6. THE TYPES OF ASSURORS PER YEAR 
 
As the graph implies, the companies, at times, used multiple assurors per year, a phenomenon 
which was briefly discussed earlier in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.3. In France, between 2010-2011 
half of the companies utilized multiple assurors to assure their sustainability data – whether by 
joint auditing or separate engagements for distinct parts of sustainability data. This amount 
steeply declined, however, as between 2014-2015 only four assurances were provided by more 
than one assuror. Meanwhile, in Finland, only one company during the period had two assurors 
provide a joint assurance for their sustainability data. This occurred in 2010.   
                                                 
81 The percentages in all graphs and tables in this section have been calculated by using the annual numbers of 
presented assurance reports per country as the corresponding denominators, unless noted otherwise. For the exact 
denominator values for each year, refer to Appendix A. 
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The independence of the assuror 
In both 2010 and 2011, the relative amount of reports describing the assuror’s independence 
was higher in Finland than in France, with an average rate of 53 % (n = 8) compared to 41 % 
(n = 7), respectively. After the Grenelle II Act became effective in 2012, the roles were 
completely reversed. In fact, between 2012-2015, about 95 % (n ≈ 24) of the reports on average 
annually in France described the assuror’s independence. Meanwhile, reports in Finland lagged 
a bit with a respective amount of around 66 % (n ≈ 12). It is noteworthy, that the amount in 
Finland spiked up to 80 % (n = 16) in 2015, with an increase of 21 percentage points (6 reports) 
from 2014, even though it was still no match for the respective amount in France, which was 
96 % (n = 24) at the time. Graph 7 below further illustrates these amounts. Appendix H, in turn, 
includes the complete company-specific information.  
 
GRAPH 7. THE ASSUROR’S INDEPENDENCE DESCRIBED 
 
The graph above also indicates the annual amounts of relevant standards or codes of ethics 
which were used to further explain and justify the assuror’s independence. As the graph 
demonstrates, it was common to include a reference to either a general or specific standard or 
code related to the assuror’s independence requirements. In France, it seems, this was an even 
more common occurrence than in Finland. In fact, almost all reports that described the assuror’s 
independence in France also referred to an independence standard or code, whereas similar 
references were present in only roughly three out of four reports in Finland. Detailed data about 
the used standards and codes can be found in Appendix I.  
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However, the previous graph presents only one side of this symbolic coin that is the description 
of the assuror’s independence. The other side is presented below in Table 11 which details the 
cited independence standards and codes in both countries throughout the examined period.  
 
TABLE 11. THE INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS OR CODES OF ETHICS CITED 
Standard or code (FIN) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
IESBA / IFAC 14 % (2) 13 % (2) 12 % (2) 24 % (4) 29 % (5) 55 % (11) 
General / Professional 7 % (1) 0 % (0) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 10 % (2) 
Company-specific 21 % (3) 25 % (4) 24 % (4) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 
None 57 % (8) 63 % (10) 59 % (10) 65 % (11) 65 % (11) 35 % (7) 
       
Standard or code (FRA) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
IESBA / IFAC 0 % (0) 11 % (2) 4 % (1) 4 % (1) 0 % (0) 4 % (1) 
General / Professional 38 % (6) 28 % (5) 83 % (20) 88 % (22) 92 % (23) 92 % (23) 
Company-specific 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 4 % (1) 4 % (1) 4 % (1) 0 % (0) 
None 63 % (10) 61 % (11) 8 % (2) 4 % (1) 4 % (1) 4 % (1) 
 
 
As the table indicates, most reports in France between 2012-2015 referred to a general standard, 
such as a professional code for the assuror’s profession or a national accounting standard. These 
reports did not clarify that the cited standards were equivalent to specific independence codes, 
such as the IESBA Code of Ethics, which is why they may not be considered similarly credible. 
In 2010 and 2011, the reports in France mostly referred to no code whatsoever. This was also 
the case in Finland for most of the examined period, although most reports in 2015 referred to 
either the IESBA or the IFAC Code of Ethics. In fact, overall, it was more common in Finland 
to refer to these international codes than in France. It should be noted that the reports that mainly 
referred to the assuror’s own independence policies are included in the topmost category in the 
table above, if these policies were explicitly stated to comply or exceed the international ethics 
codes. Otherwise, they are included in their own category. Also, if a report referred to multiple 
codes, the one with the highest international comparability was only included. The IESBA and 
IFAC ethics codes were considered the highest due to their international status, unspecified 
professional and national codes the second-highest, and company-specific policies the lowest.   
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The competence of the assuror 
The presence of a description of the assuror’s competence followed a similar – although not an 
exact – pattern to the description of the assuror’s independence. This is clearly visible when 
comparing Graph 8 below and Graph 7 on page 75. For specific details, refer to Appendix J.  
 
GRAPH 8. THE ASSUROR’S COMPETENCE DESCRIBED 
 
As the table above indicates, between 2010-2011, roughly 57 % (n ≈ 9) of the reports each year 
on average in Finland somehow described the assuror’s competence, while the respective 
amount was 62 % (n ≈ 11) in France. The difference between the countries became clearer in 
the following years, as between 2012-2015 the annual average rate in France had increased to 
91 % (n ≈ 23), whereas the respective rate in Finland demonstrated only a slight average 
increase at 66 % (n ≈ 12).  
A few notes about the included observations should be made to enable a deeper understanding 
of the results in the graph above. Some reports specifically stated that the cited assurance 
standard required the assuring party to have the professional competence needed to understand 
and review the information to be assured. These kinds of descriptions were considered sufficient 
to indicate the assuror’s competence. There were also reports that specifically described the 
cited assurance standard to require compliance with professional standards as well as planning 
and performing the assurance engagement so that the agreed level of assurance can be obtained. 
These kinds of descriptions were not considered an indication of the assuror’s competence due 
to them lacking a direct statement about the subject – even if the cited assurance standard would 
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impose requirements about the assuror’s competence. Also, in France, it was customary to 
include a statement indicating that the assuror team was assisted by sustainability experts. While 
ambiguous, this was still considered a description of the assuror’s competence, as it is directly 
related to the subject and indicates a higher capability to sufficiently understand the complex 
subject matter compared to a situation where no expert assistance is utilized.  
To gain a better understanding about the descriptions of the assurors’ competencies, Graph 9 
below illustrates the most relevant aspects of the assuror’s competence, namely previous 
experience and multidisciplinarity. As the graph clearly demonstrates, the descriptions of the 
assurors’ competencies were often much more thorough in Finland than in France.  
 
GRAPH 9. THE ASSUROR’S EXPERIENCE AND MULTIDISCIPLINARITY SPECIFIED 
 
The assuror’s previous relevant experience was indicated in an average of 51 % (n ≈ 9) of the 
reports in Finland each year, whereas the respective amount in France was only 10 % (n ≈ 2). 
Furthermore, most of the reports that indicated the assuror’s previous experience in France were 
presented between 2010-2011. Indeed, while relatively uncommon throughout the period, the 
trend seemed to be further declining, while the amounts in Finland remained rather stable 
overall. Indications of the assuror’s multidisciplinarity were less common than those of the 
assuror’s previous experience in both countries, but the ratio remained roughly the same. Each 
year, averagely 28 % (n ≈ 5) of the reports in Finland indicated the assuror’s multidisciplinarity, 
whereas the respective annual amount in France was a mere 4 % (n ≈ 1). For details about the 
assuror’s experience and multidisciplinarity, refer to Appendices K and L, if necessary.   
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4.4 PROCESS-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS82 
The scope of the assurance and the assured data types 
The scope of the assurance was described in all reports in both countries during the period, and 
therefore these results are not illustrated by a separate graph or table as most other results. The 
assured data types that were indicated in the assurance reports, however, are further discussed.  
In Finland, it was fairly customary to assure all or most of the companies’ sustainability data. 
This amount increased from a relatively high 36 % (n = 5) in 2010 to 65 % (n = 11) in 2014, 
although it fell back a bit to 50 % (n = 10) in 2015. Meanwhile, the respective amount in France 
was rather low, reaching only a high point of 17 % (n = 3) in 2011 and joint low points in 2013 
and 2015, when only a single report specified the assurance to cover all or most of the reported 
sustainability data. For more details, refer to Graph 10 below, as well as Appendix M.  
 
GRAPH 10. ALL OR MOST SUSTAINABILITY DATA ASSURED83 
 
                                                 
82 The percentages in all graphs and tables in this section have been calculated by using the annual numbers of 
presented assurance reports per country as the corresponding denominators, unless noted otherwise. For the exact 
denominator values for each year, refer to Appendix A. 
83 If an assurance report only specified exact information, such as environmental or social data, to have been 
assured, this is in all cases considered a case of specified data assured, even though technically it is possible that 
the original sustainability report only covered these aspects, and therefore the assurance report would have indeed 
covered all data presented in the original sustainability report. This decision was made to maintain an appropriate 
scope for the study, as the work needed – i.e. assessing also the contents of the original sustainability reports and 
the correspondence of the reported information to the assured information – would have been entirely too 
excessive, especially for a very small benefit in terms of maintaining exact accuracy in presenting the results. 
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Table 12 on the next page presents the assured sustainability data by type in both examined 
countries. The table excludes the reports that indicated the assurance of all or most of the 
sustainability data, as it was often unclear what these data types were without cross-referencing 
the assurance report with the original sustainability report. The purpose of the table, then, is to 
simply demonstrate the types of assured data that were specifically mentioned.  
In the table, “Selected data” includes data that was simply referred to as selected data but not 
in any way further specified in the assurance reports. The rest of the data types in the table (i.e. 
economic, social, environmental, and HR-related data) were all specifically mentioned to be 
among the assured data types in the assurance reports.  
The assurance of unspecified, selected data was indicated in a total of four assurance reports in 
France between 2010-2012 and in none between 2013-2015. In Finland, on the other hand, the 
only two assurance reports indicating the same were presented in 2015. Regarding economic 
data, in Finland, three out of ten reports on average specified economic data as part of the 
assured data, although the trend was slightly declining. In France, none of the assurance reports 
specifically mentioned economic data. Conversely, only a few reports in Finland specified HR-
related data, whereas, in France, it was specified in roughly three out of ten reports on average. 
The assurance of both social and environmental data became mandatory in 2012 for listed 
companies in France due to the Grenelle II Act, which explains why these data types were 
explicitly indicated in most assurance reports, especially between 2012-2015. The respective 
amounts are also relatively high in Finland compared to other data types. If we assumed that 
the observations of all or most sustainability data – which were illustrated in the graph on the 
previous page – included environmental and social data, which is likely to be the case in 
practice, almost every report in Finland would have effectively indicated the assurance of these 
data types, thus quite evenly matching the situation in France.  
Regarding the indication of the form of the original sustainability report, in France, every 
assurance report during the period included such an indication. The results are identical in 
Finland from 2013 to 2015, whereas before that the amount varied around 90 % (n ≈ 14). For 
further details, refer to Appendix N. It should be noted that, in France, this information was 
often further clarified in a dedicated section about the attestation of the fairness of the assured 
sustainability information – similar section was absent in the assurance reports in Finland.   
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TABLE 12. THE EXPLICITLY SPECIFIED ASSURED DATA BY TYPE84 
Selected data85 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Finland  0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 10 % (2) 
France 13 % (2) 6 % (1) 4 % (1) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 
       
Economic data86 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Finland  36 % (5) 31 % (5) 29 % (5) 29 % (5) 24 % (4) 25 % (5) 
France 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 
       
Social data87 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Finland  43 % (6) 38 % (6) 35 % (6) 35 % (6) 29 % (5) 30 % (6) 
France 56 % (9) 61 % (11) 88 % (21) 96 % (24) 88 % (22) 92 % (23) 
       
Environmental data88 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Finland  64 % (9) 56 % (9) 47 % (8) 41 % (7) 35 % (6) 40 % (8) 
France 75 % (12) 78 % (14) 88 % (21) 96 % (24) 88 % (22) 96 % (24) 
       
HR-related data89 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Finland  14 % (2) 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 5 % (1) 
France 31 % (5) 28 % (5) 21 % (5) 24 % (6) 28 % (7) 40 % (10) 
 
                                                 
84 The actual numbers of reports are included in parentheses after the percentages. Observations of assurances 
covering all or most of the reported sustainability data without explicitly specifying the data types are excluded, 
even though many of those assurances have likely assured at least some of the data types in question. This is due 
to many of these reports not specifying further what data was in fact included in the original sustainability report 
that was being assured, and therefore it is not possible to accurately present these observations in the results.  
85 Selected data includes observations of assurance reports that specifically used the term “selected data” or a 
similar variant but did not explicitly specify what that data included.  
86 It is unclear whether and how the assurance of economic data in this context differs from the audit and assurance 
of the usual financial information, such as the financial statements and balance sheets, reported by companies, as 
the assurance reports tended to leave this unclarified. This could, very well, be a significant reason why most 
companies opted to leave economic data out of the assurance engagements regarding sustainability reports, as they 
may consider the information already assured as part of the financial audit. This is, however, mere speculation.  
87 Some reports tended to specify either or both “social” and “societal” information to have been assured. These 
terms have been considered synonymous, as there is no indication that the words differ from each other in this 
context. Therefore, the decision to consider them synonymous should have no effect on the results. For those who 
are interested, the companies referring to these two terms separately are indicated in Appendix M.  
88 Environmental data also includes observations of only the assurance of GHG emissions. While environmental 
data is likely to include more information than mere GHG data, these were bundled together equally so that 
appropriate groups of data could be formed for analysis. This should have very little, if any, effect on the 
conclusions made based on these results.  
89 Many reports tended to use various names for data relating to their human capital, such as HR data, labour data, 
and health and safety data. While the actual contents of these data types may differ from each other, they are 
considered simply HR-related data, so that appropriate groups of data could be formed for analysis. This should 
have very little, if any, effect on the conclusions made based on these results.  
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The limitations and liabilities 
Various types of disclaimers related to both limitations and liabilities were very common in 
both countries. Graph 11 below illustrates this prevalence quite clearly. Individual details of all 
reports from both countries can be found in Appendix O.  
 
GRAPH 11. LIMITATIONS OR LIABILITIES ADDRESSED 
 
While not specifically analyzed in this study due to the ambiguity of what kinds of disclaimers 
of limitations or liabilities could be included in assurance reports – and how these disclaimers 
relate to the quality of assurance reports – a few notes can still be made based on the gathered 
data. In Finland, it was quite typical to emphasize the liability of the assuror towards the 
management only, and disclaim any such liability towards uninvolved parties, such as external 
company stakeholders. Also, assurance reports in Finland often discussed limitations that the 
agreed level of assurance might impose on the assurance engagement.  
In France, on the other hand, it was more typical to include an attestation on the fairness of the 
reported sustainability information, along with a brief discussion about possible audit risk. In 
both countries, especially in France, it was typical to state to the readers that the assurance 
report should be read in conjunction with the original sustainability report. This disclaimer was 
presented either among the middle parts or at the end of the assurance reports. Regarding all 
these observations made based on the gathered data, it should be noted that other studies with 
a different – i.e. more detailed – approach to analyzing the possible disclaimers regarding 
limitations and liabilities in assurance reports could provide different and interesting results.   
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The responsibilities of the involved parties 
The responsibilities of the involved parties were consistently clarified in all assurance reports 
in both countries, except in a single report presented by Arcelor Mittal in France in 2010. In 
Graph 12 below, the overall situation is clearly visible. The complete data is presented in 
Appendix P.  
 
GRAPH 12. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INVOLVED PARTIES CLARIFIED 
 
The form and length of the responsibility-related descriptions varied greatly. In France, the 
responsibilities of the parties were often stated in a very short form – sometimes in a mere 
sentence – among other descriptions regarding the assurance engagement. In Finland, on the 
other hand, the responsibilities were presented with a lengthier narrative in separate sections 
for each involved party, i.e. the assuror and the company management. Indeed, the responsible 
parties were without exception the assuror and the assured company’s management, thus 
already indicating no significant participation from the stakeholders, which is further discussed 
on the next page. It is also notable that, while previous studies have often assessed the 
responsibilities of both parties separately, they seem to be a packaged deal based on this study, 
as the responsibilities were always clarified for parties.  
In terms of the specific responsibilities of the parties, they were obviously very different. Most 
commonly, it was stated that the assured companies were responsible for presenting and 
providing the assured sustainability data according to certain reporting criteria, and the assuror 
for conducting the assurance engagement according to the parties’ assurance agreement.   
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The procedures undertaken in the assurance engagement 
The assurance reports in both countries included clear, detailed descriptions of the procedures 
undertaken in the assurance engagements almost without exceptions, as Graph 13 below 
indicates. Only a single report in Finland – presented by Telia – did not specify the undertaken 
procedures in each year between 2013-2015 (see Appendix Q for complete data).  
 
GRAPH 13. THE PROCEDURES UNDERTAKEN SPECIFIED 
 
While not analyzed in detail in this study, the procedures undertaken by the assurors during the 
assurance engagements were quite similar across both countries and the types of assurors. Often 
specified procedures included interviewing the company management, executives responsible 
for the reporting of sustainability information and employees of the company at different 
organizational levels, analyzing both internal and external documentation of the company to 
ascertain the level of stakeholder communication, and testing certain numerical data on a 
sample basis. The lists of procedures were often much longer than the aforementioned examples 
imply, typically ranging between five and ten specified, distinct procedures. These procedures 
often briefly stated their purpose, as well, as the aforementioned example about ascertaining 
the level of stakeholder communication indicated.  
Regarding stakeholders, it was also assessed as an additional aspect of the undertaken 
procedures whether stakeholder participation was in any way indicated in the assurance reports. 
There is, however, not much to report in that regard, as none of the reports in either of the 
countries included any indication of stakeholder participation (for details, see Appendix R).  
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4.5 CONCLUSION-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS90 
The clarity and form of conclusion 
All assurance reports in both countries included a clearly stated conclusion which was usually 
in a separate, titled section from other report content. The form of conclusion was most often 
negative, thus corresponding to the amount of limited assurances with which negative forms of 
conclusion is typically associated. Graph 14 below further illustrates the presence of both 
positive and negative forms of conclusion (for company-specific details, see Appendix S). 
 
GRAPH 14. THE FORMS OF CONCLUSION 
 
In France, roughly 23 % (n ≈ 5) of the reports on average included a conclusion in a positive 
form. Unsurprisingly, this strongly correlates to the amount of reasonable assurances in France. 
The only report in France that was concluded entirely in a positive form, was presented by 
Arcelor Mittal in 2010 despite the level of assurance being only partially reasonable. In Finland, 
the assurance reports of Metsä Board in 2013-2015 indicated a positive form of conclusion 
despite the limited assurance level. Interestingly, the entirely positive forms of conclusions 
were provided by non-auditor assurors. Among the assurances consisting of both a negative and 
a positive form of conclusion auditors, on the other hand, were rather prevalent.   
                                                 
90 The percentages in all graphs in this section have been calculated by using the annual numbers of presented 
assurance reports per country as the corresponding denominators, unless noted otherwise. For the exact 
denominator values for each year, refer to Appendix A. 
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Additional commentary 
Including additional commentary in assurance reports was quite common on average in both 
countries. However, the trends in the two countries were very different from each other. In 
France, the amount of reports that included additional commentary was 81 % (n = 13) in 2010, 
but the amount declined steadily to only 32 % (n = 8) in 2015. Meanwhile, in Finland, the 
amount remained quite steadily at an annual average of 64 % (n ≈ 11). These trends are further 
demonstrated in Graph 15 below. For further details, see Appendix T.  
 
GRAPH 15. ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY PRESENTED 
 
The observations of the AA1000AS principles of inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness, 
which were also discussed earlier in Section 2.3.5, are included in the graph above, as well. 
Rather strongly correlating with the amount of assurance engagements conducted against the 
AA1000AS, additional commentary regarding the aforementioned principles is rather prevalent 
in Finland at an annual average rate of 35 % (n ≈ 6). In France, only a total of four reports 
reflecting on these principles were presented between 2010-2013, all by Arcelor Mittal.  
While justifiably excluded from this study, a few notes can still be made about the various types 
of commentary which were discussed previously in Section 2.3.5. It seems that observations 
and recommendations were common in both countries, especially in Finland. Reservations, in 
turn, were mostly absent in Finland, but quite common in France. Opinions about the assured 
company’s sustainability performance were rare, and mostly present in Finland rather than in 
France. Reflections on the assuror’s own performance were entirely absent in both countries.   
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4.6 FORMALITY-RELATED QUALITY INDICATORS91 
The heading of the assurance report 
In terms of assurance report heading uniformity, reports in Finland seem to be demonstrate less 
variance. In France, there were approximately 10-20 different headings used for the reports 
depending on the year, while in Finland the respective range was between three and six. 
Interestingly, the number of different headings peaked in France in 2012 – the year when the 
Grenelle II Act became effective – but has declined since back to the level of 2010. In 2015, 
the number had indeed already declined to as low as 10, although it was still almost twice as 
high as in Finland. The annual numbers of different headings used for assurance reports is 
further illustrated in Graph 16 below. The complete, accurate data about the different headings 
used in both countries can be found in Appendix U.  
 
GRAPH 16. THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT HEADINGS USED 
 
The apparent gap between Finland and France is narrowed when the headings are grouped by 
their type (e.g., both “Report of the Statutory Auditors” and “Report by one of the Statutory 
Auditors” are the same as “Statutory Auditor’s Report”). In fact, in both 2010 and 2012 the 
most common heading types (i.e. “Statutory Auditor’s Report” and “Limited Assurance 
Report”, respectively) were slightly more often utilized than their respective counterparts in 
                                                 
91 The percentages in all graphs and tables in this section have been calculated by using the annual numbers of 
presented assurance reports per country as the corresponding denominators, unless noted otherwise. For the exact 
denominator values for each year, refer to Appendix A. 
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Finland (i.e. “Independent Assurance Report” in both years). However, on average, the heading 
uniformity was much higher in Finland with roughly three out of four assurance reports using 
the most common type of heading per year, while in France the respective amount averaged at 
a bit less than three out of five reports per year. Most notably, in both 2014 and 2015, around 
80 % (n ≈ 15) of the Finnish reports used the most common type of heading, while only 44 % 
(n = 11) of the French reports did the same. It should also be noted that the most common 
heading type in Finland – Independent Assurance Report – remained unchanged throughout the 
examined period, whereas the most common type of heading in France changed from “Statutory 
Auditor’s Report” to “Limited Assurance Report” in 2012, and back again in 2013. The heading 
types, as well as relevant information regarding them, are illustrated in Table 13 below. 
 
TABLE 13. THE MOST COMMON HEADING TYPES AND THEIR INDICATIONS 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Heading type Independent 
Assurance 
Report 
Independent 
Assurance 
Report 
Independent 
Assurance 
Report 
Independent 
Assurance 
Report 
Independent 
Assurance 
Report 
Independent 
Assurance 
Report 
Usage 71 % (10) 81 % (13) 65 % (11) 76 % (13) 82 % (14) 80 % (16) 
Independence indicated 93 % (13) 94 % (15) 88 % (15) 88 % (15) 88 % (15) 95 % (19) 
       
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Heading type Statutory 
Auditor's 
Report 
Statutory 
Auditor's 
Report 
Limited 
Assurance 
Report 
Statutory 
Auditor's 
Report 
Statutory 
Auditor's 
Report 
Statutory 
Auditor's 
Report 
Usage 75 % (12) 56 % (10) 71 % (9) 56 % (14) 44 % (11) 44 % (11) 
Independence indicated 13 % (2) 17 % (3) 25 % (6) 40 % (10) 56 % (14) 60 % (15) 
 
 
In this study, the indication of the assuror’s independence in the heading was assessed, as well. 
This data is also presented in the table above. It seems that the reports in Finland were nearly 
always titled so that the word “independence”, “independent”, or similar was included in the 
heading. In France, on the other hand, this was a quite uncommon practice in the early part of 
the examined period at a rate of 13 % (n = 2), but the amount increased each year – especially 
greatly in 2013 and 2014 – ultimately reaching a rate of 60 % (n = 15) in 2015.  
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The addressee of the assurance report 
In Finland, nearly 95 % (n ≈ 16) of the assurance reports on average each year were had an 
identified addressee. The amount peaked in 2015 when all presented assurance reports were 
addressed explicitly to someone. Meanwhile, in France, the respective amount was only around 
20 % (n ≈ 4) in 2010 and 2011 but increased greatly in the following years. Already in 2012, 
54 % (n = 13) of the reports were addressed to someone, and the amount climbed to as high as 
84 % (n = 21) in 2014, where it remained the following year, as well. For a detailed account 
and demonstration of information regarding the addressees, refer to Graph 17 below and – if 
necessary – Appendix V at the end of this document.  
 
GRAPH 17. THE ADDRESSEE IDENTIFIED 
 
On the next page, Table 14 presents the types of addressees of the assurance reports in both 
countries. In Finland, it was very common throughout the studied period to address assurance 
reports to the assured companies’ management. In France, in turn, it was increasingly common 
to address assurance reports to the shareholders of the companies. Overall, between 2013-2015, 
the uniformity of the addressees was high in both countries. A notable year was 2012, however, 
when seven distinct types of addressees were identified in France, compared to only four in 
Finland. Uniformity is difficult to compare between 2010-2011 due to most of the reports 
indicating no addressees in France.  
It is noteworthy that it was very uncommon to address the reports collectively to the company 
stakeholders. The only report to do this was presented in France by Arcelor Mittal in 2010. In 
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Finland, there were two companies – Metsä Board and Stora Enso – who frequently presented 
assurance reports that were addressed to the stakeholders – but along with the company 
management. In addition, the only reports to explicitly identify the report users (in this case, all 
company stakeholders) were presented in Finland by Tieto (see Appendix W for details).  
 
TABLE 14. THE ADDRESSEES OF THE ASSURANCE REPORTS92 
Addressees (FIN) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Stakeholders 7 % (1) 6 % (1) 12 % (2) 12 % (2) 6 % (1) 10 % (2) 
Shareholders 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 
Management 71 % (10) 75 % (12) 71 % (12) 71 % (12) 71 % (12) 80 % (16) 
Other 21 % (3) 19 % (3) 24 % (4) 24 % (4) 24 % (4) 20 % (4) 
No one 7 % (1) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 
       
Addressees (FRA) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Stakeholders 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 
Shareholders 6 % (1) 22 % (4) 13 % (3) 72 % (18) 80 % (20) 80 % (20) 
Management 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 25 % (6) 4 % (1) 0 % (0) 0 % (0) 
Other 6 % (1) 0 % (0) 17 % (4) 0 % (0) 4 % (1) 4 % (1) 
No one 81 % (13) 78 % (14) 46 % (11) 24 % (6) 16 % (4) 16 % (4) 
 
 
The division of the report contents into several sections 
All assurance reports in both countries consisted of several sections, often with clear headings, 
such as “Limitations” or “Conclusion”. The most notable difference in terms of the sections 
between the two countries was that many reports in France included a specific section on the 
attestation of fairness of the assured sustainability information, often with a separate conclusion 
from the actual assurance engagement conclusion, whereas similar narrative was often found 
among other sections in reports in Finland. If necessary, refer to Appendix X for further details.  
                                                 
92 The percentages may not add to an exact 100 % due to rounding and some reports indicating multiple addressees. 
 91 
 
The formal signature by the assuror 
All assurance reports in both countries – except for four presented by Arcelor Mittal in France 
between 2010-2013 – specifically identified the senior assuror responsible for the assurance 
engagement at the end of the report, as Graph 18 below illustrates. However, formal signatures 
were often excluded. In Finland, two out of five assurance reports on average were formally 
signed, while only a handful of reports overall in France included formal signatures. More often 
than not, however, the assurance reports in both countries clearly declared that the signatures, 
if missing, were included in the original versions of the reports. Appendix Y includes further 
details about this subject.  
 
GRAPH 18. THE IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE OF THE ASSUROR 
 
In addition to the identification and formal signature of the senior responsible assuror, the 
inclusion of a specific date and location was also assessed. However, there is not much to 
discuss in that regard, as all reports in both countries throughout the examined period had a 
clear date and location specified – always at the end of the report, before the responsible 
assuror’s identification and possible formal signature. Appendix Z can be referred to for details.  
The presentation of results regarding the aforementioned formality-related indicators concludes 
this main section. A summary of results as well as concluding remarks can be found in the final 
numbered main section of this document. Before that, however, the presented results are 
discussed both independently and in light of previous studies for their theoretical and practical 
implications in the next main section.   
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5 DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The results offer an abundance of interesting implications about assurance reporting in both 
voluntary and mandatory contexts. This section presents a summary of the main findings and 
discusses each individual finding both independently and in light of previous knowledge for 
theoretical and practical implications. Since this study has, indeed, many implications – both 
major and minor – this main section is divided in multiple (unnumbered) subsections for the 
sake of clarity and to ease finding the pieces of information that interests each reader the most. 
Table 15 on the next page summarizes the results and observed changes in a compact manner 
and is thus useful in understanding the discussion presented this section. However, it should be 
noted that the table in question is indeed only a summary – a detailed presentation of all results 
was already conducted in Section 4 – and it also includes some illustrative elements, rather than 
exact values, to help make proper and easily comprehensible inferences from the results.  
 
Overview of results 
If the results are interpreted based on an indicator-by-indicator comparison, it seems that report 
quantity was higher in France, as expected, but quality was more often higher in Finland (refer 
to Table 15 on the next page, if necessary). In total, of the around 30 indicators, 10 indicated 
higher quality in Finland, compared to only 5 in France, while the rest indicated no notable 
differences. Interestingly, the differences were quite often more evident from the sub-indicators 
rather than from the main indicators, suggesting that differences in assurance report quality may 
only be properly observed with a rigorous analysis. Also, when a difference was observed, its 
margin seemed to be on average much greater in cases where it favored Finland than in those 
favoring France. The results remain similar when inferences are made based on the indicator 
categories, as reports from Finland seem to demonstrate averagely either roughly the same or 
even a higher level of quality compared to reports from France in all of the five categories. 
While the applied method does not enable stating an exact overall quality score (refer to Section 
3.2 for details), based on the aforementioned results, it still seems that assurance reports are on 
average higher in quality in Finland than in France – at least in the case of large companies.  
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TABLE 15. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS AND OBSERVED CHANGES 
TYPE93 INDICATOR94 RESULTS: FIN95 RESULTS: FRA96 
Quantity Assurance report presented High (+) Very High (++) 
Standards Assurance standard cited Very High  Very High (+) 
 Both assurance standards cited Low  Very Low  
 Level of assurance indicated High  High  
 Level of assurance explained High  Very Low  
 Reasonable assurances presented Very Low  Low (+) 
 Additional criteria specified High (+) Low  
Assurors Credible assuror(s) identified High  High  
 Assuror’s independence described Medium (+) High (++) 
 Independence standard cited Medium (+) Medium (+) 
 Assuror’s competence described Medium (+) High (++) 
 Multidisciplinarity specified Low  Very Low (-) 
 Experience specified Medium  Very Low (-) 
Processes Scope of the assurance described Very High  Very High  
 All or most data assured Medium (+) Very Low  
 Limitations or liabilities addressed Very High  Very High  
 Responsibilities clarified Very High  Very High  
 Procedures specified Very High  Very High  
 Stakeholder participation indicated Very Low  Very Low  
Conclusions Conclusions clarified Very High  Very High  
 Form of conclusion Very Low  Low (+) 
 Additional commentary presented High  Medium (--) 
Formalities Clarity of heading High  Medium (+) 
 Heading indicates independence Very High  Medium (++) 
 Addressee(s) identified Very High  High (++) 
 Stakeholders identified as addressees Low  Low  
 Several sections included Very High  Very High  
 Identification and signature included High  High  
                                                 
93 Indicates the type of the quality indicator as per the categories defined in this study (for details, see Section 2.3). 
94 The table contains all examined quality indicators, but some minor aspects may have been presented jointly. 
95 States the observed average level of indicator quality in Finland (“Very low” ≈ 0-20 %; “Low” ≈ 20-40 %; 
“Medium” ≈ 40-60 %; “High” ≈ 60-80 %; “Very high” ≈ 80-100 %). The observed change (2010-2015) is noted 
in parenthesis (“+” = positive change up to 30 ppts.; “++” = positive change greater than 30 ppts.; “-“ = negative 
change up to 30 ppts.; “--” = negative change greater than 30 ppts.). In rare cases, discretion may have been used 
to avoid oversimplification of the results (refer to Sections 4 and 5 for detailed results and discussion, if necessary). 
96 Provides the same indications as explained in the previous footnote, but in France. 
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Looking only at the surface of the results, the aforementioned indications may be unsurprising, 
as the regulation in France only requires external verification of certain sustainability data, 
offering little detail about how the verification should ultimately be conducted or how a report 
about it should be prepared. While it would be tempting to conclude that the results seem to 
indicate that voluntary contexts may be associated with higher quality reports than mandatory 
contexts, this type of conclusion would be invalid in this case, since the level of quality seemed 
to be higher in Finland already before assurance reporting became mandatory in France. Still, 
the results did seem to indicate that the overall level of quality did not notably improve in France 
simply by assurances becoming mandatory.  
Looking through the surface, however, it becomes evident that the overall results tell only a 
part of the story. Indeed, individual quality indicators seem to demonstrate that the Grenelle II 
Act increased report quality in France notably in certain areas and decreased in a handful of 
others. At the same time, the level of quality across most indicators remained relatively 
unchanged in Finland, even though there clearly was room for improvement, as well. In any 
case, in France, the reports seemed to become increasingly harmonized and higher in quality, 
especially in terms of the description of the assuror’s independence, the clarity and uniformity 
of the report headings, and the identification of the addressees. Also, minor positive effects 
were observed in terms of the consistency of referring to either of the main assurance standards 
and the frequency of reasonable assurances, although the latter were often provided for only a 
small part of the sustainability data. Interestingly, when combined with the timing of these 
observed changes in France – which seemed to occur often right after the Grenelle II became 
effective – the results seem to offer proof that mandatory assurance regimes can be useful, even 
if the overall report quality did not seem to notably increase.  
In Finland, negative changes were not observed, but, in France, the depth of describing the 
assuror’s competence and the assurances of all or most sustainability data seemed to slightly 
decrease. Also, additional commentary became rarer in France, but whether this is actually a 
positive or negative change depends greatly on how additional commentary is viewed in terms 
of its purpose and value as part of an assurance report (refer to Section 2.3.5 for details about 
this issue). It is also noteworthy that the companies in France seemed to increasingly utilize 
only a single sustainability assuror per year, thus indicating, perhaps, a refusal of the joint 
assurance system – which is effective for financial audits in France – if possible.  
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In terms of the quantity of assurance reports, the results were as expected, as was briefly 
mentioned earlier, but the quality-related results – and especially, their details – were perhaps 
a bit surprising, even though the expectations regarding the overall results were quite neutral 
due to relatively little still being known about assurance reporting quality in general. However, 
in the broader context of sustainability disclosures, it has, at times, been found that voluntary 
contexts may produce reports of higher quality than mandatory regimes, and thus the usefulness 
of mandatory approaches has been questioned (refer to Section 2.1.4 and 2.2.4 for details about 
this issue). Therefore, observing that mandatory regimes, such as the Grenelle II Act, may lead 
to quality-related improvements in certain areas of assurance reports – or at least play a part in 
it – was, in the end, a slight surprise.  
The results of this comparative study should be credible mainly for two reasons. First, the 
method with which this study was conducted – i.e. dividing quality indicators into distinct 
groups which were then compared holistically and separately from the other groups – seemed 
to successfully remedy the most significant defects in previous attempts to assess assurance 
report quality, namely the use of biased, speculative, or even arbitrary scoring criteria. Second, 
this study applied a very broad and thorough set of assurance report quality indicators in the 
analysis – perhaps the most comprehensive set of indicators utilized to date in a study 
representing this particular research field.  
In addition, the amount of examined reports was perhaps the largest in a single study regarding 
the quality of non-financial assurance reports. The chosen period also seemed to be adequate 
for analyzing possible changes – and possibly linking these changes, in the case of France, to 
the Grenelle II Act, thus offering tentative indications about the actual effectiveness of the 
regulation in question. Using reports from Finland as a comparison – or even a control group, 
in a sense – and observing their seemingly stable level of quality throughout the period seemed 
to further increase the possibility of the observed changes in France being either partially or 
even entirely rooted in the aforementioned regulation, and not, for example, international trends 
or other noticeably influencing developments in assurance reporting. However, limiting the 
study to include only two countries may make it a bit difficult to generalize the results to other 
regions, and including only large companies adds to that issue. Still, at the end of the day, the 
results seem to offer interesting implications for future studies and everyone involved in 
utilizing and developing the sustainability assurance system.  
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The quantity of assurance reports 
As has been indicated earlier in this document, the Grenelle II Act had a major effect on the 
quantity of assurance reports, as these reports became a rule with only one exception from 2012 
onwards, i.e. after the regulation became effective. However, the number of assurance reports 
increased greatly in Finland during the examined period, as well. Interestingly, before the 
Grenelle II Act was effective, the number of presented assurance reports was actually higher in 
Finland than in France. These results correlate to expectations rather well, as it was expected 
that assurance reports would be quite common among very large and visible companies, and 
the Grenelle II Act would likely cause all – or at least most – companies to present an assurance 
report in France. The Grenelle II Act – while not enforced with sanctions – seems to prove that 
quantity of assurance reports can be easily increased with appropriate regulation.  
While it could be argued that examining the quantity of assurance reports was unnecessary as 
the results seem rather obvious, this was ultimately done for three reasons. First, assessing the 
quantity provided an understanding of how common assurances have been among the examined 
companies in these two countries when both of their reporting contexts were voluntary (before 
2012) and when one of them changed from voluntary to mandatory (from 2012 onwards). 
Second, it was likely to solidify the most apparent consequence of the Grenelle II Act, i.e. the 
increase in the quantity of reports, which provided an example of the magnitude of effects that 
regulations can have on the issues they are adequately designed to address – even if the applied 
method in this study does not enable stating with certainty that this or any other possible change 
was caused by the regulation in question. Third, and finally, it adds to the overall context of the 
included companies, and thus helps put the rest of the findings into proper perspective. 
It could also be argued that the included companies could have been screened beforehand, so 
that only the ones presenting assurance reports would be included. However, this might have 
resulted in cherry-picking of companies, possibly causing problems in the results. Therefore, 
and combined with the reasons stated earlier, a quantity assessment was deemed appropriate. 
While utilizing stock indices to select companies for this study did include a minor risk of 
including a relatively substantial number of companies not presenting assurance reports, the 
results ultimately indicate that this risk was not even close to materializing. All in all, the 
number of reports in both countries, and changes thereof, both demonstrated the possible effects 
of the regulation in question and were also appropriate for further analysis of report quality.   
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Standard-related quality indicators 
The standard-related quality of assurance reports was assessed with a total of three main 
indicators and five additional aspects relating to them (refer to Section 2.3.2 for a complete list). 
Overall, the results in terms of these indicators show a noticeably higher quality of assurance 
reports in Finland. Although it was very common to refer to either the ISAE 3000 or the 
AA1000AS in both countries, reports in Finland referred to both of these standards 
simultaneously more often. Also, most of the assurance reports in Finland had the GRI 
Guidelines specified as reporting criteria, whereas only few reports in France indicated the 
same. Companies in Finland had also additional quality standards specified in their assurance 
reports more frequently. These were, however, mostly quality control standards, namely the 
ISQC 1, promoted by the latest revision of the ISAE 3000 which affected only the year 2015 of 
the examined period. In addition, while it was extremely common to indicate the level of 
assurance in both countries, reports in France indicated reasonable assurances more often, 
although mostly regarding only small parts of originally disclosed sustainability information, 
namely specific environmental disclosures. Interestingly, the level of assurance was almost 
never explained in reports in France, whereas it was very customary in Finland.  
It is also notable that the AA1000AS – when present – was mostly utilized in Finland, and only 
on a few occasions in France. Despite the relatively high utilization level of the AA1000AS 
compared to previous findings, the ISAE 3000 was still the dominant standard by far. This is 
unsurprising, as previous literature has indeed indicated that the ISAE 3000 is mostly used by 
auditors, which were the prominent type of assuror in the reports examined in this study. 
Assuror-related subjects will be discussed more thoroughly in the next unnumbered subsection.  
A few notes about these results should be made to better understand their implications. 
Indicating the GRI Guidelines as reporting criteria has often been utilized in assessing the 
quality of assurance reports, but its usefulness has also been contradicted due to its ambiguity. 
While not specifically assessed in this study, it often seemed rather unclear to the reader how 
the GRI Guidelines had been utilized in practice either in the assurance engagement or in the 
preparing of the report. As a final note about standard-related quality indicators, it should be 
stated that referring to both main assurance standards seemed to correlate often with very 
thoroughly narrated reports. While only speculative, it seems plausible that these reports with 
seemingly superior narrative would tackle the problem that previous studies have indicated 
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about the report users lacking the capability to understand the report contents. In fact, future 
studies could, for example, test assurance reports with varying levels of narrative among various 
stakeholder groups to test the accuracy of this speculation in practice. In addition, while not 
specifically assessed previously or in this study, it is interesting that most reports in both 
countries did not explain the referred assurance standards to the reader. The explanation of the 
cited assurance standard could, then, also be an aspect to consider in future versions of the 
assurance standards, reports, and quality assessments.  
 
Assuror-related quality indicators 
The assuror-related quality of assurance reports was assessed with a total of three main 
indicators and five additional aspects relating to them (refer to Section 2.3.3 for a complete list). 
Overall, the results in terms of these indicators show a somewhat higher quality of assurance 
reports in Finland. Some individual indicators and their additional aspects did not, however, 
show any significant differences between the two countries. For example, all reports in both 
countries indicated a credible auditor or other expert as the assuror. Although with a declining 
trend, companies in France tended to utilize more than one assuror per year. The tendency to 
use multiple assurors per year in France could be explained by it being mandatory for French 
companies to have their financials jointly audited. However, the observations in this study were 
not always cases of joint auditing, but also cases of providing distinct levels of assurance for 
distinct parts of the sustainability data with separate assurance reports. In any case, the declining 
number of using multiple assurors per year, and thus utilizing joint audits, could be explained 
by companies attempting to avoid them if possible, as they may not provide any significant 
benefits, but rather additional costs, as some previous studies have indicated.  
The changes in the number of assurors per company per year may be either positive or negative. 
On one hand, using multiple assurors could be a positive sign if, for example, the assurors’ 
competencies were optimized to correspond to the respective types of assured data. On the other 
hand, using only a single assuror could also be a positive sign if, for example, this led to the 
presentation of only single, consistent assurance report instead of two or more, possibly 
inconsistent assurance reports. Since ascertaining these aspects with further analysis was 
outside of the scope of this study, drawing solid conclusions about this particular aspect is 
therefore simply impossible. 
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In this study, assurors were divided in two types, namely auditors and non-auditors, the latter 
of which refers to sustainability or certification experts. Overall, auditors – which consisted 
solely of the Big Four companies – were the most prevalent type of assuror in both countries. 
The results of this study seem to indicate an even more significant difference between the ratio 
of auditors and non-auditors as sustainability assurors than previous knowledge has evidenced. 
To illustrate, in Finland, about one out of five assurances were provided by a sustainability 
expert – which was, in fact, as expected – whereas only a handful of reports overall in France 
indicated a sustainability or certification expert as the assuror.  
The ratio between the two types remained mostly the same throughout the examined period. 
Consequently, this indicates that the changes in the assurance reports in France cannot be 
explained with changes in the types of assurors, which previous studies have indicated to 
explain – at least some of – the differences in assurance reports. Furthermore, the results seem 
to offer further proof that the type of assuror does not really matter in terms of overall assurance 
report quality or the indicated level of assurance – although the emphasis between various 
individual quality indicators may differ. These findings seemingly contradict the implications 
of a similar study in the South African context, discussed earlier in this document. 
It is also interesting that the assurors observed in this study have consisted mainly of the same 
handful of companies over the examined years – another point that previous studies have also 
implied, as was discussed in Section 2.3.3. As was additionally predicted in the very same 
section, this seems to have indeed resulted in a decreasing variance in the assurance report 
format and contents, especially in France. In terms of the assuror-related quality indicators, this 
congruence is mainly evident in terms of how the assuror’s independence and competence were 
described. Similar effects were also observed in terms of formality-related indicators, which 
will be discussed a bit later in this main section.  
The description of the assuror’s independence was also assessed in this study. While more 
common in Finland at first, the roles were reversed after the Grenelle II Act, when almost every 
assurance report in France somehow described the assuror’s independence. The independence 
was, however, mostly justified in France by broadly referring to general, country-specific 
regulatory texts, while references to specific international independence codes, such as the 
IESBA Code of Ethics, were relatively more prominent in Finland. Referring to an international 
code was considered a better approach, as it is comparable despite of the country-specific 
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context. It should also be noted that while the ISAE 3000 was the prevalent assurance standard, 
and it imposes certain independence requirements on the assurors, often, especially in France, 
this connection was not clarified to the report readers who may not know the implications of 
the assurance standards. Therefore, clarifying the requirements of the standard would 
undoubtedly increase also the justification of the assuror’s independence. In any case, the 
increase in France in terms of this quality indicator could be explained with the companies 
attempting to demonstrate compliance with the Grenelle II Act which specifically requires an 
independent third party to conduct the assurance.  
Describing the assuror’s competence followed a similar pattern to the description of the 
assuror’s independence, as it also became a more common occurrence in France after 2012 and 
the Grenelle II Act’s effective date. However, assessing the details of the assuror’s competence, 
namely the indication of previous experience and multidisciplinarity, demonstrate a different 
picture than the main indicator would suggest. Descriptions of both the assuror’s relevant 
experience and multidisciplinarity were quite common in Finland, but mostly absent in France. 
The descriptions in Finland were also clearly stated.  
Furthermore, often in the reports in France, the assuror’s competence was justified with either 
or both of two blatantly vague statements. The first statement merely noted that the assuror had 
been assisted by sustainability experts during the assurance engagement, and the second one 
explained that the work conducted in previous years should provide a sufficient basis for the 
assurance engagement in question. Even though verifying the usefulness of these statements 
would require a survey among various report users, it still seems likely that these kinds of 
descriptions of the assuror’s competence could use a bit more tangibility and accuracy.  
It is also interesting that the ISQC 1, an international standard on quality control, which was 
only observed in 2015 in Finland, was often indicated to be a description of the assuror’s 
competence. Also, in France, it was often vaguely stated that the assuror has quality control 
policies in place. While applying quality controls can be considered an important part of the 
assuror’s working methods, it is difficult to see how these relate to the assuror’s competence in 
terms of providing sustainability assurances – especially when the reports do not clarify this 
connection. If the connection was made clear in the assurance reports, it could be a relevant and 
interesting addition to the scoring criteria of assurance report quality in the future.  
 101 
 
Process-related quality indicators 
The process-related quality of assurance reports was assessed with a total of four main 
indicators and four additional aspects relating to them (refer to Section 2.3.4 for a complete 
list). Overall, the results in terms of these indicators demonstrate only a slightly higher quality 
of assurance reports in Finland, although the quality seems mostly quite even between the two 
countries. For example, the scope of the assurance was clearly stated in all the examined reports 
in both countries.  
However, there were significant differences between the two countries in terms of what data 
was assured according to the assurance reports. In Finland, it was relatively common to indicate 
that the assurance reports covered all or most of the originally reported sustainability data. This 
was quite rare in France where it was more typical to explicitly indicate the assurance of both 
environmental and social data types. However, it was often unknown whether these were also 
the only sustainability data reported by the companies, as the assurance reports did not indicate 
this further and the verification of the original sustainability reports’ contents was outside the 
scope of this study. In any case, the decision to emphasize the assurance of environmental and 
social data in France could also be due to the Grenelle II Act which specifically requires the 
assurance of these data types. Interestingly, many reports in France separately referred to social 
and societal data, but the actual difference between these two data types was unclear. This is 
also why these data types were considered somewhat synonymous in this study.  
It was very typical to indicate the form of the original sustainability report as part of the 
description of the scope of the assurance in both countries. The indicated report forms were not 
analyzed in this study, as it is irrelevant in terms of assurance report quality. However, it was 
often indicated whether the sustainability report was separate from or integrated in the annual 
report, and whether the report was in electronic format. While there is little discussion about 
this subject in previous studies, during the gathering of data for this study it became quite clear 
why the form of the sustainability report should be indicated in the assurance report. Many 
reports stated as a disclaimer that the report should be read in conjunction with the original 
sustainability report to understand the implications of the assurance. Thus, it seems that it would 
add value to the report user if the assurance report would indicate where (and possibly even 
how) this sustainability report could be accessed. This is something to consider in future 
incarnations of the main assurance standards, assurance reports, and quality assessments.  
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Addressing possible limitations was also very common in both countries. As was discussed in 
Section 4.4, the limitations were not specifically analyzed in this study due to the ambiguity of 
what kinds of limitations could be included in assurance reports – and how they relate to the 
quality of these reports. However, it can be stated that assurance reports in Finland often 
discussed the limitations that the agreed level of assurance might impose on the assurance 
engagement, whereas it was more common in France to include an attestation on the fairness 
of the reported sustainability information, along with a brief discussion about possible audit 
risk. Regarding liabilities, especially in Finland, it was quite typical to emphasize the liability 
of the assuror towards the management only, and disclaim any such liability towards uninvolved 
parties, such as external company stakeholders.  
Regarding all these observations made based on the gathered data, it should be noted that a 
different – i.e. more detailed – approach to analyzing the possible disclaimers of limitations and 
liabilities in assurance reports could result in different findings than the ones presented in this 
study. Still, even if, for example, limitations and liabilities were assessed separately, the results 
would have indicated them both to be quite common in both countries, although maybe not as 
common as the results currently indicate. Overall, more knowledge is required about the types 
and effects of various disclaimers that may be included in assurance reports before they can be 
assessed more specifically in terms of assurance report quality.  
Regarding the description of the responsibilities of the involved parties as well as the procedures 
undertaken in the assurance process, it can be stated that they were both extremely common in 
the assurance reports in both countries. Also, the descriptions followed somewhat similar 
patterns, as was indicated previously in Section 2.3.4. It should be noted, however, that the 
responsibilities were often much more briefly discussed than the undertaken procedures, which 
is likely due to there being more individual procedures than responsibilities on average.  
It was interesting that none of the assurance reports assessed in this study indicated the inclusion 
of stakeholders in the assurance process, although its importance has been discussed in previous 
studies. While it may seem an odd element in an assurance engagement – to include third-party 
non-professionals, that is – the complex nature of the audited information and its direct relation 
to many stakeholders seems a sufficient justification for it. Furthermore, while the undertaken 
procedures were not specifically examined in this study, it became clear that a company’s 
claimed stakeholder inclusiveness is often assured by analyzing both internal and external 
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company documentation. While it may not be a straightforward approach to credibly perform 
in practice, should not the stakeholders be interviewed about their inclusiveness, as well? Based 
on the methods that were commonly specified to assess stakeholder inclusiveness, there does 
seem to be a level of management control – whether intentional or inadvertent – over the 
assurance process that there perhaps should not be.  
As a final note about the subject, it was curious that many reports in France specified the exact 
size of the assuror team and the time it took for them to conduct the assurance engagement. 
While this has not been prominently discussed in previous studies, it may have additional 
implications on the depth and thoroughness of the assurance engagement. Although purely an 
exaggeration, one could, for example, compare an assurance engagement conducted only by a 
single person in the duration of a single day to an assurance by ten full-time team members in 
ten weeks. As a result, there would likely be a difference in the quality of the assurance 
engagement. Therefore, it seems that including a description of the assuror’s team – as well as 
the roles and competencies of each individual team member – and the duration of the assurance 
engagement could enhance the quality of the assurance report. This, again, is something to 
consider in future versions of the assurance standards, reports, and quality assessments. 
 
Conclusion-related quality indicators 
The conclusion-related quality of assurance reports was assessed with a total of two main 
indicators and one additional aspect relating to them (refer to Section 2.3.5 for a complete list). 
However, seven other aspects were also considered as part of the assessment of one of the main 
indicators. Overall, the results in terms of these indicators demonstrate a rather even quality of 
assurance reports between the two countries.  
The type of conclusion was made clear in all reports in both countries. This may reflect the 
importance of the conclusion, as it just might be the single most crucial element in an assurance 
report – without the conclusion, there is no assurance. The conclusions were mostly stated in a 
negative form, although positive forms were also observed regarding the parts of the assurances 
that were agreed to achieve a level of reasonable assurance. Overall, the forms of conclusion 
seem to strongly correlate to the indicated levels of assurance, as was expected, although some 
exceptions were observed (refer to Section 4.5 for details).  
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Including additional commentary to the conclusion was relatively common in both countries, 
although the trend was declining in France and quite stable in Finland. As was discussed earlier 
in Section 2.3.5, there are various types of additional commentary, but their implications in 
terms of report quality are not straightforward. Therefore, this study simply decided to assess 
whether any kind additional commentary was included, but the types of commentary were not 
further specified. Due to this decision, the role of this particular indicator in the overall 
assessment was notably reduced compared to many earlier studies about assessing assurance 
report quality. In practice, this study did therefore not, for example, consider the inclusion of 
recommendations and the AA1000AS principles as separate, individual quality indicators, due 
to both the debated role of the recommendations and the principles having otherwise too much 
weight in the overall quality assessment criteria. This seems to have been an appropriate 
decision, as scoring these aspects related to additional commentary individually would have 
likely resulted in an exacerbated quality gap between the two countries.  
Despite the aforementioned decision, during data collection, it was still noted that reservations 
were quite common in France, but rather rare in Finland. Recommendations, on the other hand, 
were more common in Finland than in France, thus indicating that the assuror had acted also as 
an advisor, an aspect of sustainability assurances that has been criticized at times in previous 
literature. In addition, including a reflection on the AA1000AS principles of inclusivity, 
materiality and responsiveness was notably more common in Finland than in France, showing 
a very strong, expected positive correlation to conducting the assurance engagement against the 
AA1000AS. Other types of additional commentary discussed earlier in Section 2.3.5 were rare.  
Interestingly, a disclaimer about how the unspecific nature of some sustainability information 
may affect the accuracy of assurances thereof was sometimes included either after the 
conclusion or among the main body of text. This was not a specific reservation on the 
conclusion, but – pessimistically – it still seemed like a convenient way for the assuror to wash 
their hands of liabilities or possible mistakes made in the assurance process. However, a more 
optimistic perspective would be to suggest that this disclaimer was simply included so that the 
report users would better understand the difference between providing assurance for financial 
and – relatively more multifaceted – non-financial information. As these perspectives are only 
speculation, future studies could attempt to provide a better understanding of how various types 
of additional commentary affect the perceived quality of assurance reports.  
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Formality-related quality indicators 
The formality-related quality of assurance reports was assessed with a total of four main 
indicators and five additional aspects relating to them (refer to Section 2.3.6 for a complete list). 
Overall, the results in terms of these indicators show a noticeably higher quality of assurance 
reports in Finland. However, an increased congruence was observed in the reports in France, 
thus perhaps hinting at the Grenelle II Act having positive effects on assurance report quality.  
The headings of the assurance reports were overall more uniform in Finland than in France. 
While the exact wordings of the headings often differed, especially in France, the most 
frequently observed heading type – based on purely illustrative categories – was “Independent 
Assurance Report” in Finland and “Statutory Auditor’s Report” in France. Indeed, the assuror’s 
independence was already indicated in the headings of most reports in Finland, whereas, in 
France, this became common only after the Grenelle II Act became effective. It is also notable 
that the most frequently utilized heading type in France establishes a slightly flattering picture 
of the actual practices. Indeed, the report headings in France were often very lengthy (e.g., 
“Attestation and assurance report of one of the Statutory Auditors”) compared to the respective 
headings in Finland. Interestingly, this might be a result of the mandatory joint financial 
auditing system in France, as the report headings likely attempted to indicate that the assuror of 
sustainability information was also one of the financial auditors.  
In Finland, the assurance reports were most often addressed to the assured company’s 
management, but also to the stakeholders on a few occasions. In France, on the other hand, the 
reports were addressed to no one during the early years of the examined period. However, after 
the Grenelle II Act, the reports were increasingly addressed to the shareholders, a critical group 
of company stakeholders. Despite the Grenelle II Act, it was still relatively more customary to 
identify the report addressees in Finland than in France. This study also assessed whether the 
report users were explicitly specified in addition to the addressee, but this was observed only 
in very few reports that – interestingly – had no addressee identified. This suggests, although 
with considerable uncertainty, that the addressee and the main report users can be considered 
one and the same. If this really is the case, the results in Finland then support the notion 
discussed in Section 2.2.2 that assurance reports may mainly be managerial tools to improve 
internal control and management systems and processes, instead of being methods to gain and 
maintain legitimacy or relieve stakeholder pressure regarding information asymmetries.  
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It is noteworthy, on the other hand, that the assurance engagements were often specifically 
indicated to have been requested by the company management. Why, then, would the assuror 
address the assurance report to anyone else? In light of this question, the approach in previous 
studies that considers it a sign of higher quality if the addressees include the stakeholders, 
should, perhaps, be reconsidered – at least until it can be validated that the assuror should, in 
all situations, address the assurance reports to the company stakeholders collectively.  
The readability of the assurance report was also assessed in terms of whether the report was 
divided into several sections. This turned out to be the case with all reports. However, some 
reports did include more sections than others. For example, separate sections for the 
responsibilities of the involved parties, the competence of the assuror, or the possible limitations 
were not nearly always observed. Conclusion, on the other hand, seemed to have been included 
in all reports as a separate section. The types of sections also varied a bit between the countries, 
as was indicated earlier in the results. However, significant differences in terms of the provided 
overall information were not observed, although there was some variance in how the 
information was emphasized.  
While the inclusion of several sections was the only assessed aspect of the readability of the 
assurance reports, it should be noted that there was a rather large variance in the presentation 
and appearance of the reports, making them, at times, difficult to skim and compare. Even 
though this is understandable due to company-specific image and format preferences, it is still 
an aspect that companies could better consider, so that various report users, especially external 
stakeholders, would have an easier time to understand the actual assurance report contents.  
As the final main indicator of quality, the inclusion of a formal signature was assessed. 
Interestingly, they were relatively common in Finland, but mostly absent in France. While the 
formal signature was often missing, it was usually specifically declared that the original copy 
(whether in different language or format) was signed by the assuror. From the perspective of 
an international stakeholder, such as an institutional investor, however, also the electronic and 
translated versions should probably be signed, so that it becomes apparent that the translations 
are as approved by the assuror as the original copies. In any case, when the formal signature 
was missing, the responsible assurors were identified by name with very few exceptions. As an 
additional aspect to the formal signature, the inclusion of a specific date and location was 
assessed. Aptly, both of them were specified in all reports – as they should be.  
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Additional implications regarding the results 
Regarding the results of this study, it should be noted that even when the reports in France are 
assessed only among the 16 companies who presented assurance reports consistently before the 
Grenelle II Act became effective (i.e. both in 2010 and 2011), the results remain approximately 
the same. This means that the observed possible effects of the Grenelle II – whether direct or 
indirect – in France apply to both those who have been presenting assurance reports previously 
and those who joined the sustainability assurance party out of necessity. Therefore, the overall 
results would likely be similar with another set of large French companies.  
Contributing to the everlasting and intercontextual discussion of whether size matters, this study 
seems to offer further evidence that it does. In France, the observed average rate of assurance 
reports was even higher than the already high amounts among France’s top 100 companies 
reported in recent KPMG reports (see, e.g., KPMG, 2015). In addition, in Finland, the observed 
rate of assurance reports was notably higher than the average rate among all sustainability 
reporters during the same years reported by recent PwC reports (see, e.g., PwC, 2016).  
Previous studies have also suggested that assurance report quality may be explained with 
country-specific factors. Indeed, the results of this study seem to demonstrate that assurance 
reports may have several country-specific differences. Furthermore, the gathered data included 
a handful of interesting observations regarding the few companies officially headquartered 
elsewhere than the country they were representing. For example, in terms of the referred 
assurance standards, the odd observations of the RevR 6 assurance standard within Finland 
were caused by reports presented by Nordea and Telia – both headquartered in Sweden during 
the examined period. In France, in turn, similarly odd observations were caused by the reports 
presented by Arcelor Mittal, headquartered in Luxembourg. These were the only reports in 
France referring to the AA1000AS as the main assurance standard and a specific international 
ethics code to describe the assuror’s independence. While these apparent anomalies may be 
only isolated coincidences, they could also very well be explained with country-specific factors.  
Previous studies have also indicated that industry may partially explain a company’s tendency 
to request sustainability assurances. The gathered data does not, however, enable drawing 
conclusions about this, as the amount of examined companies was simply too small to include 
proper representation of various industries, and thus no significant patterns could be observed.  
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Implications on the future of assurance reporting practices and regulations 
Finally, before moving on to conclusions, a few thoughts will be explored regarding the 
implications this study may have on the future of sustainability assurances both in the examined 
countries as well as in general. In addition, a handful of suggestions will be offered to hopefully 
help develop and improve regulations regarding sustainability assurances.  
In principle, if the triple bottom line thinking is to be fully and equally materialized, practically 
all companies should report on their sustainability and assure the reported information – exactly 
to the same extent as their financial information is reported and audited. Furthermore, regarding 
large companies specifically, the Big Four auditors, for example, seem to conduct both financial 
and non-financial audits, and often for the same companies. This raises an interesting question. 
Should both financial and non-financial assurance engagements be documented and presented 
in a single assurance report instead of separate ones? On one hand, maybe they should be. On 
the other hand, providing separate assurances for each bottom line could also be justified, if, 
for example, the competencies of the involved assurors would be optimized for the assurance 
of distinct information types. Interestingly, some companies in this study utilized this approach, 
at least seemingly, as some specific parts of environmental data were assured separately from 
other sustainability data. In any case, future studies could attempt to find out whether the future 
of various assurance reports is separate or integrated.  
Besides the results presented in the previous main section, this study also offers indications 
about how to improve assurance reports in the examined countries and among the included 
companies specifically. In Finland, there seems to be a clear need for more assurance reports, 
as well as reasonable assurance engagements. In France, on the other hand, the most urgent 
aspects to improve relate to indicating the assurance of all or most sustainability data – and not 
only the specific data that is required by the Grenelle II Act – as well as applying both main 
assurance standards in a single assurance engagement. In addition, both countries seem to 
demonstrate a flat-out disregard of including stakeholders in the assurance process. While it 
may seem odd to include stakeholders in an audit, the complex nature of the audited information 
and its direct relation to many stakeholders seems to provide a sufficient justification for such 
an approach. Company-specific improvement opportunities will not be discussed, as it would 
result in a lengthy discussion with little added value. However, for those who are interested, the 
complete company-specific data gathered during this study can be found in the appendices.  
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As was indicated earlier in this document, a study about the effect of regulation on assurance 
reporting in a South African context has been conducted, and it was observed that the rate of 
assurance reports increased substantially despite the local regulation imposing only a seemingly 
mandatory reporting regime. It was also suggested that inconsistent application of assurance 
practices could be overcome with a proper mandatory reporting regime. The results of this 
study, in turn, suggest that loosely regulated and seemingly mandatory assurance regimes, such 
as the relevant parts of the Grenelle II Act, may help increase congruence of report contents, 
but only in terms of certain aspects. Therefore, it seems that mandatory regimes need to be 
sufficiently detailed to successfully improve the quality of assurance reporting practices.  
What, then, could be included in regulations to increase their effectiveness in improving 
assurance report quality? A complete answer is not straightforward. However, to remedy the 
most significant shortcomings observed in this study, regulations could attempt to mandate the 
• references to and explanations of the applicable assurance standards, 
• indication and explanation of the level of assurance, 
• clear and specific justification of both the assuror’s independence and competence, 
• assurance of all sustainability data by default, and explaining possible exceptions, 
• inclusion of key stakeholder groups in the assurance process, 
• utilization of a predefined report heading, such as “independent assurance report”, 
• inclusion of formal signatures in all official, public versions of the assurance report, 
• avoidance of vague and ambiguous references, justifications, or other narrative.  
Achieving a regulation that addresses these aspects may only be an ideal to be pursued but 
never achieved. It also should be noted that mandatory regimes addressing the aforementioned 
aspects alone are unlikely to be sufficient to notably improve the quality of assurance reports. 
In fact, this is also likely to require, at least, improvements in the competence of assurors in 
terms of providing sustainability assurance and reports thereof, reductions in possibly 
significant management control over the assurance process, international standardization and 
supervision of the entire assurance system, and more stakeholder pressure to help these things 
to materialize. Hopefully, these improvements will occur in the nearby future, as the results of 
this study indicate that there is a long way to go for assurance reports to reach a high and 
consistent level of quality that can be easily compared across various contexts.   
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to gain knowledge about how non-financial assurance reporting 
quality is associated with voluntary and mandatory contexts, especially in the case of large 
companies. The examined countries were Finland and France where assurance reporting of non-
financial information is voluntary and mandatory, respectively. The published assurance reports 
of the 25 companies listed in the OMXH25 index of the Helsinki stock exchange and the largest 
25 companies by market value in the CAC40 index of the Paris stock exchange were assessed 
based on a broad set of quality indicators that were identified using existing knowledge. The 
examined period consisted of the years from 2010 to 2015, covering periods both before and 
after the implementation of the Grenelle II Act in France, so that possible changes that may 
have occurred during that particular period could be observed. In total, 101 assurance reports 
were presented in Finland and 133 in France, out of a maximum of 150 reports per country. 
The research was conducted by answering two specific questions: how many of the companies 
presented an assurance report, and, more importantly, which indicators of quality were present 
in the companies’ assurance reports? The first question was answered simply by determining 
the number of assurance reports presented during the defined period of time by the included 
companies. To answer the second question, a new approach was implemented to remedy the 
most significant shortcomings in the previous attempts. The indicators were divided into five 
distinct categories with no specific weights, so that different aspects and areas of assurance 
report quality could be holistically and tangibly compared between the examined countries.  
Before specifically discussing the main contributions of this study, presenting a brief summary 
of and a few important inferences about the results seem appropriate. By interpreting the results 
based on an indicator-by-indicator comparison, it seems that the report quality was more often 
higher in Finland. Of the around 30 indicators, 10 suggested higher quality in Finland, 
compared to only 5 in France, while the rest demonstrated no notable differences (refer to Table 
15 on page 93, if necessary). Also, when a difference was observed, its margin seemed to be on 
average much greater in cases where it favored Finland than in those favoring France. The 
findings remain similar when analyzing the indicator categories, as reports from Finland seem 
to demonstrate either roughly the same or even a higher level of quality compared to reports 
from France in all of the categories. While the applied method does not enable stating an exact 
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overall quality score (refer to Section 3.2 for details about this issue), the results still seem to 
suggest that assurance reports are on average higher in quality in Finland than in France, at least 
in the case of large companies. While it would be, then, tempting to conclude that the results 
seem to consequently indicate that voluntary contexts may be associated with higher quality 
reports than mandatory contexts, this type of conclusion would be invalid in this case, since the 
level of quality seemed to be higher in Finland already before assurance reporting became 
mandatory in France. Still, the results did seem to indicate that the overall level of quality did 
not notably improve in France simply by assurances becoming mandatory.  
Regarding the observed changes specifically, in France, the reports seemed to become 
increasingly harmonized and higher in quality, especially in terms of the description of the 
assuror’s independence, the clarity and uniformity of the report headings, and the identification 
of the addressees. Also, minor positive effects were observed in terms of the consistency of 
referring to either of the main assurance standards and the frequency of reasonable assurances, 
although the latter were often provided for only a small part of the sustainability data. 
Interestingly, when combined with the timing of these observed changes in France – which 
seemed to occur often right after the Grenelle II Act became effective – the results seem to 
indicate that mandatory assurance regimes may be useful, even if overall report quality did not 
seem to notably increase. At this point, it is important to remind that the applied research 
method does not enable stating with absolute certainty that the observed changes have occurred 
due to the regulation in question – other, unknown factors may have played a role, as well. 
Interestingly, the level of quality across most indicators seemed to remain relatively unchanged 
in Finland, even though there was room for improvement, as well. Still, a few minor positive 
changes were observed, such as increases in reporting quantity, specifying additional criteria, 
describing and justifying the assuror’s independence with specific international ethics codes, 
describing the assuror’s competence, and explicitly stating that the assurance covers all original 
sustainability data (with possible exclusions properly indicated). Also, in Finland, negative 
changes were not observed, but, in France, the depth of describing the assuror’s competence, 
the amount of additional commentary, and the assurances of all or most sustainability data 
seemed to slightly decrease. In addition, the companies in France seemed to increasingly utilize 
only a single sustainability assuror per year, thus indicating, perhaps, a refusal of the joint 
assurance system – which is effective for financial audits in France – if possible.  
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Now that the results have been appropriately summarized, the three main contributions of this 
study should be emphasized. First, this study extends the scarce, existing knowledge regarding 
the quality of assurance reports in both voluntary and mandatory contexts. To illustrate, in a 
fairly recent study, Ackers and Eccles (2015) suggested that mandatory assurance regimes may 
help improve knowledge about assurance reports and decrease inconsistencies in assurance 
reporting practices. The findings of this study can be inferred to support these earlier findings, 
but it also seems that the regulations need to be much more specific than they are now, as, in 
France, for example, the Grenelle II has seemed to help decrease inconsistencies, but regarding 
only few quality factors. At the same time, in the voluntary context of Finland, only very minor 
changes were observed. Combining the findings from both contexts, several suggestions can 
then be made to help improve future versions of assurance reporting regulations, as it seemed 
that these were the aspects with most room for improvement. Specifically, it is suggested that 
regulations could in more detail impose requirements for the assurance report contents, such as 
explanations and justifications of the applicable assurance standards, the level of assurance, and 
the assuror’s independence and competence. It was also acknowledged that improving the 
quality of assurance reports is likely to require, at least, improvements in the competence of 
assurors in terms of providing sustainability assurance and reports thereof, and international 
standardization and supervision of the entire assurance system.  
The second main contribution of this study is that it also offers an original method to assess 
assurance report quality, as critical shortcomings were identified in previous attempts originally 
by Perego and Kolk (2012) and Zorio et al. (2013). While these attempts have aimed to produce 
either an indicative or an exact total quality score based on predetermined criteria, this study 
did not follow in their footsteps, as too little is known about the importance and weight of each 
individual quality indicator to consider any criteria based on them to be useful. In other words, 
attempting to determine specific weights based on little evidence, is likely to result in biased, 
speculative, or arbitrary total quality scores. Therefore, this study applied a method based on 
all known indicators – including all those in the aforementioned two methods and their later 
extensions – but divided them into distinct categories which were then compared holistically 
between the examined countries. The applied method does not enable stating an exact total 
score but helps understand both the individual quality factors as well as the concept of assurance 
report quality in a holistic, yet thorough manner – perhaps even better than previous methods.  
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The third, and final, main contribution of this study is that it offers a handful of useful insights 
to consider in future assurance report quality assessments as well as any standards or regulations 
that aim to guide or even mandate the contents of sustainability assurance reports. Indeed, based 
on the observations made from the gathered data, it seems that assurance report quality could, 
perhaps, be increased with certain additions and changes that seem to have been overlooked 
previously. For example, it might be appropriate for assurance reports to explain the applied 
assurance standard, state the implications of the possibly applied quality control policies, 
describe the size of the assuror team, and state the duration of the assurance process. These 
additions could help the report users better understand the meanings of the report contents and 
the underlying assurance process. It should also be noted that the role and relevance of both 
additional commentary as well as indications of stakeholders as either report addressees or 
participants in the assurance process seem to require careful reconsideration. While they have 
been included in previous quality assessments – as well as in this study, although in a much 
smaller role – the implications of additional commentary are debated at best, and there is no 
clear indication that the role of stakeholders is as outrightly positive indication as many studies 
seem to assume. In sum, until more is known about these often-cited assurance report elements, 
their role should perhaps be as minimized as possible in assurance report quality assessments.  
This study also provided an abundance of additional implications aside from its three main 
contributions. For example, this study seems to offer evidence that size may indeed matter. In 
France, the observed average rate of assurance reports was even higher than the already high 
amounts reported in the recent KPMG reports about corporate responsibility among France’s 
top 100 companies. Furthermore, the observed rate of assurance reports is notably higher in 
Finland than, for example, the relatively low average rate among all sustainability reporters 
during the same years reported by the Finnish branch of the PwC. Despite these observations, 
it is important to note that there may also be determinants other than company size in play, but 
that is impossible to state with certainty with the help of this study, as it was not the main focus, 
and would have therefore required a different research approach altogether.  
Previous studies have also suggested that assurance report quality may be explained with 
country-specific factors. The results of this study seem to support that notion, as the gathered 
data included a handful of anomalies caused by the few companies officially headquartered 
elsewhere than the country they were representing. While these apparent anomalies may be 
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only isolated incidents, they could also very well be explained with country-specific factors. 
Previous studies have also indicated that industry may determine a company’s tendency to 
request sustainability assurances. The gathered data in this study does not, however, enable 
drawing conclusions about this, as the amount of examined companies was too small to include 
proper representation of various industries, and thus no prominent patterns could be observed.  
At this point, it seems appropriate to note that even when the reports in France are assessed only 
among the 16 companies who presented assurance reports consistently before the Grenelle II 
Act became effective (i.e. both in 2010 and 2011), the results remain approximately the same. 
This seems to mean that the observed possible effects of the Grenelle II – whether direct or 
indirect – in France apply to both those who have been presenting assurance reports previously 
and those who joined the sustainability assurance party out of necessity. Therefore, the overall 
results would likely be similar with another set of large French companies.  
The results of this comparative study should be credible mainly for two reasons. First, the 
method with which this study was conducted – i.e. dividing quality indicators into distinct 
groups which were then compared holistically and separately from the other groups – seemed 
to successfully remedy the most significant defects in previous attempts to assess assurance 
report quality, as was explained earlier. Second, a very broad and thorough set of quality 
indicators was used in the analysis – perhaps the most comprehensive set of indicators to date 
in a study representing this particular research field. In addition, the amount of examined reports 
was perhaps the largest in a single study regarding the quality of non-financial assurance 
reports. The chosen period also seemed adequate for analyzing possible changes and tenderly 
linking these changes, in the case of France, to the Grenelle II Act, thus offering tentative 
indications about the effectiveness of the regulation in question. Using reports from Finland as 
a comparison – or even a control group – and observing their rather stable level of quality 
throughout the period seemed to further increase the possibility of the observed changes in 
France being either partially or even entirely rooted in the aforementioned regulation, and not, 
for example, international trends or other noticeably influencing developments in assurance 
reporting. However, limiting the study to include only two countries may make it a bit difficult 
to generalize the results to other regions, and including only large companies adds to that issue. 
Still, in the end, the study seemed to fulfill its purpose well and offer interesting implications 
for future studies and everyone else involved in the sustainability assurance system.  
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To sum up, the contributions of this study can be considered very valuable in this particular, 
scarce field of research due to their originality and implications. However, much more research 
is needed to improve understanding about non-financial assurance reports and their quality in 
general. Consequently, multiple research needs were identified. For example, an imaginary 
mandatory regime based on the suggestions made in this study could be constructed and tested 
among various companies to assess its effectiveness. Also, future studies could attempt to 
ascertain whether it would be useful to assure each of the three bottom lines of a company with 
an integrated assurance report or with separate assurance reports. In addition, more knowledge 
is needed to understand as accurately as possible the actual effects of each individual quality 
indicator on the overall quality of an assurance report. To achieve this, future studies could, for 
example, test assurance reports with varying compositions of quality indicators and overall 
levels of quality among various stakeholder groups to determine how the report quality is 
perceived. Furthermore, when understanding about the effectiveness of each individual quality 
indicator improves, it might be possible to construct and test a balanced assurance report 
scorecard which could enable an accurate method of assessing the quality of assurance reports, 
thus likely increasing the usefulness of the two previous assessment methods discussed earlier. 
All in all, any kind of research aimed at finding out how the value and quality of sustainability 
assurances could be further increased, would likely be very useful for companies, assurors, 
stakeholders, academics, and regulatory authorities alike in improving and developing the 
current sustainability assurance practices.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Did the company present any kind of an assurance report? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS No No No No No No  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC No No No No No Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  AXA No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI No No No No No Yes  BNP PARIBAS No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES No No No No No Yes  ESSILOR No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES No No No No No Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION No No No No No No  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO No No No No No No  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY No No Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT No No No No No No  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 56 % 64 % 68 % 68 % 68 % 80 %  YES 64 % 72 % 96 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 44 % 36 % 32 % 32 % 32 % 20 %  NO 36 % 28 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix B: Which main assurance standards are specified? (1/2) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - - 
CARGOTEC - - - - - ISAE 3000 
ELISA ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
FORTUM ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 1 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 1 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 1 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 1 - 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 1 
KEMIRA ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
KESKO ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 
KONE - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 AA1000AS Type X 
KONECRANES - - - - - ISAE 3000 
METSO ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
METSÄ BOARD ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 AA1000AS Type 2 N/A AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 1 
NESTE ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 
NOKIA ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - ISAE 3000 
NORDEA BANK N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ORION - - - - - - 
OUTOKUMPU ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
OUTOTEC ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
SAMPO - - - - - - 
STORA ENSO AA1000AS Type X AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 1 ISAE 3000 
TELIA COMPANY - - N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TIETO AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 2 AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 
UPM-KYMMENE - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type 2 
WÄRTSILÄ ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
YIT - - - - - - 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EITHER 93 % 94 % 88 % 82 % 88 % 90 % 
ISAE 3000 79 % 81 % 71 % 71 % 76 % 80 % 
AA1000AS 36 % 38 % 41 % 35 % 41 % 30 % 
BOTH 21 % 25 % 24 % 24 % 29 % 20 % 
N/A 7 % 6 % 12 % 18 % 12 % 10 % 
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Appendix B: Which main assurance standards are specified? (2/2) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AIR LIQUIDE ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
AIRBUS (EADS) ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
ARCELOR MITTAL AA1000AS Type 2 ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type X ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type X ISAE 3000 & AA1000AS Type X ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
AXA - - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
BNP PARIBAS - - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
CARREFOUR - - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
DANONE N/A N/A ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) N/A N/A ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
ESSILOR - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
KERING (PPR) ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
L’OREAL - - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
LAFARGEHOLCIM ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 N/A N/A ISAE 3000 
LVMH ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
MICHELIN ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
ORANGE - - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
PERNOD RICARD ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
PUBLICIS - - N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SAINT-GOBAIN ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
SANOFI N/A N/A ISAE 3000 N/A ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
TOTAL - ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
VINCI ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
VIVENDI ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 ISAE 3000 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EITHER 81 % 83 % 96 % 88 % 92 % 96 % 
ISAE 3000 75 % 83 % 96 % 88 % 92 % 96 % 
AA1000AS 6 % 6 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
BOTH 0 % 6 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
N/A 19 % 17 % 4 % 12 % 8 % 4 % 
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Appendix C: What is the level of assurance? (1/2) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - - 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Limited 
ELISA Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
FORTUM Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited - 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Limited 
KEMIRA Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
KESKO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
KONE - Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
KONECRANES - - - - - Limited 
METSO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
METSÄ BOARD Limited Limited Limited N/A Limited Limited 
NESTE Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
NOKIA Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Limited 
NORDEA BANK N/A N/A N/A Limited Limited Limited 
ORION - - - - - - 
OUTOKUMPU Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
OUTOTEC Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
SAMPO - - - - - - 
STORA ENSO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited & Reasonable 
TELIA COMPANY - - Limited Limited Limited Limited 
TIETO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
UPM-KYMMENE - Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
WÄRTSILÄ Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
YIT - - - - - - 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EITHER 93 % 94 % 94 % 94 % 100 % 100 % 
LIMITED 93 % 94 % 94 % 94 % 100 % 100 % 
REASONABLE 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 5 % 
BOTH 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 5 % 
N/A 7 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix C: What is the level of assurance? (2/2) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AIR LIQUIDE Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
AIRBUS (EADS) Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
ARCELOR MITTAL Limited & Reasonable Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
AXA - - Limited Limited Limited Limited 
BNP PARIBAS - - Limited Limited Limited Limited 
CARREFOUR - - Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable 
DANONE Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable 
ESSILOR - Reasonable Limited Limited Limited Limited 
KERING (PPR) Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
L’OREAL - - Limited Limited Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable 
LAFARGEHOLCIM Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
LVMH Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable 
MICHELIN Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
ORANGE - - Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable Limited Limited 
PERNOD RICARD Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
PUBLICIS - - N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SAINT-GOBAIN Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
SANOFI Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Limited Limited Limited 
TOTAL - Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
VINCI Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited & Reasonable Limited & Reasonable 
VIVENDI Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EITHER 100 % 100 % 96 % 96 % 96 % 96 % 
LIMITED 100 % 94 % 96 % 96 % 96 % 96 % 
REASONABLE 19 % 17 % 17 % 16 % 24 % 24 % 
BOTH 19 % 11 % 17 % 16 % 24 % 24 % 
N/A 0 % 0 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 
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Appendix D: Is the level of assurance explained? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE No No No No No No 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL No No No No Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - No No No No 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE No No No No No No 
KONE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No No No No No 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - No No No No No 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) No No No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes No No No No  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No No 
NOKIA Yes Yes No No Yes Yes  LVMH No No No No No No 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - No No No No 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No No No No No 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - No No No No 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No No No No No 
STORA ENSO No No No No Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC No No No No No No 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No No No 
TIETO No No No No Yes Yes  TOTAL - No No No No No 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No No No No No 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI No No No No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No No No No No 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 86 % 88 % 76 % 76 % 94 % 95 %  YES 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 4 % 4 % 
NO 14 % 13 % 24 % 24 % 6 % 5 %  NO 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 96 % 96 % 
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Appendix E: Are the GRI Guidelines specified as reporting criteria? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE No No No No No No 
CARGOTEC - - - - - GRI G4  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA No No No GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G4  ARCELOR MITTAL GRI G3 GRI GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G4 No 
FORTUM GRI G3 GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G4 -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - GRI G4  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA No GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G4 GRI G4 GRI G4  CARREFOUR - - No No No No 
KESKO GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4 GRI G4 GRI G4  DANONE No No No No No No 
KONE - No GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No No No No No 
KONECRANES - - - - - GRI G4  ESSILOR - No No No No No 
METSO GRI G3 GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G4  KERING (PPR) No No No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD GRI G3 GRI G3.1 GRI GRI G3.1 GRI G4 GRI G4  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No No 
NOKIA No No No No No No  LVMH No No No No No No 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - GRI G4  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI GRI  ORANGE - - No No No No 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No No No No No 
OUTOKUMPU GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4  PUBLICIS - - No GRI G4 GRI G4 No 
OUTOTEC GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4 GRI G4  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No No No No No 
STORA ENSO GRI GRI GRI GRI G4 GRI G4 GRI G4  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC No No No No No No 
TELIA COMPANY - - GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI GRI  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No No No 
TIETO GRI G3 GRI G3.1 GRI G3.1 GRI G4 GRI G4 GRI G4  TOTAL - No No No No No 
UPM-KYMMENE - GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No GRI 3.1 No No No 
WÄRTSILÄ GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G3 GRI G4 GRI G4  VINCI No No No No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No No No No No 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 79 % 81 % 88 % 94 % 94 % 95 %  YES 6 % 6 % 8 % 8 % 8 % 0 % 
• GRI GX 7 % 6 % 12 % 0 % 12 % 10 %  • GRI GX 0 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
• GRI G3 71 % 75 % 76 % 71 % 35 % 0 %  • GRI G3 6 % 0 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
• GRI G3.1 0 % 31 % 29 % 29 % 12 % 0 %  • GRI G3.1 0 % 0 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
• GRI G4 0 % 0 % 0 % 24 % 47 % 85 %  • GRI G4 0 % 0 % 0 % 4 % 8 % 0 % 
NO 21 % 19 % 12 % 6 % 6 % 5 %  NO 94 % 94 % 92 % 92 % 92 % 100 % 
 
 138 
 
Appendix F: Which additional standards or criteria are mentioned? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE None None None None None None 
CARGOTEC - - - - - ISQC1  AIRBUS (EADS) None None None None None None 
ELISA GHG GHG GHG None None ISQC1  ARCELOR MITTAL None None None None None None 
FORTUM None None None None GHG  -  AXA - - None None None None 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - None  BNP PARIBAS - - None None None None 
KEMIRA None None None None None None  CARREFOUR - - None None None None 
KESKO None None None None None ISQC1  DANONE None None None None None None 
KONE - GHG GHG, ISO 14064-3 GHG, ISO 14064-3 GHG, ISO 14064-3 GHG   ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) None None None None None None 
KONECRANES - - - - - None  ESSILOR - None None None None None 
METSO None None None None None ISQC1  KERING (PPR) None None None None None None 
METSÄ BOARD None None None None None None  L’OREAL - - None None None None 
NESTE None None None None None ISQC1  LAFARGEHOLCIM None None None None None None 
NOKIA GHG, ISO 14001 GHG, ISO 14001 None None GHG  GHG   LVMH None None None None None None 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - ISQC1  MICHELIN None None None None None None 
NORDEA BANK RevR 6 RevR 6 RevR 6 RevR 6 RevR 6 RevR 6, ISQC1  ORANGE - - None None None None 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD None None None None None None 
OUTOKUMPU None None None None None ISQC1  PUBLICIS - - None None None None 
OUTOTEC None None None None None None  SAINT-GOBAIN None None None None None None 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI None None None None None None 
STORA ENSO None None None None None None  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC None None None None None None 
TELIA COMPANY - - RevR 6 RevR 6 RevR 6 RevR 6, ISQC1  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - None None None 
TIETO None None None None None ISQC1  TOTAL - None None None None None 
UPM-KYMMENE - None None None None None  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO None None None None None None 
WÄRTSILÄ None None None None None ISQC1  VINCI None None None None None None 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI None None None None None None 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AT LEAST ONE 21 % 25 % 24 % 18 % 29 % 65 %  AT LEAST ONE 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
GHG PROTOCOL 14 % 19 % 12 % 6 % 18 % 10 %  GHG PROTOCOL 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
ISO 14000 SERIES 7 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 0 %  ISO 14000 SERIES 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
ISQC 1 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 55 %  ISQC 1 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
REVR 6 7 % 6 % 12 % 12 % 12 % 10 %  REVR 6 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
NONE 79 % 75 % 76 % 82 % 71 % 35 %  NONE 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
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Appendix G: Who is the assurance provider? (1/2) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - - 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Auditor (PwC) 
ELISA Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) 
FORTUM Auditor (PwC) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) - 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Auditor (Deloitte) 
KEMIRA Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) 
KESKO Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
KONE - Auditor (PwC) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Mitopro) 
KONECRANES - - - - - Expert (Ecobio) 
METSO Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
METSÄ BOARD Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Expert (Tofuture) Expert (Mitopro) Expert (Mitopro) Expert (Mitopro) 
NESTE Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
NOKIA Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Auditor (KPMG) 
NORDEA BANK Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) 
ORION - - - - - - 
OUTOKUMPU Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
OUTOTEC Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) Expert (Ecobio) 
SAMPO - - - - - - 
STORA ENSO Expert (Tofuture) Expert (Tofuture) Expert (Tofuture) Expert (Tofuture) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) 
TELIA COMPANY - - Auditor (PwC) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) 
TIETO Expert (Ethos / Two Tomorrows) Expert (Ethos) Expert (Ethos) Expert (Ethos) Expert (Ethos) Auditor (PwC) 
UPM-KYMMENE - Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
WÄRTSILÄ Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) 
YIT - - - - - - 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AUDITOR 79 % 81 % 71 % 71 % 76 % 80 % 
EXPERT 21 % 19 % 29 % 29 % 24 % 20 % 
MORE THAN ONE 7 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix G: Who is the assurance provider? (2/2) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AIR LIQUIDE Auditor (EY / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Mazars) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
AIRBUS (EADS) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
ARCELOR MITTAL Expert (Bureau Veritas) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) 
AXA - - Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
BNP PARIBAS - - Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
CARREFOUR - - Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (Mazars) Auditor (Mazars) Auditor (Mazars) 
DANONE Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (EY / PwC) Auditor (EY / PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (EY) 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Auditor (EY / Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (EY / Deloitte) Auditor (EY / Deloitte) 
ESSILOR - Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) 
KERING (PPR) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) 
L’OREAL - - Auditor (Deloitte / PwC) Auditor (Deloitte / PwC) Auditor (Deloitte / PwC) Auditor (Deloitte / PwC) 
LAFARGEHOLCIM Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Expert (Bureau Veritas) Expert (Bureau Veritas) Expert (Bureau Veritas) Auditor (EY) 
LVMH Auditor (EY / Deloitte) Auditor (EY / Deloitte) Auditor (EY / Deloitte) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
MICHELIN Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
ORANGE - - Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG) 
PERNOD RICARD Auditor (Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (Deloitte / Mazars) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) Auditor (Deloitte) 
PUBLICIS - - Expert (SGS ICS) Expert (SGS ICS) Expert (SGS ICS) Expert (SGS ICS) 
SAINT-GOBAIN Auditor (PwC / KPMG) Auditor (PwC / KPMG) Auditor (PwC / KPMG) Auditor (PwC / KPMG) Auditor (PwC) Auditor (PwC) 
SANOFI Auditor (EY / PwC) Auditor (EY / PwC) Auditor (EY / PwC) Auditor (EY / PwC) Auditor (EY) Auditor (PwC) 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
TOTAL - Auditor (EY) / Expert (Bureau Veritas) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
VINCI Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG / Deloitte) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) 
VIVENDI Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (KPMG) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) Auditor (EY) 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AUDITOR 94 % 100 % 92 % 92 % 92 % 96 % 
EXPERT 6 % 6 % 8 % 8 % 8 % 4 % 
MORE THAN ONE 50 % 50 % 42 % 32 % 8 % 8 % 
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Appendix H: Is the assuror’s independence described? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA No No No No No Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO No No No No No Yes  KERING (PPR) No No No Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA No Yes Yes Yes No Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU No No No No No Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No Yes Yes Yes No 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO No No No No No Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes No No No  VINCI No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 57 % 50 % 65 % 59 % 53 % 85 %  YES 44 % 39 % 92 % 96 % 96 % 96 % 
NO 43 % 50 % 35 % 41 % 47 % 15 %  NO 56 % 61 % 8 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 
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Appendix I: Which independence standard or code of ethics is explicitly specified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE General General General General General General 
CARGOTEC - - - - - IESBA  AIRBUS (EADS) General General General General General General 
ELISA None None None None None General  ARCELOR MITTAL None IFAC IFAC IFAC None IESBA 
FORTUM Company Company Company IESBA IESBA -  AXA - - General General General General 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - IFAC  BNP PARIBAS - - General General General General 
KEMIRA IFAC IFAC IFAC Company Company IFAC  CARREFOUR - - General General General General 
KESKO General Company Company IESBA IESBA IESBA  DANONE None None General General General General 
KONE - None None None None None  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) None None General General General General 
KONECRANES - - - - - None  ESSILOR - None General General General General 
METSO None None None None None IESBA  KERING (PPR) None None None General General General 
METSÄ BOARD Company None None None None None  L’OREAL - - General General General General 
NESTE Company Company Company IESBA IESBA IESBA  LAFARGEHOLCIM General None Company Company Company General 
NOKIA None Company General General None IESBA  LVMH General General General General General General 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - General  MICHELIN None None General General General General 
NORDEA BANK None None None None None None  ORANGE - - General General General General 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD None None General General General General 
OUTOKUMPU None None None None None IESBA  PUBLICIS - - General General General General 
OUTOTEC None None None None None None  SAINT-GOBAIN None None None None General General 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI None None General General General None 
STORA ENSO None None None None IFAC IFAC  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC General General General General General General 
TELIA COMPANY - - None None None None  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - General General General 
TIETO None None None None None None  TOTAL - IFAC General General General General 
UPM-KYMMENE - None Company IESBA IESBA IESBA  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO General General General General General General 
WÄRTSILÄ IFAC IFAC IFAC None None IESBA  VINCI None None General General General General 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI None None General General General General 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ANY 43 % 38 % 41 % 35 % 35 % 65 %  ANY 38 % 39 % 92 % 96 % 96 % 96 % 
• IFAC / IESBA 14 % 13 % 12 % 24 % 29 % 55 %  • IFAC / IESBA 0 % 11 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 4 % 
• GENERAL 7 % 0 % 6 % 6 % 0 % 10 %  • GENERAL 38 % 28 % 83 % 88 % 92 % 92 % 
• COMPANY 21 % 25 % 24 % 6 % 6 % 0 %  • COMPANY 0 % 0 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 
NONE 57 % 63 % 59 % 65 % 65 % 35 %  NONE 63 % 61 % 8 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 
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Appendix J: Is the assuror’s competence described? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA No No No No No No  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO No No No No No Yes  KERING (PPR) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No Yes 
NOKIA No Yes Yes Yes No Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU No No No No No Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No Yes Yes Yes No 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes No No No No No  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 64 % 50 % 65 % 65 % 59 % 75 %  YES 63 % 61 % 88 % 92 % 92 % 92 % 
NO 36 % 50 % 35 % 35 % 41 % 25 %  NO 38 % 39 % 13 % 8 % 8 % 8 % 
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Appendix K: Is the assuror’s experience specified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes No No No No 
CARGOTEC - - - - - No  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA No No No No No No  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA No No No Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - No No No No 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE No No No No No No 
KONE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No No No No No 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - No No No No No 
METSO No No No No No No  KERING (PPR) No No No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No No 
NOKIA No Yes No No No No  LVMH No No No No No No 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - No No No No 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No No No No No 
OUTOKUMPU No No No No No No  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No No No No No 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes No No No No 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No No No 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  TOTAL - Yes No No No No 
UPM-KYMMENE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No No No No No 
WÄRTSILÄ No No No No No No  VINCI No No No No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No No No No No 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 50 % 44 % 53 % 59 % 59 % 45 %  YES 19 % 22 % 8 % 8 % 4 % 4 % 
NO 50 % 56 % 47 % 41 % 41 % 55 %  NO 81 % 78 % 92 % 92 % 96 % 96 % 
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Appendix L: Is the assuror’s multidisciplinarity specified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE No No No No No No 
CARGOTEC - - - - - No  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA No No No No No No  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA No No No Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - No No No No 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE No No No No No No 
KONE - No No No No No  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No No No No No 
KONECRANES - - - - - No  ESSILOR - No No No No No 
METSO No No No No No No  KERING (PPR) No No No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD Yes No No No No No  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No No 
NOKIA No Yes No No No No  LVMH No No No No No No 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - No No No No 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No No No No No 
OUTOKUMPU No No No No No No  PUBLICIS - - No No No No 
OUTOTEC No No No No No No  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No No No No No 
STORA ENSO No No No No Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC No No No No No No 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No No No 
TIETO No No No No No No  TOTAL - Yes No No No No 
UPM-KYMMENE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No No No No No 
WÄRTSILÄ No No No No No No  VINCI No No No No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No No No No No 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 29 % 25 % 24 % 29 % 35 % 25 %  YES 6 % 11 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
NO 71 % 75 % 76 % 71 % 65 % 75 %  NO 94 % 89 % 96 % 96 % 100 % 100 % 
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Appendix M: Is the scope of the assurance stated? / What data is assured? (1/2) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - - 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Selected 
ELISA GHG Emissions GHG Emissions GHG Emissions All or most All or most All or most 
FORTUM Econ., Social, Env. All or most All or most All or most All or most - 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - All or most 
KEMIRA Env., HR All or most All or Most All or most All or most All or most 
KESKO Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. All or most Econ., Social, Env. 
KONE - GHG Emissions GHG Emissions GHG Emissions GHG Emissions GHG Emissions 
KONECRANES - - - - - Env., HR 
METSO Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. 
METSÄ BOARD Social, Env. Social, Env. All or most All or most All or most All or most 
NESTE Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. 
NOKIA Env., HR Env., HR Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Soc Env., Soc 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - All or most 
NORDEA BANK All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most 
ORION - - - - - - 
OUTOKUMPU Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. 
OUTOTEC All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most 
SAMPO - - - - - - 
STORA ENSO All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most 
TELIA COMPANY - - All or most All or most All or most All or most 
TIETO All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most Econ., Social, Env. 
UPM-KYMMENE - Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Econ., Social, Env. Selected 
WÄRTSILÄ All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most 
YIT - - - - - - 
       
SCOPE STATED 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ALL OR MOST 36 % 44 % 53 % 59 % 65 % 50 % 
SELECTED 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 10 % 
ECONOMIC 36 % 31 % 29 % 29 % 24 % 25 % 
SOCIAL / SOCIETAL 43 % 38 % 35 % 35 % 29 % 30 % 
ENVIRONMENTAL / GHG 64 % 56 % 47 % 41 % 35 % 40 % 
HR / LABOUR 14 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 5 % 
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Appendix M: Is the scope of the assurance stated? / What data is assured? (2/2) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AIR LIQUIDE HR, Env. HR, Env. Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
AIRBUS (EADS) Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social 
ARCELOR MITTAL All or most All or most All or most All or most All or most Env. 
AXA - - Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social 
BNP PARIBAS - - Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour 
CARREFOUR - - Env., Social, Societal Env., Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social 
DANONE Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social, HR Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
ESSILOR - Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social, Societal 
KERING (PPR) Selected Selected Selected Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, HR 
L’OREAL - - Env., Social, HR Env., Social, Societal HR, Env., Social, Societal HR, Env., Social, Societal 
LAFARGEHOLCIM Selected Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, HR 
LVMH Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour 
MICHELIN Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Labour Env., Societal, Labour Env., Social, Labour 
ORANGE - - Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Labour 
PERNOD RICARD Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, HR Env., Social, HR 
PUBLICIS - - Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal All or most All or most 
SAINT-GOBAIN Env., Social, HR Env., Social, HR Env., Social, HR Env., Social, HR Env., Social, Labour Env., Social, Labour 
SANOFI All or most All or most All or most Env., Social, Labour All or most Env., Social, Labour 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC HR, Env. HR, Env. Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
TOTAL - All or most Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Env., HR Env., HR Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
VINCI Env., Social Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social Env., Social 
VIVENDI Env., Social Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal Env., Social, Societal 
       
SCOPE STATED 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
       
SPECIFIED DATA TYPES 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ALL OR MOST 13 % 17 % 8 % 4 % 12 % 4 % 
SELECTED 13 % 6 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
ECONOMIC 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
SOCIAL / SOCIETAL 56 % 61 % 88 % 96 % 88 % 92 % 
ENVIRONMENTAL / GHG 75 % 78 % 88 % 96 % 88 % 96 % 
HR / LABOUR 31 % 28 % 21 % 24 % 28 % 40 % 
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Appendix N: Is the form of the original sustainability report indicated? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA No No No Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - No Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 93 % 88 % 94 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 7 % 13 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix O: Are possible limitations or liabilities addressed? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - Yes Yes Yes Yes No  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes No No No  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 94 % 94 % 90 %  YES 100 % 94 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 6 % 6 % 10 %  NO 0 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix P: Are the responsibilities of involved parties clarified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  YES 94 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  NO 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix Q: Are the procedures undertaken in the assurance process specified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 94 % 94 % 95 %  YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 6 % 6 % 5 %  NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix R: Is stakeholder participation indicated? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE No No No No No No 
CARGOTEC - - - - - No  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA No No No No No No  ARCELOR MITTAL No No No No No No 
FORTUM No No No No No -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - No  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA No No No No No No  CARREFOUR - - No No No No 
KESKO No No No No No No  DANONE No No No No No No 
KONE - No No No No No  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No No No No No 
KONECRANES - - - - - No  ESSILOR - No No No No No 
METSO No No No No No No  KERING (PPR) No No No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD No No No No No No  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE No No No No No No  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No No 
NOKIA No No No No No No  LVMH No No No No No No 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - No No No No 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No No No No No 
OUTOKUMPU No No No No No No  PUBLICIS - - No No No No 
OUTOTEC No No No No No No  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No No No No No 
STORA ENSO No No No No No No  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC No No No No No No 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No No No 
TIETO No No No No No No  TOTAL - No No No No No 
UPM-KYMMENE - No No No No No  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No No No No No 
WÄRTSILÄ No No No No No No  VINCI No No No No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No No No No No 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  YES 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
NO 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  NO 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
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Appendix S: Is the type of conclusion made clear? / What is the form of conclusion? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Negative  AIRBUS (EADS) Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
ELISA Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  ARCELOR MITTAL Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
FORTUM Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative -  AXA - - Negative Negative Negative Negative 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Negative  BNP PARIBAS - - Negative Negative Negative Negative 
KEMIRA Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  CARREFOUR - - Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
KESKO Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  DANONE Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
KONE - Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
KONECRANES - - - - - Negative  ESSILOR - Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
METSO Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  KERING (PPR) Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
METSÄ BOARD Negative Negative Negative Positive Positive Positive  L’OREAL - - Negative Negative Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
NESTE Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  LAFARGEHOLCIM Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
NOKIA Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  LVMH Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Negative  MICHELIN Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
NORDEA BANK Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  ORANGE - - Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
OUTOKUMPU Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  PUBLICIS - - Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
OUTOTEC Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  SAINT-GOBAIN Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
STORA ENSO Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Pos. / Neg.  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Negative Negative Negative Negative Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
TELIA COMPANY - - Negative Negative Negative Negative  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Negative Negative Negative 
TIETO Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  TOTAL - Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
UPM-KYMMENE - Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
WÄRTSILÄ Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative  VINCI Negative Negative Negative Negative Pos. / Neg. Pos. / Neg. 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
               
CONCLUSION 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  CONCLUSION 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
               
FORM 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FORM 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NEGATIVE 100 % 100 % 100 % 94 % 94 % 95 %  NEGATIVE 94 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
POSITIVE 0 % 0 % 0 % 6 % 6 % 10 %  POSITIVE 19 % 11 % 21 % 20 % 32 % 32 % 
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Appendix T: Is additional commentary included? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes No No No  ARCELOR MITTAL Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) No No 
FORTUM Yes (AA) Yes Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA No No No Yes No No  CARREFOUR - - Yes No No No 
KESKO Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA)  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - No No No No No  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
METSO No No No No No Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD Yes No Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA)  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA)  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes (AA) Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No Yes Yes Yes No 
STORA ENSO Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA) Yes (AA)  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ No No No No No No  VINCI Yes Yes Yes No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
               
COMMENTARY 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  COMMENTARY 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 71 % 63 % 65 % 65 % 59 % 65 %  YES 81 % 78 % 75 % 60 % 52 % 32 % 
NO 29 % 38 % 35 % 35 % 41 % 35 %  NO 19 % 22 % 25 % 40 % 48 % 68 % 
               
AA = AA1000APS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  AA = AA1000APS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 36 % 31 % 41 % 41 % 41 % 20 %  YES 6 % 6 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
NO 64 % 69 % 59 % 59 % 59 % 80 %  NO 94 % 94 % 96 % 96 % 100 % 100 % 
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Appendix U: What is the heading of the assurance report? (1/4) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 
AMER SPORTS - - - 
CARGOTEC - - - 
ELISA Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
FORTUM Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - 
KEMIRA Independent Assurance Report Independent Limited Assurance Report Independent Limited Assurance Report 
KESKO Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
KONE - Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
KONECRANES - - - 
METSO Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
METSÄ BOARD Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Statement 
NESTE Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
NOKIA Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Verification Statement 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - 
NORDEA BANK Auditor's Review Report Auditor's Review Report Auditor's Review Report 
ORION - - - 
OUTOKUMPU Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
OUTOTEC Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
SAMPO - - - 
STORA ENSO Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement 
TELIA COMPANY - - Auditor's Report 
TIETO Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement 
UPM-KYMMENE - Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
WÄRTSILÄ Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
YIT - - - 
    
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT HEADINGS 3 4 6 
INDEPENDENCE NDICATED 93 % 94 % 88 % 
MOST COMMON HEADING TYPE Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
USAGE OF MOST COMMON TYPE, % 71 % 81 % 65 % 
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Appendix U: What is the heading of the assurance report? (2/4) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 
AMER SPORTS - - - 
CARGOTEC - - Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
ELISA Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
FORTUM Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report - 
HUHTAMÄKI - - Independent Limited Assurance Report 
KEMIRA Independent Limited Assurance Report Independent Limited Assurance Report Independent Limited Assurance Report 
KESKO Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
KONE Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Statement 
KONECRANES - - Independent Assurance Statement 
METSO Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
METSÄ BOARD Independent Expert Review Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement 
NESTE Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
NOKIA Independent Verifier's Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
NOKIAN TYRES - - Independent Assurance Report 
NORDEA BANK Auditor's Limited Assurance Report Auditor's Limited Assurance Report Independent Auditor’s Limited Assurance Report 
ORION - - - 
OUTOKUMPU Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
OUTOTEC Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
SAMPO - - - 
STORA ENSO Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement 
TELIA COMPANY Auditor's Limited Assurance Report Auditor's Limited Assurance Report Auditor's Limited Assurance Report 
TIETO Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Report 
UPM-KYMMENE Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Practitioner's Assurance Report 
WÄRTSILÄ Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
YIT - - - 
    
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT HEADINGS 6 4 6 
INDEPENDENCE NDICATED 88 % 88 % 95 % 
MOST COMMON HEADING TYPE Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
USAGE OF MOST COMMON TYPE, % 76 % 82 % 80 % 
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Appendix U: What is the heading of the assurance report? (3/4) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 
AIR LIQUIDE Statutory Auditors' Limited Assurance Report Statutory Auditors' Limited Assurance Report Independent verifier’s attestation and assurance report 
AIRBUS (EADS) Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
ARCELOR MITTAL Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Statement 
AXA - - Attestation of completeness and limited assurance report 
BNP PARIBAS - - Limited Assurance Report 
CARREFOUR - - Assurance report of one of the Statutory Auditors 
DANONE Limited Assurance Report Limited Level of Assurance Report Statutory Auditor's Attestation and Limited Assurance Report 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Attestation of Completeness and Limited Assurance Report 
ESSILOR - Report Expressing Reasonable Assurance Reporting certificate and report of assurance 
KERING (PPR) Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditors’ Limited Assurance Report Statutory auditors’ limited assurance report 
L’OREAL - - Attestation of completeness and limited assurance report 
LAFARGEHOLCIM Statutory Auditor's Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
LVMH Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Limited Assurance Report / Assurance Report 
MICHELIN Review Report from one of the Statutory Auditors Review Report from one of the Statutory Auditors Attestation and assurance report of one of the Statutory Auditors 
ORANGE - - Attestation of Completeness and Assurance Report 
PERNOD RICARD Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report 
PUBLICIS - - Certification and Substantiated Recommendation 
SAINT-GOBAIN Statutory Auditor's Review Report Statutory Auditor's Review Report Statutory Auditor's Review Report 
SANOFI Statutory Auditor's Review Report Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report Independent verifier’s attestation and limited assurance report 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - 
TOTAL - Third Parties Assurance Reports Third Party Assurance Report 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Statutory Auditor's Report Limited Assurance Report Independent verifier’s attestation and limited assurance report 
VINCI Report of the Statutory Auditors Report of the Statutory Auditors Report of the Statutory Auditors 
VIVENDI External Auditor’s Report External Auditor’s Report Attestation and Limited Assurance Report 
    
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT HEADINGS 10 14 20 
INDEPENDENCE NDICATED 13 % 17 % 25 % 
MOST COMMON HEADING TYPE Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report Limited Assurance Report 
USAGE OF MOST COMMON TYPE, % 75 % 56 % 71 % 
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Appendix U: What is the heading of the assurance report? (4/4) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 
AIR LIQUIDE Statutory Auditor's Report Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report 
AIRBUS (EADS) Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
ARCELOR MITTAL Independent Assurance Statement Independent Assurance Report Independent Assurance Report 
AXA Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
BNP PARIBAS Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
CARREFOUR Report by an independent third party Report by an independent third party Report by an independent third party 
DANONE Statutory Auditor's Report Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Independent Verifier’s Report 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Report of the statutory auditor Report of one of the statutory auditors Report of one statutory auditor 
ESSILOR Independent Third-Party Report Independent Third-Party Report Assurance Report by the Appointed Independent Third-Party 
KERING (PPR) Report of the Statutory Auditors Report of one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
L’OREAL Report of the Statutory Auditors Report of one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
LAFARGEHOLCIM Verification Report Verification Report Independent Assurance Report 
LVMH Limited Assurance Report / Assurance Report Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report 
MICHELIN Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Assurance Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
ORANGE Report of the statutory auditor Report of one of the Statutory Auditors Assurance Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
PERNOD RICARD Report of one of the Statutory Auditors Report of one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
PUBLICIS External Independent Auditors' Audit Report Independent Verification Statement Independent Verification Statement 
SAINT-GOBAIN Statutory Auditor's Review Report Report by one of the Statutory Auditors Report by one of the Statutory Auditors 
SANOFI Statutory Auditor's Report Independent Verifier's Report Statutory Auditor's Report 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE Independent Verifier’s Attestation and Assurance Report Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report 
TOTAL Independent Verifier's Report Independent Verifier's Report Independent Verifier’s Report 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report Independent Verifier’s Report 
VINCI Report of the Statutory Auditors Report of the independent third-party body Report of the independent third-party body 
VIVENDI Independent Statutory Auditors’ Report Independent Statutory Auditors’ Report Independent Statutory Auditors’ Report 
    
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT HEADINGS 16 11 10 
INDEPENDENCE NDICATED 40 % 56 % 60 % 
MOST COMMON HEADING TYPE Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report Statutory Auditor's Report 
USAGE OF MOST COMMON TYPE, % 56 % 44 % 44 % 
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Appendix V: Who is the addressee? (1/2) 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - - 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Management 
ELISA Management Management Management Management Management Management 
FORTUM Management Management Management Management Management - 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Management 
KEMIRA Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors 
KESKO Management Management Management Management Management Management 
KONE - Management Management Management Management Management & Stakeholders 
KONECRANES - - - - - Management 
METSO Management Management Management Management Management Management 
METSÄ BOARD Management Management Management & Stakeholders Management & Stakeholders Management & Stakeholders Management & Stakeholders 
NESTE Management Management Management Management Management Management 
NOKIA Management Management Management Management Management Management 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Management 
NORDEA BANK Readers of the report Readers of the report Readers of the report Readers of the report Nordea AB Nordea AB 
ORION - - - - - - 
OUTOKUMPU Management Management Management Management Management Management 
OUTOTEC Management Management Management Management Management Management 
SAMPO - - - - - - 
STORA ENSO Management & Stakeholders Management & Stakeholders Management & Stakeholders Management & Stakeholders Management Management 
TELIA COMPANY - - Readers of the report Readers of the report TeliaSonera AB TeliaSonera AB 
TIETO No one No one No one No one No one Management 
UPM-KYMMENE - Management Management Management Management Management 
WÄRTSILÄ Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors Board of Directors 
YIT - - - - - - 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SOMEONE 93 % 94 % 94 % 94 % 94 % 100 % 
MANAGEMENT 71 % 75 % 71 % 71 % 71 % 80 % 
SHAREHOLDERS 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
STAKEHOLDERS 7 % 6 % 12 % 12 % 6 % 10 % 
OTHER 14 % 13 % 12 % 12 % 18 % 10 % 
NO ONE 7 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 0 % 
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Appendix V: Who is the addressee? (2/2) 
FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AIR LIQUIDE No one No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
AIRBUS (EADS) No one No one No one No one No one No one 
ARCELOR MITTAL Stakeholders No one No one No one No one No one 
AXA - - No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
BNP PARIBAS - - No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
CARREFOUR - - No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
DANONE No one No one Executive Board Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No one No one Executive Management Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
ESSILOR - No one Senior Management Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
KERING (PPR) No one No one Group Management Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
L’OREAL - - No one No one Shareholders Shareholders 
LAFARGEHOLCIM No one Shareholders No one No one No one Executive Committee 
LVMH Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
MICHELIN No one No one No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
ORANGE - - Executive Management Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
PERNOD RICARD No one No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
PUBLICIS - - No one No one No one No one 
SAINT-GOBAIN No one No one No one No one Shareholders Shareholders 
SANOFI No one No one Senior Management Shareholders Managing Director No one 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Sir or Madam Shareholders Board of Directors Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - General Management Shareholders Shareholders 
TOTAL - Shareholders Executive Board Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No one No one Executive Board Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
VINCI No one No one No one Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
VIVENDI No one No one Management Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders 
       
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SOMEONE 19 % 22 % 54 % 76 % 84 % 84 % 
MANAGEMENT 0 % 0 % 25 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
SHAREHOLDERS 6 % 22 % 13 % 72 % 80 % 80 % 
STAKEHOLDERS 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
OTHER 6 % 0 % 17 % 0 % 4 % 4 % 
NO ONE 81 % 78 % 46 % 24 % 16 % 16 % 
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Appendix W: Are the users of the report explicitly identified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE No No No No No No 
CARGOTEC - - - - - No  AIRBUS (EADS) No No No No No No 
ELISA No No No No No No  ARCELOR MITTAL No No No No No No 
FORTUM No No No No No -  AXA - - No No No No 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - No  BNP PARIBAS - - No No No No 
KEMIRA No No No No No No  CARREFOUR - - No No No No 
KESKO No No No No No No  DANONE No No No No No No 
KONE - No No No No No  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No No No No No No 
KONECRANES - - - - - No  ESSILOR - No No No No No 
METSO No No No No No No  KERING (PPR) No No No No No No 
METSÄ BOARD No No No No No No  L’OREAL - - No No No No 
NESTE No No No No No No  LAFARGEHOLCIM No No No No No No 
NOKIA No No No No No No  LVMH No No No No No No 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No  MICHELIN No No No No No No 
NORDEA BANK No No No No No No  ORANGE - - No No No No 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No No No No No No 
OUTOKUMPU No No No No No No  PUBLICIS - - No No No No 
OUTOTEC No No No No No No  SAINT-GOBAIN No No No No No No 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No No No No No No 
STORA ENSO No No No No No No  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC No No No No No No 
TELIA COMPANY - - No No No No  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No No No 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  TOTAL - No No No No No 
UPM-KYMMENE - No No No No No  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No No No No No No 
WÄRTSILÄ No No No No No No  VINCI No No No No No No 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No No No No No No 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 7 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 0 %  YES 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
NO 93 % 94 % 94 % 94 % 94 % 100 %  NO 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
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Appendix X: Does the report consist of several sections? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix Y: Is the report formally signed by the assuror? / Is the responsible assuror(s) identified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
CARGOTEC - - - - - No (ID)  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  ARCELOR MITTAL No No No No No (ID) Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes No (ID) No (ID) -  AXA - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
KEMIRA No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) Yes No (ID) No (ID)  CARREFOUR - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
KESKO Yes Yes No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  DANONE No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
KONE - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
METSO No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  KERING (PPR) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
METSÄ BOARD No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) Yes  L’OREAL - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
NESTE Yes No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  LAFARGEHOLCIM No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
NOKIA Yes Yes No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  LVMH No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - No (ID)  MICHELIN No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
NORDEA BANK No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) Yes Yes  ORANGE - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  PUBLICIS - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes No (ID) Yes No (ID) No (ID) 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
TELIA COMPANY - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No (ID)  TOTAL - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
UPM-KYMMENE - No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
WÄRTSILÄ No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID)  VINCI No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) No (ID) 
               
SIGNATURE / ID 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  SIGNATURE / ID 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 64 % 50 % 35 % 24 % 24 % 35 %  YES 13 % 11 % 0 % 4 % 0 % 4 % 
NO / ID 36 % 50 % 65 % 76 % 76 % 65 %  NO / ID 81 % 83 % 96 % 92 % 100 % 96 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  NO 6 % 6 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
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Appendix Z: Is the report date and assuror’s location specified? 
FINLAND 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  FRANCE 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AMER SPORTS - - - - - -  AIR LIQUIDE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CARGOTEC - - - - - Yes  AIRBUS (EADS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ELISA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ARCELOR MITTAL No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FORTUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -  AXA - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HUHTAMÄKI - - - - - Yes  BNP PARIBAS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KEMIRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  CARREFOUR - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KESKO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  DANONE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ENGIE (GDF SUEZ) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KONECRANES - - - - - Yes  ESSILOR - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  KERING (PPR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
METSÄ BOARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  L’OREAL - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NESTE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LAFARGEHOLCIM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  LVMH Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOKIAN TYRES - - - - - Yes  MICHELIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NORDEA BANK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ORANGE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ORION - - - - - -  PERNOD RICARD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOKUMPU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  PUBLICIS - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OUTOTEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SAINT-GOBAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SAMPO - - - - - -  SANOFI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
STORA ENSO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TELIA COMPANY - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE - - - Yes Yes Yes 
TIETO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  TOTAL - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UPM-KYMMENE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WÄRTSILÄ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  VINCI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YIT - - - - - -  VIVENDI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  TOTAL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  YES 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %  NO 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
 
